Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

285. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, August 28, 1962, 1 p.m.

480. For Secretary from Ambassador. Deptel 293.² There is surely no misunderstanding between embassy and Department upon objective of peaceful, stable, unified (reintegrated) Congo to be secured by peaceful means. I assume we also continue to agree: that Katangese separation works against US interests, accelerates centrifugal pressures in Congo and prepares way for communist influence.

We fully understand UN is debarred from initiating aggressive action in Congo. We are equally aware UN like any armed force must be prepared defend itself. There may be some differences between Department and embassy, or rather Department and UN about what such defense includes.

We also agree that time does not appear to be working on our side. There may be some divergence on courses of action needed to reverse this effect. In this connection we believe it particularly important to combine relation between UNOC’s contingency planning and US-backed proposals for national conciliation.

I am grateful for opportunity you have given us to comment on these matters.

First, with respect to UNOC planning: the contingency plan which you have read (Embtel 413)³ is just that and nothing more—a plan drawn up by military men against contingency they may be attacked. We do not know whether this plan has approval of UNNY or any official status. It was dispatched to UNNY when it looked as if UNOC might be attacked at Albertville. It has, however, long been under study. US military and civil officers have urged UN to complete some plan and have deplored its absence. UN had been hesitant lest it be accused of aggressive intentions.

We hope it comes as no surprise that UNOC is convinced that if significant attack upon it develops it cannot submit passively to that attack. Self preservation requires it engage main body of attackers lest it actually risk isolation, defeat and annihilation. Embassy Léopoldville has repeatedly conveyed this UNOC opinion to Washington.

No armed conflict, of course, is wholly predictable.

There can be differences about choice of objectives, force requirements and elements of strategy. There have been such differences in our country team. We in Léopoldville unanimous, however, in believing UNOC force cannot sit down in Elisabethville while it is attacked all around perimeter and risks losing its sole links with outside through airfields near Elisabethville and Kaminaville. It may not be obliged to secure all objectives set in its plan.

This is not to say massive retaliation will be applied to any attack, however insignificant. To extent choice is left to it we are confident UNOC will limit its use of force to “quelling incidents or protecting civilian population”. We know many cases in which UNOC has gone to great pains and taken real risks to avoid escalation of local incidents.

We have, moreover, repeatedly reported that UNOC believes its force must be absolutely, relatively and visibly superior if irresponsible Katangese are to be preserved from temptation of attacking.

Appreciation of UNOC intentions incomplete without reference evolving UNNY interpretation of its mandate from Assembly and GA. Department better able interpret this but UN has been acting under resolutions backed by US which presumably contemplate use of force to expel mercenaries and to authorize its use as last resort to prevent civil war. Lately UNOC has been acting under definitions we heard expressed by UN officials in meeting of U Thant, Bunche, Gardiner, Narisimhan with Ambassador Yost and Department officials⁴ and which are reflected in U Thant’s latest report. UN considers it is in entirely different relation to Central Government, particularly under terms latest resolution, than Katanga or any other province. If negotiations failed or were abandoned and GOC undertook police action against GOK rebels UNOC would not interpose itself to protect latter. Presumably, converse is that it would intervene to protect GOC against GOK. I did not hear latter interpretation expressed at NY, but UNOC here was clearly prepared to act upon it last week when it pledged itself to defend Albertville and did act upon it in ordering Katanga to cease attack.

This concept UN role was perhaps already implicit in UN resolutions but it is increasingly in evidence since legal establishment of Central Government and as UN swings to view that its onerous commitment here may only be brought to end through increased cooperation with Central Government.

The foregoing interpretations are not inconsistent with “quelling incidents and protecting civilians” but they do go beyond it. It would probably have support of overwhelming majority of UN members if indeed they did not support something more drastic.

I am not sure your message reflects change in US policy or how far USG follows UN current thinking on its mandate. In past US has gone pretty far. We have affirmed to governments that US would support UN action (negotiations) “even at risk incurring hostilities” and declared “none of parties should operate under any different assumption” (e.g. Deptel 1953, May 19; 1961, May 25; 1905, May 11,⁵ et al).

The most detailed and categoric statement I know of the circumstances in which US could envisage UN’s use of UN force in defense and in support GOC occurs in 14 paragraph of letter from President Kennedy to Mr. Macmillan on June 1.⁶

Presumably these statements still stand, even if subject to review as circumstances change.

