97. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State0
1221. Foreign Secretary Dehlavi called me to Foreign Office 6 p.m. today and handed me following message dated January 18 from President Ayub now in Sibi to President Kennedy. Comments contained immediately following message:
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“Dear Mister President,
Please accept my sincere thanks for your message of January 15,1 on the Kashmir issue.
I would also like to express to you my gratitude for the deep concern and interest that you have shown over the relations between Pakistan and India and the efforts that you have been personally making to bring about negotiations between the two countries to relieve the dispute, which is, as you have truly said, the one major problem that now remains between the two countries.
I entirely agree with you that it would be a tragic error to assume that this problem cannot be settled. I do not think I should tire you by setting forth the efforts that I have been making during the last three years to persuade Prime Minister Nehru to enter into direct negotiations with me, to find an equitable and realistic solution of the Kashmir dispute. At no time, however, have I had any assurance that the Indian leader was ready to enter into discussions with me except on his own terms.
You have inquired whether I would be willing to request a trusted friend of both India and Pakistan—Mister Eugene Black—to explore with Mister Nehru and myself, the prospects for negotiations and discussions which might lead to a final solution of the problem. I am deeply grateful to you for this constructive initiative and I welcome it as yet another manifestation of the deep concern of the United States and yourself personally for the peaceful existence and well-being of the peoples of the sub-continent.
I know Mister Black to be a man of high stature in international life and as a statesman who has given proof of his talents for mediation and conciliation.
While my final answer to your inquiry must necessarily be formulated after taking into consideration Prime Minister Nehru’s reactions, I consider your offer to assist in negotiations between Pakistan and India by making available the good offices of a trusted statesman of international prestige as one that I could readily accept.
You have said that if I agree with the approach to the Kashmir problem suggested by you, you would expect that the appeal of Pakistan to the Security Council would be suspended. I must, of course, attach the utmost weight and importance to any suggestion that you feel it necessary to make. At the same time, may I assure you that the decision of my government to make the appeal has been prompted solely with a view to ending the intolerable impasse in which the question of self-determination [Page 203] of the people of Kashmir has become embedded for the past 13 years.
There is another consideration of a basic nature which is at the back of our appeal to the Security Council. The political independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan, and indeed its very existence, have never been free from threat by India. Confident of its growing strength and encouraged by the failure of the world to thwart its successful recourse to force in the past, our colossal neighbor has become more emboldened than ever to proclaim its aggressive intentions towards Pakistan. Since the danger of an armed attack by India is real and ever present to us, Pakistan is under the obligation and has indeed the right to invoke the political and moral protection of the United Nations. in the attempt to safeguard its security. It would be neither wise nor statesmanlike, for comparatively small countries like Pakistan, to discard the instrumentality of the United Nations whenever they feel themselves threatened by more powerful neighbors. Therefore, our motivation in appealing to the Security Council flows from our deep concern for the future of our country, and from our anxiety to guard against a mounting threat to its very existence. That this threat has become more grave and imminent is manifest not only from the recent statements of the Indian Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, Mister Krishna Menon, and the President of the Ruling Congress Party, Mister Sanjiva Reddy, but also from the fact that 85 percent of the Indian Armed Forces, including their armoured formations, are now concentrated within striking distance of our borders. This situation is causing grave concern in Pakistan.
I hope you appreciate that in the circumstances suspending our proposed action in the Security Council at this stage would shock public opinion in Pakistan and provoke severe criticism as [of] the value of our present alignments. This is scarcely desirable, particularly at this time when we are about to introduce our constitution.
The Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations is an eminent statesman and I have no doubt that insofar as his interventions in the Security Council are concerned, they will rise above the level of mere controversy and recrimination.
Yours sincerely
Mohammed Ayub Khan.”
End Verbatim Text.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1-1862. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; Limit Distribution. Repeated to New Delhi and USUN.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 93.↩