Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan⁰

Washington, November 29, 1961, 7:14 p.m.

212. Karachi 887¹ 1 to Dept; Kabul 370,² 364³ to Dept (none rptd London, Jidda, Tehran).

1. Assessment

Reviewing Pak-Afghan situation in wake Merchant Mission, Dept draws following conclusions:

a. Understandably annoyed by Afghan propaganda and provocations, Paks are deliberately applying pressure (closure of consulates and denying entry to Powindahs)⁴ to bring Afghans to knees in belief this will cause Afghans to abandon “Pushtunistan stunt.” Mindful of similarprevious pressures from Paks as well as historic pressures by British, proud Afghans determined resist this Pak pressure.

b. Afghans believed USG could produce change in Pak policy. GOP is extremely sensitive to assumption that, because of substantial aid USG is supplying, GOP policy can be influenced by USG, and is determined not to appear responsive to USG “pressure.” (Earlier [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports as well as Merchant’s talks with Qadir clearly indicate GOP intends give USG appearance of cooperating but not to point of seeing Pak-Afghan impasse resolved as direct result of USG endeavors.)

c. Neither Afghan Royal Family nor GOP wishes Afghanistan to become Soviet satellite but both greatly underestimate extent to which Soviets can exploit present impasse.

d. Soviet power on Pakistan’s border would be serious threat for free world, including Pakistan and USG. Accordingly, USG cannot relax efforts to break Pak-Afghan impasse and facilitate neighborly relations between those two countries.

e. View conclusion 1(b) further dramatic USG efforts, e.g. Merchant Mission and Presidential letters, suggest over-anxiety by USG and likely increase Pak (and Afghan) intransigence. More subtle diplomatic efforts are required. In any case, given other factors in US-Pak relationships, GOP will resist such direct pressure which USG willing to apply.

f. Our goal should be restoration of status quo ante. There is no likelihood of disposing of “Pushtunistan” concept. It is political horse which RGA will ride when useful but which RGA can also bridle as it has in past when it suits RGA purpose. In addition there is little likelihood RGA will consent to any tampering with previous arrangements for handling shipments at Peshawar since shift to Tor-Kham involves political implications unacceptable to RGA.

g. Some time may have to elapse before a long-range solution to Pak-Afghan transit problem is possible. Merchant Mission is still too recent and neither side has as yet felt full economic and political impact of their folly.

2. Courses of Action

In light of foregoing assessment, Dept favors following courses of action:

a. To extent feasible USG will continue its aid program to Afghanistan. Purpose is to assure RGA that it need not be exclusively dependent on Soviets. At same time fact that Afghanistan has Iranian as well as Soviet outlet should cause GOP to realize that it cannot bring Afghanistan to its knees. Dept will: (1) look sympathetically into possibility of providing maintenance assistance Meshed-Herat route; and (2) without mounting major airlift seek step-up of Ariana and other air-ferrying services from Beirut to Kandahar and Kabul.

b. In discussing with RGAUSG’s desire to proceed in accordance with 2(a) above, USG will address further appeal to RGA requesting RGA permit an American forwarding team to arrange for movement to Afghanistan (perhaps via Chaman) of aid supplies now in Pakistan but not any new shipments. Text of proposed demarche presently being prepared will include reference to Congressional interest in efficient delivery of these supplies. If RGA indicates willingness, request might be broadened to include all diplomatic supplies, perhaps even commercial goods, now in Pakistan. Meanwhile, USG request would be directed to GOP not in any case to auction any of these goods.

c. Dept hopes measure of type described Deptel 1018 to Karachi⁵ might help persuade GOP to restore normal access to Powindahs.

3. Possible Long-range Solution

Dept considering two possible new approaches:

a. Noting increasing interest of Saudis (Kabul 370), whose intervention unlike that of USG unlikely be considered by GOP as “pressure,” Dept believes Saudis should be encouraged attempt patch up this quarrel between two Muslim countries. Specifically, suggestion might be made that King Saud address personal letter to Ayub. Dept has been impressed by solution proposed several times here by Afghan Ambassador Maiwandwal (probably with RGA concurrence). It calls for reopening of Afghan consulates and/or trade agencies but in deference to Pak charges against previous RGA officials would authorize only RGA personnel who have never before served in Pakistan. If Saud made this suggestion, of course unattributed to Maiwandwal, it might find some favorable response from Ayub. Coming from “Keeper of Holy Places,” Saud letter might stress interest in Muslim brotherliness and perhaps contain additional suggestion that feast marking end of Ramadhan would be appropriate time for magnanimous gesture by Ayub and for public announcement resolution Pak-Afghan difficulties. Dept believes letter might be sent some time in January assuming Saud has left US by that time. If Ayub accepted this simple proposal, Dept foresees no great difficulty on part either GOP or RGA working out orderly process leading to relatively speedy resumption full diplomatic relations.

b. If Saud letter not successful, or if for any reason it not sent, Dept would consider new approach by respective US ambassadors no later than February. While it is too early spell out exact details because of imponderables over course next several weeks—e.g., details of how Soviet Union will attempt exploit situation, Dept thinks Merchant’s last talk with Qadir not without some hope that differences could eventually be reconciled. According present thinking here, approach thus might be suggested involving following steps in consecutive order:

1. Appointment of Afghan liaison officers in Pakistan equipped to document shipments and arrange forwarding, coinciding with joint public statement that both governments looked forward early resumption diplomatic and consular relations.