This brings us to current UN proposals for national reconciliation to which US is important contributor. Under this plan Katanga has less reason to attack because GOC will not have introduced its tax agents into Katanga.

Nor will UMHK be so liable to reprisal because of any voluntary overt anti-Katanga actions on its part. UNOC correspondingly less likely confront situations which might involve hostilities. Whole purpose of plan is to provide reasonable peaceful solution to integration problem. If sanctions are required, newly available tool of economic pressure gives promise of effectiveness short of force.

Yet it is of utmost importance that we realize hostilities may nevertheless occur. Tshombe or his extremist followers may strike out in blind over confidence fairly soon. Or, if economic pressures are stepped up through phase II, III and IV risks go up proportionately.

There is no good putting forth this plan if we are not prepared to accept its implications and back it up. If we back away from it our position here, in UN and in Africa would be dismal. We here do not think it will come to fighting but UNOC must plan for eventuality that it will.

I wish to emphasize that UNOC does not believe it can carry out its mission nor defend itself unless US airlift is available to permit it to concentrate its heavy equipment from elsewhere in Congo in Katanga. If this is not also view UNNY we should know it soonest.

After September and VAC fighting this mission suggested measures which might reduce dependence on UN and US airlift in time of crisis (e.g. Embtel 1729, January 3, ’62).⁷ Perhaps this concentration ought or could have taken place sooner. It is arguable that if it occurs now temperatures may rise dangerously but we believe it more likely that effect on Katanga would be salutary.

Point is that if hostilities do occur as result of plan US helped create and if US withholds airlift support which it provided in past emergencies in which it had less responsibility, and if lives of fighting men of many nations are lost as result, results for US policy would be grievous.

Let us turn now to time which works against US. It does so in several ways: UN has bear by tail and may have to let go; governing group friendly to US may lose its grip as it fails in its grapple with secession; radical leaders are emerging from wings to take over; parts of economy (e.g. Kasai) are falling into chaos; and meanwhile Tshombe brings in more mercenaries and makes common cause with far left elements to attack US and bring down Moderate Government.

It is partly use of force indecisively which has permitted situation to spin out so dangerously. When UN was obliged to reply with force of force in December it was within its power to have destroyed Tshombe’s means to resist.

It did not do so because of its own restraint and because Tshombe called for US intervention in nick of time. At his request humanitarian US policy (perhaps influenced by exaggerated accounts of fighting) accorded him opportunity to make an agreement which he promptly dishonored.

If time is not to work adversely, therefore, UNOC draws at least two lessons from past: first, force if ever it must be used to resist attack should be not Carthaginian but sufficient; two, so long as Tshombe retains full control of his unfederated forces he feels free to upset any agreement (cf, President’s letter to Macmillan).

Finally, I believe that unless we are prepared to support program of SYG with firmness even at some risk time will bring about very condition you describe in even worse form. There is evidence that Tshombe thinks governments behind SYG are both undetermined and divided. This is, I think, last round-up for both UN and Moderate Government in Congo.

Alternative to full support of SYG’s program is use of force by ANC with help from whence it can get it.

This could indeed cause plenty of chaos and communist opportunity. Less likely, but possible as UNOC begins to conceive it, there could be an orderly turnover to ANC and this force could be brought level with its responsibilities under dependable influence. GOC would then try to consolidate its own territory by long and risky process. This at least would relieve our alliances and UN of strains which Congo has set up while civil war would be free to follow precedents of history.

Either way, however, war would be substituted for peace, cause of international organization would be set back incalculably, and lives and property of our friends in Katanga would be in far greater danger than anything to which plan of SYG, including economic pressure, would expose them.

If there is any change in our policy I should appreciate full opportunity to consult.

I wish to assure you that we here have some sense of wider concerns in light of which Congo policy must be judged and are aware of need for caution in field and fidelity to our instructions.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–2862. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. Document 280.
3. See footnote 1, Document 280.
4. See Document 266.
5. Telegram 1953 is printed as Document 238. Regarding telegram 1961, see footnote 2, Document 242. Telegram 1905 is printed as telegram 6037 to London, Document 230.
6. See Document 244. Reference is to the 15th paragraph, beginning “We have told Mr. Adoula”.
7. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/1–362)