Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

296. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, September 25, 1962, 7 p.m.

738. Eyes only Acting Secretary for McGhee. Adoula agrees to McGhee visit.²

I opened interview informing Adoula for first time of scheduled arrival of impact shipment for ANC at which he greatly pleased.

I expressed apologies on behalf Under Secretary for shortness of notice of his trip saying he suddenly found after passage of bond issue that he might have time before GA got well into action for visit he had long wished to make to Congo. Then proceeded closely on line Department’s instructions.

Adoula politely gratified at visit but disturbed when he heard trip to Katanga projected. However he declared he “has confidence in US”. Says he hopes “McGhee is tough man otherwise Tshombe will roll him in rug like Cleopatra”. Cautions against getting mousetrapped into making statements and impromptu speeches. (Adoula furious at what he considers indiscretions of Ngalula³ who apparently was maneuvered into position of saying or seeming to say that UN must go and commiserating Katanga on casualties suffered at UN hands.)

Adoula’s immediate concern as he professes it is with simultaneous outbreak troubles in all provinces and disorders attending creation new ones. Kivu worries him particularly and he kept me waiting over half hour while he dealt with noisy Kivu delegation. He claims many areas do not wish accept integration in new provinces and want Central Government rule and protection. He asked perhaps disingenuously, “could it be that federalism is dying at birth?” He reiterated that he did not believe he could get Parliament to adopt constitution “unless Tshombe reintegrated in Congo. If he continues to make constitution sine qua non of integration, Parliament will not adopt constitution”.

Referring to letter from U Thant⁴ Adoula said “if he showed it to his council there would be a non-recevoir”. UN seemed to be trying to prove his adversaries right about his alleged surrender of sovereignty to UN, and readiness to let Tshombe drag out talks indefinitely.

I persisted that he should nevertheless find formula. Perhaps because he has letter from me not too different from UN approach, he did not say flatly that he would not budge. I fear, however, that he will not do so.

Adoula said “everything going very badly” in other provinces and in conversations. Tshombe proposals in military commission and Badre’s report most discouraging. (See separate telegram)⁵ Adoula said he could not understand Governor Williams’ optimistic remarks. I answered was necessary to maintain propitious atmosphere for conciliation until proved fruitless.

These worries seemed to keep Adoula from focusing too closely on visit.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–McG/9–2562. Confidential; Niact. Received at 3:13 p.m.
2. Telegram 492 to Léopoldville, September 25, informed Gullion that it had been decided that McGhee’s visit should take place without delay and that he would arrive in the evening of September 25. (Ibid., 110.12–McG/9–2462)
3. Joseph Ngalula, Congolese Minister of National Education, led the Léopoldville delegation to three mixed commissions, representing the Central Government and Katanga and assisted by U.N. experts, which began meeting in Elisabethville on September 22. The commissions were set up to establish arrangements for implementing the military provisions and the provisions on revenue and foreign exchange in the U.N. plan.
4. Reference is evidently to a September 24 letter from U Thant to Adoula. A draft was given to Gullion by Gardiner and transmitted in telegram 729 from Léopoldville, September 24. The draft urged Adoula to authorize the U.N. constitutional experts in the Congo to consult with Tshombe or his representatives. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9– 2462)
5. Telegram 746 from Léopoldville, September 26, reported that Albert Y.N. Badre, Chief Economist for the U.N. Operation in the Congo and Economic Adviser to Adoula, had concluded after a week in Elisabethville that Katangan policy was one of delay. (Ibid. 770G.00/9–2662)