2. Agreement privately by both governments to continue use moderation in press and radio.

3. As traffic volume increased, transfer of liaison officers into reopened Afghan trade agencies in Pakistan.

4. Assuming trade agency personnel demonstrate by example intent stick to business over reasonable period of time, say six months, two governments would open discussions leading to reopening consulates in both countries under clearly understood ground rules. RGA could help re-establish its bona fides by refraining from using trade agencies as distribution centers for propaganda or literature of any description.

5. Resumption diplomatic relations.

If made in above-described order, this approach would serve to meet RGA demands for restoration previous facilities and at same time permit GOP be reassured that consulates and trade agencies would not be used in manner for which they not intended. Dept would contemplate saving any Presidential letter to Ayub for this critical juncture.

Dept would appreciate views Kabul⁶ and Karachi⁷ on foregoing courses of action and proposed approaches. Jidda requested comment on suggestion involving King Saud.⁸ Teheran requested comment on anticipated Iranian reaction to possibility US assistance maintain Meshed-Herat route.⁹

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/11-2161. Secret. Drafted by Meyer and Gatch; cleared by Gaud and William R. Polk of the Policy Planning Council; and approved by Meyer. Also sent to Karachi, Jidda, and Tehran and repeated to London.
1. In telegram 887 from Karachi, November 18, Rountree suggested that a revised version of the formula drafted by Merchant be used as a basis for a settlement of the transit issue. (Ibid., 689.90/11-1861) Rountree sent a draft of the revised formula to the Department in telegram 888 from Karachi, November 18. (Ibid.)
2. Telegram 370 from Kabul, November 24, reported that the Saudi Ambassador to Afghanistan had recommended that his government consider mediating the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Ibid., 689.90D/11-2461)
3. Telegram 364 from Kabul, November 21, noted that the revised formula proposed by Rountree in telegram 888 from Karachi would have no chance of acceptance by the Afghan Government, and would have a counter-productive effect upon the U.S. position in Afghanistan. (Ibid., 689.90D/11-261)
4. The Powindahs were a Pushtu-speaking nomadic tribe who moved seasonally with their livestock back and forth across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the spring of 1961, the Government of Pakistan announced that the Powindahs would have to produce the usual international travel documents when they entered Pakistan that fall. The Embassy in Karachi noted that the tribe had no passports or health cards, and would be faced with the prospect of starvation of both animals and people or fighting their way into Pakistan unless the Pakistani authorities relaxed the requirement and allowed the usual migration. (Despatch 275 from Karachi, October 25; ibid., 689.90D/10-2561)
5. In telegram 1018 to Karachi, November 25, the Department instructed the Embassy to express concern that the Powindah problem was potentially explosive. With the onset of winter, the tribe could be expected to fight rather than starve, and the fighting could lead to an escalation of force on both sides of the border. To avoid that danger, as well as for humanitarian reasons, the United States urged that Pakistan consider relaxing the regulations affecting the Powindah migration. (Ibid., 689.90D/11-2561)
6. In a long assessment of the transit impasse and the courses of action and new approaches proposed by the Department, the Embassy in Kabul generally concurred with the steps outlined to move the impasse toward solution. The Embassy warned that a relaxation of the U.S. good offices effort would open the door to Soviet exploitation of the situation. (Telegram 390 from Kabul, December 6; ibid., 689.90D/12-761)
7. Rountree’s assessment of the steps proposed by the Department was more pessimistic than that offered by the Embassy in Kabul. He felt that the positions taken by the Ayub government were grounded in the conviction that Afghan agitation on the Pushtunistan issue constituted a threat to the state, and those positions would not be easy to alter. He noted, however, that Ayub was concerned about the risk of Soviet power expanding to Pakistan’s border, and concluded that Ayub’s concern might lead to opportunities for a break in the impasse. (Telegram 965 from Karachi, December 2; ibid., 689.90D/12-261)
8. Telegram 359 from Jidda, December 13, reported that the Saudi Government had not responded to the suggestion from the Saudi Ambassador in Kabul that Saudi Arabia play a mediatory role in the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Embassy felt that, given the longstanding Saudi policy of avoiding foreign entanglements if possible, it was unlikely that the government would respond positively to the Ambassador’s suggestion. (Ibid., 689.90D/12-1361)
9. Telegram 430 from Tehran, December 7, reported that the Iranian Government was anxious to facilitate arrangements to transship U.S. aid supplies to Afghanistan. (Ibid., 689.90D/12-761)