143. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)0
Washington,
January 31,
1963.
SUBJECT
- Preparations for King Hassan’s Visit
Hassan’s visit has more potential for trouble than any recent African visit. The President is naturally not anxious to get involved in any more detailed bargaining over “base rights” than is absolutely necessary.1 I realize you’re already hammering out our position, but I thought it worthwhile to highlight some of the points which seem from here to need clarification by, say, the end of February:
- 1.
- Are we fully satisfied that we have our Kenitra needs down to the minimum? Do we still think our naval package is an adequate quid pro quo? Should we have a fallback offer if Hassan ups the ante or says he can’t buy our full proposal?
- 2.
- Exactly what do we mean by “standby status” at Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane? Precisely what rights should we ask the King for, what services will we perform that he might consider helpful, and how many people will we need? Can we dispose of these details before the visit?
- 3.
- How should we handle Nouasseur conversion to a civil airport? Announcement during visit or simply confirm to King that arrangements are well along?
- 4.
- What relative priority do we assign to Kenitra, Ben Guerir, Sidi Slimane, Voice of America station in case these end up competing with each other?
- 5.
- Can we make an honest case for increased development lending to supplant decreasing supporting assistance? If we are going to make this line palatable, we need a realistic idea of what projects may be nearly ready to go. Do we see enough realistic DL possibilities to argue, even among ourselves, that DL will help maintain the aid level required to cover our various interests? How far should we lean in helping the Moroccans to put together reasonable loan applications?
R.W.
Komer2
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Morocco, 333-680.1, 1963. Secret. Also sent to William Bundy, Hutchinson, and Kitchen, with a copy for Witman.↩
- On January 25, President Kennedy sent Ambassador Ferguson a message saying that he hoped to avoid too much personal detailed bargaining on bases and quid pro quos with King Hassan during his visit. He asked Ferguson to tell the King that in order to make his visit more fruitful, Ferguson was to find out from him directly what he wished to discuss. (Telegram 1562 to Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 MOR)↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Komer signed the original.↩