Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, July 29, 1961, 5:34 p.m.

146. For Charge. Deptel 127; Embtel 220.² Agree that Kasavubu’s speech affects Deptel 127. Secretary desires emphasize for your guidance that Gizenga as Prime Minister not only question prestige abroad and reaction at home but involves our most vital interests in Africa and our future ability support UN in such situations. As you are aware from previous instructions, blocking Gizenga from controlling government is a specific object of policy for which your full attention and imaginative effort are required. Secretary considers you are doing excellent job in difficult circumstances but he wanted to underline gravity this matter.

It is apparent that Kasavubu holds the key to our being able to block Gizenga from gaining control of the central government. It appears reasonably clear that Kasavubu realizes as we do that Gizenga as Prime Minister would have disastrous divisive effects on the Congo. It would seem also that Kasavubu’s instincts of self-preservation would re-enforce his reluctance to name Gizenga because he realizes Gizenga’s ultimate goal would be to replace Kasavubu. If the Katangan members of parliament join the session at Lovanium as now appears possible (Deptel 137),³ attaining the goal of blocking Gizenga would appear to be considerably facilitated.

Dept would appreciate soonest your estimate of the likelihood of our having advance warning of any weakening of Kasavubu’s will to resist Gizenga as government leader. It appears essential that we devise now some course of action we could take in this eventuality either to gain more time or to block a Kasavubu capitulation. We would hope courses of action could be found which would preserve the desirable public stance of the Léopoldville leaders regarding a parliamentary solution but wish to consider all feasible courses of action whether or not they meet this important consideration. Would appear that some short lapse of time or the development of an impasse in parliament might render suggestion contained Deptel 127 feasible.

Your suggestions on this matter also requested soonest.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2961. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Vance, cleared by Fredericks and in draft by Cleveland, and approved by Johnson. Repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, and USUN.
2. Documents 87 and 88.
3. Document 89.