Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria⁰

Washington, November 8, 1963, 8:59 p.m.

1009. Following summary of Yazid conversation with President today is uncleared summary, FYI only, Noforn and subject to revision on review of memcon.¹

1. Yazid message from Ben Bella was expression GOA appreciation for US position Algerian-Moroccan conflict including both neutrality and indication that US favored solution in African framework.

2. In response Yazid statement that anti-Algerian tenor US press had caused concern in early stages, President countered strongly with point that anyone with real knowledge US press could never have drawn conclusion that it reflected official opinion this administration. Our official position had been made clear to GOA and this was what counted. He expressed annoyance over fact that our efforts correct false Christian Science Monitor story were never followed up by commensurate efforts Algeria and Algerian press to set record straight.

3. President then turned vigorously to subject of Cuba. He said he really disturbed by persistent Algerian attacks on United States over Cuba in such statements as those to Le Monde by Ben Bella (Algiers 994)² which he read to Yazid and in treating his friend Senator Mansfield lightly last July while Che Guevara singled out for all honors. He saw no reason for this continued Algerian excitement over Cuba. We would not attack Cuba and less concerned what system it adopted internally. But Cuba had become part of international communist network threatening weaker Latin American states, and with Soviet missiles had presented direct threat to US security. In these respects Castro was our enemy not just a fetish of some Americans. Until gravity of this fully understood, Cuba would continue present real problem US-Algerian understanding. Castro’s early revolutionary exploits were impressive and it understandable they had certain appeal to Algerian revolutionaries. But Cuba had lost national identity and integrity and now using dictatorial controls and propaganda to keep up front. President returned repeatedly to Cuban theme and cited quotes from Algiers 994 several times.

4. Yazid said he understood US concern and that Ben Bella and GOA had sought make clear that Algeria neither Marxist nor Communist and believed Cuba wrong in this regard.GOA had sought avoid resorting to arms procurement from Cuba and had done so only because of urgent need more equipment than UAR could readily supply and desire avoid alternative of having to import many Soviet technicians and maintenance crews. Ben Bella determined keep Communism out of Algeria and Africa. He was devout Moslem with political power based on peasantry. Despite difficulties Algeria determined follow own national course and own socialist goals. In relations with Cuba it had sought convince Castro become non-aligned.

5. President said he wished talk frankly on these points for benefit good US-Algerian relations. Our interests North Africa only see progress of countries and maintenance their independence. On this basis good relations possible. But while we sought no praise, we felt greater recognition deserved for fact US had clearly demonstrated its friendship for Algeria. Reciprocal basis for conducting relations and expression of official views one another was most important. Frank talks with Algerian Ambassador always welcome and Ben Bella should not hesitate use him rather than other channels like Tito whenever doubt exists about our policy.

6. Yazid said OAU FonMins meeting should serve to “freeze situation” and prevent further fighting while solution to basic dispute being sought. GOA still hoped latter could be found in system of joint economic exploitation Tindouf and other border areas. King Hassan probably reluctant be too closely associated Algerian socialist experiment out of anxieties over his own internal problem. Yazid believed ways still could be found establish basis cooperation nonetheless, and convinced both countries better off trying achieve it without big power intervention.

7. President urged importance avoiding continuing arms build-up in Algeria. Morocco would move to match it and regrettable arms race might ensue wasting resources both countries. Expressed interest in knowing just what plans GOA had for military build-up over next twelve months.

8. Yazid said he not military expert, but felt certain Algerian build-up was reasonable effort make up basic deficiencies such equipment as tanks, planes, artillery and transport. Admitted that in addition to UAR as source, some equipment coming from USSR and Cuba as result Algerian military mission visits to both Havana and Moscow. Recognized significance of military build-up problem with regard both economic considerations, which still paramount Algeria, and considerations of involvement other powers. Promised he would stress President’s views to Ben Bella and inform Ambassador Porter in greater detail about extent Algerian intentions military build-up.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Baldwin and Komer, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris, Rabat, Addis Ababa, USUN, and Moscow.
1. Six separate memoranda of this conversation are ibid., POL ALG-US and POL 32-1 ALG-MOR; and ibid., President’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
2. Telegram 994 from Algiers, November 8, reported Ben Bella’s statement to Le Monde that it would be a “cause for despair if Cuban revolution were crushed or smothered because this would signify there is no place in world for justice or liberty.” (Ibid., Central Files, POL ALG-US)