Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

230. Record of National Security Council Action No. 2430⁰

Washington, June 13, 1961.

Korea (NSC Action No. 2421;¹SNIE 42-2-61;² Report of the Task Force on Korea, dated June 5, 1961³)

a. Discussed the Report of the Task Force on Korea and concurred in the following recommendations:

U.S. Actions to be Undertaken Immediately

1. The new U.S. Ambassador to Korea should undertake early discussions with the appropriate leaders of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction along the lines described in paragraphs a⁴ and c through e⁵ (pp. 5-6) of the report.

2. With reference to paragraph b (p. 5),⁶ in these early discussions and subsequently the Ambassador should seek to create a gradual recognition among the leaders of the Supreme Council that it is in their interest and in the interest of their country that they from time to time publicly reaffirm their intention eventually to restore representative government and constitutional liberties; and that failure over the long run to demonstrate their good faith in this matter will compromise them in the eyes of the people of the United States and other Free World countries and in the United Nations.

3. The Ambassador is authorized to invite the Chief of Government to Washington for an informal visit including conferences with the President and the Secretary of State.

4. Provided assurances are given in respect to the matters to be discussed under 1 and 2 above and that the Korean Government undertakes actions immediately with respect to certain essential reforms, including the completion of fiscal, foreign exchange and stabilization reforms, the rationalization of the corporate structure and rates in the power and transportation industries, and the bringing into production of certain factories already built; and provided the Ambassador is satisfied with evidences of Korean willingness and capacity to carry out mutually agreed plans and programs, then the Ambassador is authorized:

(a) to indicate U.S. willingness to release approximately $28 million in remaining defense support funds for FY 1961;

(b) to state that the United States is willing to enter into agreed commitments for specific projects for expansion of the power industry, immediately upon appropriation of funds;

(c) to indicate U.S. willingness to support through U.S. aid the expansion and intensification of the National Construction Service on a long-term basis;

(d) to offer technical experts to assist the Korean Government in preparation of its Five-Year Development Plan; and

(e) to state that, provided substantial progress is made in the next few months, the United States will be prepared to provide resources to the Korean Government to help carry out a Five-Year Development Plan. As a long-term policy, U.S. influence should be reinforced by making economic development assistance (as distinguished from supporting assistance) available in increments which can be withheld in the event of Korean failure to carry out agreed programs.

5. The Director of the International Cooperation Administration should take immediate measures to improve the administration of the United States Operations Mission in Korea, including action to concentrate the U.S. effort on the most essential projects and to reduce or eliminate others.

Subsequent U.S. Actions

6. Upon a determination of the Secretary of State that the Korean Government is sufficiently stable and cooperative to justify provision of long-range development assistance to it, the actions specified in paragraphs a through d⁷ (pp. 7-8) should be taken, including the appointment of a Special Envoy of the highest stature to visit Korea at a time recommended by the Ambassador. The Envoy will be accompanied by a group of economic advisers to perform functions along the lines of those described in Appendix A to the report, including assistance in the definition of Korean economic goals. While the Koreans must establish and take responsibility for their own goals, the United States can, having defined its goals, help advise the Koreans toward goals that are realistic and consistent with our own. The economic goals which the United States should seek to achieve in Korea include: (1) reversal of the present downward trend in the rate of economic growth and establishment of a specific target of an average annual growth rate for the first five-year plan (rate in 1960: 2.3 per cent); (2) reduction of the present unemployment and underemployment rate (estimated at 35 per cent); (3) increase in average real farm income; and (4) consistent with (1)-(3) above, reduction of the present wide gap between imports and exports ($30 million v. $345 million) in a staged progression toward an eventual balance in Korea’s international accounts.

7. Subject to concrete action by the Korean Government to increase electric power rates, consolidate the power companies and eliminate power losses, announce U.S. willingness to provide, subject to Congressional appropriation, the external resources required to carry out an agreed five-year plan of electric power development. In addition announce that Korean power requirements for the next ten years will be further reviewed and the level of U.S. support re-examined following development of an adequate Korean Five-Year Development Plan.

8. The Secretaries of State and Defense should conduct an urgent review of the force and equipment levels of Korean Armed Forces, including in the first instance a military assessment of (a) the missions of these forces, in the context of overall U.S. Far East strategy and in the light of the Communist threat and of the anticipated deployment and use of U. S. forces; and (b) the strategic implications of alternative force and equipment structures, including the adequacy of the existing level of forces. Such a military assessment should then be keyed to political and economic factors, to produce a recommendation for long-term force goals and for immediate actions, as necessary and practical, to move toward these goals. This review should be completed in time for use as a basis for allocation of FY 1962 military assistance funds.

