Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

231. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, June 13, 1961, 8 p.m.

1798. Embtels 1771,¹ 1764.² My recent conversations with ROKG leaders and trend of events here lead me to certain tentative conclusions and policy implications which will have, of course, to be tested against future developments.

A. Conclusions:

(1) Junta has no intention of relinquishing power to civilian authority for long time—perhaps years. Moreover, deeply distrustful of civilians and bent on achieving its aims by rigidly enforced national discipline, junta members are unwilling at present, despite yesterday’s regimented “citizens rally” (Embtel 1786),³ to undertake any real broadening of government’s base by bringing civilian leaders into authoritative positions. In refusing make such concessions they not only disregard our urging but put themselves in position of opposition to main stream Korean public thought which, as near as we can judge, desires fairly early return civil authority or, at minimum, establishment of target date for such return.

(2) It is still unclear where new regime is moving. Junta indicates its intention eradicating communism, corruption and social evils, but it may well pursue these worthy objectives by self-defeating means. Excessively narrow, repressive, end-justifies-means tactics will weaken Korea’s capability to cope with the fundamental problems of instability, mutual distrust, poverty, backwardness, surplus population and under-employment. Junta seems poorly organized at present in terms of structure as well as competency of military to deal with nation’s staggering economic problems despite plain evidence that economic disorder is principal cause of political instability here.

(3) Divisions among junta members and within ROK military may become accentuated in months ahead. In absence single strong leader commanding national respect, factionalism and old loyalties, as well as basic differences in outlook between senior and junior officers, will be all the greater obstacles to cohesive operations by junta. Continuation of junta as now constituted is not assured and, particularly, General Chang Do-young’s future is insecure. So far junta has been engaged in denouncing and tearing down the old order, but it now faces the far more difficult job of constructing a viable social-political order, advancing the national economy and ensuring stability. Difficulties of this task will impose new and greater strains on the group holding power.

(4) Junta outwardly appears confident that US gives and will give it full support, and indeed increased economic aid, as long as junta demonstrates it is clearly anti-Communist. Up to present, junta’s principal argument for full or increased US support, usually made in private conversations, is that this will help put government in strong position from which it (especially younger military officers will feel they) can afford be less repressive and more attentive to broadening base of government. In absence full support and assistance in future, however, junta will seek to intimidate us into giving such support on grounds that only alternative to continuation of junta is a Communist takeover.

B. Policy Implications:

I believe that we should continue along general policy lines which we have pursued over past several weeks. Although many of our counsels seem to have been ignored, I nevertheless feel that our efforts have not been all in vain. We have undoubtedly averted perpetrations of greater excesses by regime. Moreover, US press and Congressional reactions have not gone unnoticed, and ROKG leaders are acutely aware of necessity for continued military and economic aid from us. Despite surface appearances, junta is probably far from feeling secure. In final analysis this uncertainty is probably our most useful short-range means of preventing regime from riding roughshod over Korean people and of moving it in direction of positive program for coping with national problems which could enlist true public support at home and abroad. Under these conditions, a position of friendly reserve is infinitely preferable to expressions of complete confidence and support which reduce our ability to influence situation and, in event regime becomes dangerously repressive and discredited with people, would resound only to advantage of the ever-ready Communists and to permanent detriment of US standing with the Korean people.

US friendship and prestige in Korea should not stand or fall with this present regime. Our time-tested friends in Korea are still the Korean people, not necessarily those few who arrogate power to speak for them, who may be corrupted by the power they too long wield, and who may fail to hold this nation’s confidence and support.

Green

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/6-1361. Confidential. Repeated to Tokyo, CINCPAC for POLAD, Taipei, Manila, Canberra, and London.
1. In telegram 1771 from Seoul, June 11, Green reported an hour-long conversation he had with the Chairman of the SCNR, General Chang To-yong (Chang Do Young), which covered the spectrum of U.S.-Korea issues, with the exception of a possible visit by Chang To-yong to the United States. (Ibid., 611.95B/6-1161)
2. In telegram 1764 from Seoul, June 9, Green reported on his hour-long conversation with Major General Pak Chung-hui. During this meeting Green made five specific points to Pak Chung-hui as instructed in telegram 1465 to Seoul, June 8. They were that the United States considered the SCNR the established government; it welcomed the SCNR’s stated objectives; it hoped for a “fruitful relationship,” which would serve the Korean people and U.S. interests; it hoped the SCNR would move forward with economic reforms; and it welcomed the reaffirmation of CINCUNC operational control of ROK Armed Forces. (Ibid., 795B.00/6-961 and 611.95B/6-861, respectively)
3. Dated June 12. (Ibid., 795B.00/6-1261)