148. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- American Bases in Morocco
PARTICIPANTS
- His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco
- The President
- Mr. Edmund Glenn, Interpreter
The President brought up the subject of the American bases. He mentioned that the U.S. is prepared to withdraw from the three air bases, [Page 225] as this had undoubtedly been communicated to His Majesty by the American Ambassador. We would desire, however, to keep the telecommunications facilities of the Naval base at Kenitra. What are the King’s ideas on the subject?
The King asked what were the President’s proposals.
The President said that we attached a considerable amount of importance to the telecommunications base at Kenitra, as there are no other facilities easily available in that part of the world, and as the installation had been quite costly. There might be a possibility to remove the facilities to Spain, but this would take time and call for special negotiations.
The King said that when he came to the United States in 1960 as head of the Moroccan Delegation to the United Nations, he spent a full day at the Pentagon where he was thoroughly briefed by representatives of American Naval aviation. He was shown also films about the Kenitra facilities and he fully realizes their importance. At the same time, however, an agreement had been reached between the United States Government and his late Majesty, the King’s father, which provided for withdrawal from the bases at the end of 1963. This has a great importance in the eyes of Moroccan public opinion and the King would not wish to appear in any way to have broken an item of his father’s will. This is the problem to which a solution needs to be found.
The President stated that our withdrawal from the three air bases would amount to carrying out the agreement mentioned by the King. As for the Naval facility, some arrangements might be found—for example, in the area of command—which would make American presence at that base less conspicuous, but which would allow us to continue using the facilities for a period of time, until they could be phased out.
The King asked for how long would the U.S. wish to keep its facilities.
The President said for as long as the Moroccans would have us.
The King asked what would be the minimum.
The President suggested that five years might be the minimum. The President further said that an arrangement as to the command structure of the bases might be sought in connection with some economic programs and also with some help to the Moroccan Navy which, although not necessarily directly tied to the Kenitra base, would nevertheless be to the advantage of that Navy.
The King said that while he understood the interest of the United States in that question, what is important in fact are the telecommunications facilities, which are needed by the United States to cover the Atlantic and even part of the Pacific. Under those circumstances, it would be useful to seek some sort of arrangement, if this were to prove possible.
[Page 226]The President said that the King would be seeing the Secretary of State the next day. It is possible that details could be discussed between the Moroccan Ministers and the Secretaries and then be brought up again before the King and the President in the afternoon.
The King asked whether he was going to see Mr. McNamara. According to his schedule, he was to receive the call of the Air Force Secretary, Mr. Zuckert.
The President said that Mr. Gilpatric, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was in the next room and that he was the person from Defense who would be discussing those questions with the Moroccans.
The King said that in this case conversations could take place between Secretary Rusk and Mr. Balafrej on the one hand, and Mr. McNamara and Mr. Ahardane on the other. It would be exceedingly important to keep those conversations secret and for that reason the two negotiating delegations must be kept down in numbers to the strict minimum. These conversations could take place the next day. After that, the King might perhaps give up his trip to Annapolis which had been programmed, and instead make another call on the President to conclude the negotiations carried out by the ministers.
The King wanted to make clear the reasons which led him to this proposal. Since the beginning of his reign, it has always been his policy to be clear, explicit and frank in his relations with the Moroccan people. Any decision arrived at in regard to the bases would have to be placed in a communique. It is extremely important that this communique be drafted in such a manner that the decisions in question do not appear to contradict in any way those reached at an earlier moment.
The President said that these questions could be usefully discussed tomorrow as it had been suggested by the King.
The King said that the President, as a person bearing extremely heavy responsibilities, and as a friend of Morocco, certainly understands that the King would not wish in any way to repudiate any part of his father’s political will. At the same time, schools, equipment, and hospitals certainly will give more food to the Moroccan people than would the evacuation of some telecommunications facilities. This is a policy of realism. Means have to be found, however, to implement it. For example, civilian mixed US-Moroccan corporations might be established for the reconversion of the three air bases. As for the Kenitra base, the Royal Moroccan Army intended to keep it as its own facility in any case. What might be done is to convert it into a school base, in which Moroccan mid-shipmen would receive training from American instructors. It would be necessary to consider it a Moroccan facility under Moroccan command. There exists an air training facility at Marrakech which is under Moroccan command and which flies exclusively the Moroccan flag. The Moroccan command has, however, French assistants who are highly qualified [Page 227] from the technical point of view and thanks to whom the school in question has remained operational and efficient, instead of becoming a museum piece as it might have been without French assistance. Some such arrangement would enable the King to say with clear conscience to his own people and to friendly countries that there are no more strategic bases on Moroccan territory, since three such bases are converted to civilian use and one is converted into a Moroccan training facility.
This, however, is the maximum of what the King can do.
The President said that such an approach appeared fruitful. The details would have to be discussed between the ministers.
The King said that it is essential that the negotiating parties be kept small and tight. The Soviets are certainly interested in what is being discussed between the Moroccans and the Americans. The French are likewise interested, the more so that they were forced to give up Kenitra. “My friend” Nasser likewise is ready to say that Hassan II has sold Moroccan soil for American gold, in spite of the fact that Nasser himself has 500 Soviet technicians on his territory. The King can say with clear conscience that he has not sold any part or parcel of Moroccan territory, but he would not wish to see Moroccan public opinion poisoned by an adverse propaganda. Therefore, the communique must be drafted in such a way as to make it clear that the 1959 agreements on base evacuation continue to hold. As for the details on further cooperation, that might be described in an exchange of letters between the ministers of foreign affairs.
The President asked the King whether other members of the negotiating groups could be brought in. The King suggested that Messrs. Balafrej and Ahardane be brought in from the Moroccan side.
The President suggested that Secretaries Rusk and Gilpatric would be called in on the American side.
After the four secretaries had come in, Mr. Balafrej suggested that Prince Moulay Abdallah also be invited.
The President summed up the decisions taken concerning negotiations for the next day.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Glenn on March 28 and approved by the White House on April 1. The meeting was held at the White House. Documentation on King Hassan’s visit, including memoranda of conversation and substantive correspondence, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2235.↩