144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco0
1809. Joint State-Defense message. This first of three messages relating forthcoming talks with Moroccans re bases and aid for action as indicated and for information and comment. This outlines base requirements. Others relate aid and negotiating tactics.1
Requirements generally in line with discussions Embassy has had previously with GOM. We believe, however, it would be helpful for you to discuss them again with Balafrej so King does not come to Washington with inflated idea of what we will want and base his negotiating position accordingly.
SAC Bases. SAC reflex phasing out June 1963. Major US forces would be withdrawn by the end of 1963. US would assist in conversion of Nouasseur to civil use. In view large U.S. investment and prospective assistance in conversion, we would expect to have USG planes use the field on occasion without charge. FYI. If occasional use without charge accorded US aircraft, USAF could take this benefit into account in determining what US property could be left at Nouasseur, within limitations 1949 Federal Property Act, in connection with conversion program. End FYI.
USAF prepared to retain detachments at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir (not exceeding total 500 personnel; dependents additional) to maintain these facilities on standby basis pending decision by GOM on future use, provided USAF has right to use facilities for weather alternates, communications, transit, and occasional fair weather training. USAF would be prepared to accommodate similar use by Moroccan Air Force.
FYI: Foregoing must be handled very carefully since USAF does not want to be committed to maintain these bases for an indefinite period and wishes leeway to withdraw maintenance detachments if expense does not warrant benefits gained. Further, USAF is not interested in maintaining facilities unless assured of rights outlined above. Level of [Page 220] maintenance by USAF would be limited to that needed for retaining facilities on standby basis and would not involve major repair or replacement. USAF not prepared to maintain bases if Moroccans want more than limited use parallelling that sought by USAF or if bases are to be turned over to Moroccan command under arrangement where USAF would be responsible to Moroccans for upkeep of bases without control over expenditures or base property. Similarly, USAF not prepared to accept establishment of civil enterprises on bases since this would involve increase of USAF expenditures (through providing utility serv-ices, for example) and increased possibility of theft or pilferage US property. USAF interest in continued presence as outlined based on desirability maintaining facilities working order against narrow, unknown future requirements and precluding unfriendly use. End FYI.
Navy Facilities. Navy wishes retain use of outlying communications sites (1000 personnel) and base at Kenitra. Latter, but not communications could be turned over to nominal Moroccan command and used jointly by USN and Moroccan forces, including RMAF. Navy would absorb costs (up to $4 million annually) of operating and maintaining jointly used facility. This would entail initially retaining 1200 USN personnel at Kenitra, of which 400 would be withdrawn as soon as Moroccans were trained and capable of assuming certain responsibilities for maintenance and operation. USN prepared, but reluctant, to agree have personnel in mufti if Moroccans desire. Personnel figures do not include dependents.
FYI. Communications facilities [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are of major importance to US. Facilities at Kenitra [1 line of source text not declassified] also provide logistic support for communications sites. Navy would hope to retain communications and Kenitra facilities for indefinite period. We recognize, however, political obstacles obtaining such indefinite retention and our objective would be to gain at least five-year extension. If this not feasible, we would need two years as minimum period to enable switch to alternate facilities. Minimum of two-year extension would also be helpful in current negotiations with Spain.
You are aware of proposed Naval MAP package, which will be discussed in separate telegram, but do not believe this should be discussed with Moroccans now. We would hope gain full benefit, however, from Navy offer to absorb costs of operating and maintaining jointly used facilities. We expect $4 million would cover costs of operating and maintaining facility even if Moroccans wish to make use of it by stationing Moroccan air transit unit there. Dept has received reports some Moroccans may be thinking in terms certain types flat rental payment. No encouragement should be given such approaches. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Lang (DOD); cleared by Bundy (DOD), Bell (AID), Newman, and Witman; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris for USCINCEUR and London for USNAVEUR.↩
- Telegram 1812, March 5, discussed future U.S. economic and military assistance to Morocco and noted the need to discourage any Moroccan expectations of massive U.S. aid based on an exaggerated estimate of the U.S. need for Moroccan facilities. It stated that the U.S. Government had not yet arrived at a final determination on the level of future aid to Morocco, and asked for the Ambassador’s comments on the minimum price likely to get Moroccan agreement on U.S. base requirements as outlined in telegram 1809. (Ibid.) A third message to Rabat suggested negotiating tactics for Ferguson to use in his discussions with Moroccan officials. (Telegram 1838, March 8; ibid.)↩