9. U.S. military personnel should be directed to encourage and support greater participation by Korean armed forces in the work of the National Construction Service and in other appropriate civil works projects. The review referred to in 8 above should also include the preparation, and the assessment of the economic and military implications, of a program to place far greater stress than heretofore on the training of Korean military personnel in skills and vocations which will permit them to make a greater contribution to the development of Korean infrastructure and the civilian economy.

10. The improvement of Japanese-ROK relations, along the lines called for in paragraph f (p. 9),⁸ should be discussed with the Japanese Prime Minister during his visit to Washington and should be urged upon the new regime in Korea. (It is recognized that this is an extremely sensitive issue with the present ROK regime.)

11. The Director of the U.S. Information Agency should arrange for USIS to assist the Korean Government, as may be appropriate, in defining and propagating national ideals and goals and in improving the Korean image abroad.

Required Korean Actions

12. The following basic requirements must be pressed upon the Koreans from the outset if they are to achieve meaningful progress and to make profitable use of U.S. development assistance:

(a) Formulation and implementation of a National Development Plan, with short-range, measurable elements susceptible of prompt fulfillment; and in conjunction therewith, undertaking long-range social planning including definition and public promulgation by national leaders of national goals and ideals; reform of civil service and police (including salary increases); achievement of better relations with students, intellectuals, and the press; and enhancement of Korea’s national image;

(b) Consideration of the preconditions for the eventual return to civilian rule;

(c) Assurances that the new regime does not interfere with CINC-UNC in the discharge of its military responsibilities;

(d) Endorsement by deed and word of the constitutional freedoms of individuals to the maximum extent consistent with the emergency nature of the government, and avoidance of promiscuous abuse of power, ex post facto laws, blood-purges, or other excesses;

(e) Protection of the rural population against the exorbitant interest rates of the money-lenders; and

(f) Formulating and implementing a thorough anticorruption program along the lines outlined in Appendix B to the report.

b. Agreed that NSC 6018/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Korea”, is no longer applicable.⁹

c. Noted that the Task Force would remain in being for such follow-through action on the above directives as its Chairman deems appropriate.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meeting No. 485. Secret. This NSC action was taken at the 485th meeting of the Council on June 13 and approved by the President that same day. NSC Action No. 2429 was taken at the same meeting.
1. See Document 212.
2. Document 224.
3. See the source note, Document 225.
4. Paragraph a on page 5 of the report reads: “To inform them that the U.S. is prepared to deal on a friendly and cooperative basis with the new regime;”.
5. Paragraphs c-e on pages 5-6 of the report read: “c. To affirm the intention of the U.S. to continue supporting assistance to the civilian economy and defense establishment; d. To make clear that the higher levels of assistance to support a National Development Plan will be provided only as the Korean Government enters into and carries out firm and specific commitments of reform, including certain reforms which have been under consideration for a long time. In this connection, the U.S. is prepared to offer technical and managerial experts to the Supreme Council; e. To obtain renewed assurance that the SCNR will recognize the authority of CINCUNC to exercise operational control over Korean Armed Forces, as a constituent element of the UN Command.”
6. Paragraph b on page 5 of the report reads: “To impress upon them that it is in their own national interest that the Supreme Council publicly and repeatedly affirm its adherence to the principle of representative government and constitutional liberties and its intention to restore these at the earliest possible time; and that the failure to demonstrate their good faith in this matter will ultimately compromise them in the eyes of the United States, and in the forum of the United Nations.”
7. Paragraphs a-d on pages 7-8 of the report read: “a. Authorize the Secretary of State to determine when the Korean Government is sufficiently stable and cooperative to justify long-range development assistance; b. Upon such finding, and at a time recommended by the Ambassador, appoint a Special Envoy of the highest stature to visit Korea. This envoy would be accompanied by a group of economic advisers and would carry out the terms of reference set forth in Appendix A. c. Announce, on the recommendation of the Special Envoy and the Ambassador, the readiness of the U.S. to make available, in concert with other nations of the Free World, external resources to support a Korean Five-Year National Development Plan; d. Authorize the Secretary of State to explore with nations most likely to make a contribution to Korean developments (e.g. Japan and Germany), their willingness to contribute to such a program.”
8. Paragraph f on page 9 of the report reads: “Discuss with the Japanese Prime Minister during his forthcoming visit, the U.S. planning for Korea and the ways in which economic and political differences between Korea and Japan can be bridged, despite recent changes of government. It should be understood that while the U.S. will not participate actively in negotiations, it should be prepared to act as a catalyst in seeking a settlement. The Prime Minister should be encouraged to continue efforts recently begun to develop Japanese trade with Korea, and to provide economic assistance for Korean development coordinated with American programs. It should be made clear that Japanese settlement of GARIOA is not to be related to U.S. and Japanese aid to Korea. (The U.S. should also urge the SCNR to be responsive to Japanese overtures.)”
9. NSC 6018 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. XVIII, pp. 699-707.