Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

90. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 62-63

Washington, November 27, 1963

ALGERIA

Conclusions

A. The sum of the political and economic difficulties facing Algeria make the achievement of real political stability an uncertain prospect for some time to come. For the present, however, Ben Bella clearly remains the political personality with the widest popular appeal and he appears to have a fairly firm grip on such governmental institutions as exist in Algeria. His recent negotiations with the Kayble dissidents and other opponents seem likely to contain further threats of armed revolt for the time being. Over time, the greatest danger to him would arise from an erosion of his popular support as a consequence of continued economic misery or of military reverses on the Moroccan border conflict. (Paras 29-36)

B. No early improvement in the country’s serious economic condition is likely. European colonization gave independent Algeria an impressive physical plant in terms of industries and transportation links, but the exodus left it with only a tiny fragment of trained people necessary to run it. At best, Algeria will probably make only modest progress in putting idle industrial capacity to work, with the result that massive unemployment will continue for some time to plague the three million Algerians in the cities. We think it likley that the nationalized agricultural properties will experience considerable trouble in maintaining a minimum level of subsistence in rural areas. However, Algeria will need to import food for many years to come. (Paras. 2-4, 24-28)

C. For a number of years foreign aid will play a critical role in keeping Algeria from financial collapse and in feeding the country. France will almost certainly continue to provide a substantial level of developmental and budgetary assistance for at least the next two years or so. Nevertheless, the Franco-Algerian relationship will be delicate and there will almost certainly be strains, perhaps arising from the use of the Saharan test sites or disagreements over oil revenues, which could threaten the flow of French aid. (Paras. 21, 46-48)

D. In the absence of a Franco-Algerian rupture, the Soviet Union is unlikely to play a major role in Algeria. If relations with France deteriorate, Algiers would probably try to obtain more aid from both the US and the Soviet Bloc. Under present circumstances, the Soviets seem to realize that they cannot compete with France and are content to establish a presence, get into the military field where possible, and take advantage of any opportunities which may occur. (Paras. 44-45, 49)

E. Algeria’s general foreign policy will continue to be governed by the desire of its leaders to align themselves broadly with the neutralist bloc and to oppose “imperialism”. This general attitude will from time to time bring frictions not only with France but with the US and other Western Powers as well. One major source of such frictions will be Algeria’s effort to play a prominent role in encouraging revolutionary independ-ence movements in Africa, a policy to which the regime seems fairly well committed. Links to the eastern Arab world are unlikely to be of major importance to Algeria’s policy, but Ben Bella will probably continue to look to Cairo for assistance and will cooperate with Nasser on an ad hoc basis. (Paras. 37, 42-43, 49)

F. Prospects for a final settlement of the Moroccan border conflict are not promising. Incidents in the disputed border areas are likely to be endemic and could lead to outbreaks of larger scale fighting. If this occurs or if an arms buildup continues because no political settlement can be reached, there may be increasing pressure on the great powers to declare themselves and to give material support. On the whole, however, we believe that if the US preserves a generally neutral stance the USSR will be disposed to limit its intervention. The effort of the other African states to find a solution through the Organization for African Unity (OAU) will also help to insulate the struggle from the wider issues of the cold war. (Paras. 40-41)

[Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 242. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 27 except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.