Office of the Historian

147. Memorandum for the Record0

Washington, March 26, 1963.

PRESIDENT’S BRIEFING SESSION, 26 MARCH 1963,ON KING HASSAN’S VISIT

PRESENT

  • The President
  • G. Mennen Williams
  • John Ferguson
  • William Witman
  • David Bell
  • Edward Hutchinson
  • William Bundy
  • Frank Sloan
  • R.W. Komer

The President was satisfied in general with the proposed US aid package designed to assure retention of base rights at least at Kenitra, though he was aware that there might be great Moroccan pressure for more than we were prepared to offer.

He also approved the proposed tactics for the visit: (1) during first meeting he would give King Hassan the broad brush treatment on world and African affairs and then discuss our base requirements, mentioning our willingness to give a $5 million navy MAP package in return for Kenitra; (2) Rusk would then make a general aid offer at his meeting the next morning, sticking with the agreed initial position; (3) if the King reacted with shock as expected, the President would then reveal our fallback position in his second meeting with the King Thursday afternoon.

The President asked several questions. He wanted to know why we shouldn’t give jet fighters to the Moroccans. Ambassador Ferguson didn’t think they’d ask for these, but would ask for considerable training. Bill Bundy thought we could give training, but not in jet fighters. Upon the President’s query, Bundy and Williams described the key importance to the navy of the communications installation at Kenitra. The President couldn’t see much use in standby rights at two of the SAC bases. It was explained that these were possible transit alternates to the Azores and Wheelus and that we might have some “emergency” use for them, although this was dubious. It was also brought out that Kenitra in particular, but also the SAC bases, gave us certain leverage in the Spanish base negotiations.

There was considerable discussion of the price we should pay for continued use of bases. Williams and Ferguson pointed out that the King thought he was taking new risks in allowing us to stay longer than specified in the agreement between Eisenhower and Mohammed V; therefore he might want a lot of aid.

[Page 224]

In reply to the President’s query Bill Bundy indicated that DOD was prepared to pick up the tab on bases in general if it were legally feasible, but that Congress was very reluctant to do so. Senator Saltonstall, for example, had objected to the procedure used in the Libyan case. The President also asked how long we want to stay in Kenitra. We would prefer to stay for five years but could live with two years; it was agreed we would not try to tape down a specific time of stay, but would attempt to keep it open-ended beyond two years.1

Ambassador Ferguson emphasized that the King would probably press for an increase in FY 63 aid which wasn’t specified in our package (Morocco was cut from $30 million SA loans in FY ’62 to $20 million in FY ’63.) It was agreed that we would try to avoid giving the Moroccans an opportunity to make a counter-proposal to our aid package, because this would inevitably be considerably higher than we could afford.

R.W. Komer2
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, Hassan Visit. Secret. Drafted by Komer.↩
  2. In a memorandum to President Kennedy on March 26, Komer indicated that Rusk planned to give King Hassan an aide-memoire on base rights before his first meeting with the President, who would thus be relieved of the need to explain what base rights the United States wanted. Komer also noted that the King was so anxious to have this trip appear to be a success that he would try to put a good face on any reasonable aid offer. (Ibid.) The text of the aide-memoire on military base withdrawal is in the Briefing Book for King Hassan’s visit in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2234.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