94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan0

260. From the Secretary. Kabul’s 452.1 I understand how difficult your official and personal position has become as result events past three weeks and I appreciate your willingness delay departure. Before getting to specifics regarding your meeting with Naim, I believe following observations may help remove any misunderstanding our position.

In our strenuous efforts serve Afghan and American interests by keeping aid flowing to Afghanistan despite troublesome Pak-Afghan dispute, we have never been willing to let Afghanistan use these efforts for propaganda advantage against Pakistan or vice versa. We object to being associated with publication of Afghan note only because terms “illegal” and “Pakistan and Peshawar, Chaman and Quetta” carry legal meaning which we cannot accept. Afghanistan’s insistence on retaining these terms has increasingly suggested to us Afghans intend use them propagandistically. Therefore we cannot now agree to joint publication notes if these terms remain.

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We have no other objection to the Afghan note. We would agree publication of notes jointly if these terms deleted or we would agree to other alternative procedures specified below. Our prime immediate object remains to get border open so aid goods now in Pakistan can be moved directly into Afghanistan.

FYI. At time President authorized some funds for added costs transit reported Deptel 2562 to honor our pledge to use Iran route as a temporary alternative to the traditional route through Pakistan, the subject of authorizing funds for backhauling of aid goods via Iran or India was not raised. However he takes firm position we have made all advisable concessions to Afghan’s sensibilities and if these insufficient to move stalled aid goods we will reconsider aid program. End FYI.

In view foregoing US prepared follow any one of following three courses of action in conjunction with RGA. Latter two are successive fall-back positions if first proposal not acceptable RGA.

A.
The US will agree to the publication of exchange notes if para 3 RGA note revised to remove political content. We do not regard our language Deptel 255 as sacrosanct as long as political allusions mentioned para two above omitted.
B.
The US will agree to confidential exchange of RGA note as presently phrased and revised US draft (Kabul tel 451)3 with subsequent RGA press release along lines suggested Deptel 247.4 US also willing, if you believe it might be helpful, agree associating itself with RGA in joint communique along same lines as press release—i.e. without reference political issues. Within these limits you authorized use your discretion in agreeing on language press release or communique.
C.
Failing obtain agreement on either above proposals, you may tell Naim US will not object to RGA publication by itself of RGA note as originally drafted. In this case either Embassy or RGA could issue press release (preferably before publication RGA note) acceptable to you stating that negotiations have been held, and that the border will be temporarily reopened. Mention of Iran route in this release also authorized if necessary Under this procedure RGA accepts our note which remains confidential and basis of agreement.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1-1462. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Naas, Gatch, and Talbot; cleared by Hewitt, Gaud, Ball, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi.
  2. In telegram 452 from Kabul, January 14, Byroade expressed himself as “gravely disappointed” in what he saw as a change in the Department’s position as outlined in telegram 255 to Kabul (Document 91). He felt that to demand new changes in the Afghan note would be to risk the loss of an opportunity for a breakthrough in the transit impasse, and would encourage the Afghan Government to maintain a rigid position. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1-1462)
  3. Document 92.
  4. Telegram 451 from Kabul, January 12, transmitted the text of the U.S. note, as revised in accordance with instructions from Washington. The Embassy also confirmed that the Afghan note remained identical to the note initially transmitted in telegram 429 from Kabul (Document 81), except for the substitution of January 22 for January 15 as the date on which the border would be opened for the transit of U.S. aid material. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1-1262)
  5. Document 86.