342. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
2015. Eyes only Secretary and McGhee. Eyes only Principal Officers. Congo. Stevenson, McGhee and Spaak had two-hour mtg this PM with SYG. Also present were Williams, Yost, Rothschild, Davignon, Loridan, Bunche and Gardiner.
U Thant said he first wished to express his gratitude to Spaak and McGhee for joint statement by President and Spaak2 which he considered very helpful.
Spaak then said he had talked with President and Secretary. Must now begin from starting point that Tshombe’s answer to Gardiner letter Nov 2 [1] not satisfactory.3 Most logical step, one would think, would be proceed with measures outlined in Reconciliation Plan (Courses of Action). However, this policy open to question because it not known what Tshombe reaction would be and where sanctions would lead. Two measures, therefore, have been considered. First, sending tripartite team to Leoville and Eville. However, had discussed situation yesterday with US and felt SYG had reservations, would consent to mission but [Page 694] would not sponsor it. US and Belgium had therefore reconsidered in view difficulties measure would present both for selves and SYG. Moreover, would be difficult to achieve and time-consuming. Therefore, had decided that second proposal, which he had mentioned to SYG Nov 26, would be preferable. It would be better for SYG keep leadership of operation, decide on steps and not give this role to US and GOB. US and Belgium thought it would be desirable for SYG to invite Adoula to New York to discuss reintegration problem. At same time, SYG could call upon US, GOB and UK to send reps to New York at Ministerial level. After this first stage, SYG would call Tshombe to New York and all those who had agreed on desirable steps would pressure Tshombe accept agreed measures. Tshombe would be told of plan have UMHK pay foreign exchange and taxes direct to GOC and it would be demonstrated to him how other measures would be carried out. US could tell Tshombe it would support sanctions. UK could tell him he could not rely on it for protection against sanctions. Belgium would say it ready support all measures especially payment by UMHK to GOC. US and GOB were in agreement this formula would be better, would put most pressure on Tshombe, could be implemented quickly, would be more direct and apply pressures on Tshombe all at once. If this not successful, final phases of Reconciliation Plan could be applied.
U Thant expressed thanks for interesting and constructive proposals. Reviewed history of Reconciliation Plan to date, pointing out its implementation had met with deferral after deferral. Finally, because of CAC pressure, he had informed CAC of Nov 15 deadline. His objection UN participation in new proposal was procedural. He did not want to give Adoula impression UN once again deferring action on plan. Therefore, he preferred tripartite mission proposal, would tell Adoula plan not abandoned, then he would give tripartite mission until Dec. 10. He considered main flaws in new proposal were that Adoula not competent negotiate for GOC, would have to bring Bomboko, Kamitatu and three or four other Ministers with him to New York as well as several members Parliament.
McGhee then explained second proposal not contrary to plan. Latter called for consultation of govts which was exactly what now being proposed. President liked proposal which would have advantage of reasserting SYG’s leadership in implementation of plan. Much time could be saved by reps of countries concerned assembling in one place. He was sure that Spaak, Home and Rusk would come if invited. World would applaud SYG’s invitation as bold effort resolve issue.
U Thant said he understood all this. However, assumed that Adoula would not come and that if he did trip would create great difficulty for him in Leoville. Also SYG’s action would surely be misconstrued in UN. Bunche added that he even more concerned about [Page 695] reaction in UN, particularly on part Afro-Asians and Sov bloc. (Spaak suggested this reservation might be met by addition one or two members of CAC to consulting group.) Moreover, Bunche said, Tshombe would have field day in New York with US press and TV. Summons to New York might end in great personal success for him.
McGhee suggested proposal could be put up to Adoula through Gardiner. Perhaps Adoula would not object. McGhee wondered whether problem might not be resolved by sending intermediary to Tshombe in Eville after consultations among SYG, Adoula and interested powers had taken place here.
U Thant remarked this would resolve more than half his problem. Extensive discussion then produced decision that Gardiner would be sent Leoville tomorrow to explain second proposal to Adoula. Question of whether Tshombe would be summoned to New York or an intermediary sent to inform him of decisions was left in abeyance subject to future decision. Doubt was expressed that UK should be invited and it was agreed that US would sound out UK and notify Gardiner of decision through Gullion in Leoville. Considerable doubt was expressed whether UK would agree attend consultations in New York and whether it even desirable that it do so since it was generally agreed that it would not be able to participate in measures. Common front would thus be broken.
Subsequent to mtg, Spaak and McGhee discussed problem in US Mission where general agreement reached that New York talks would have better chance success if British did not participate. Principal concern was whether Gardiner, who had shown little enthusiasm for new proposal, would really push it with Adoula. It was decided that Belgian and US reps should meet again with Bunche tomorrow morning in effort firm up manner of Gardiner approach. It was agreed that while Gardiner should make first approach to Adoula, US and Belgian Ambs should coordinate with him in order support proposal with Adoula. To do this, it would be necessary that Gardiner and Ambs be in possession of same version of proposal. For use in mtg with Bunche, agreed text of proposal was ironed out by Spaak and McGhee. Resulting text transmitted by septel.4 At mtg tomorrow strong effort will be made get Bunche accept text and assure that Gardiner, instead simply explaining proposal to Adoula and stating it has SYG’s endorsement, will make real effort persuade Adoula of advantages of acceptance.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2862. Confidential. Received at 6:07 a.m. on November 29 and repeated to Brussels, London, Léopoldville, and Elisabethville.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 340.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 324. The text of Tshombe’s reply, dated November 12, was transmitted in telegram 753 from Elisabethville, November 13. It declared that Katanga had endeavored to execute the U.N. Plan and charged that the Adoula government wanted the plan to fail so that it could “pursue its policy of violence and of domination.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–1362) For text of an annex to the letter, which listed actions that Tshombe stated Katanga had taken to carry out the plan, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 901–905.↩
- Telegram 2016, November 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2862)↩