344. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India0
1267. Following summary is for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon.
At own request Ambassador Nehru called on Acting Secretary Ball December 18. Ambassador said purpose was to obtain up-to-date reading Administration’s thinking prior return to India for consultations. Principal topics of conversation relating to India were Indian Ocean Naval Task Group and longer-term military aid. (Ambassador also [Page 707] inquired about situation in Cambodia and Viet Nam. This being reported separately.)
Indian Ocean Naval Task Group: Ambassador said his reports from Delhi indicate General Taylor “went slow” on Indian Ocean Task Group, probably due situation created by press leak; Prime Minister Nehru “heard him out” and later made statement in Parliament giving Indian position. Ambassador asked what is concept behind Task Group—to link up Seventh Fleet with Mediterranean? Is concept more psychological than military? Mr. Ball replied Task Group would make forces available in Indian Ocean area in case of need, and give sense of US presence for defense of subcontinent which could contribute to its security. Mr. Ball emphasized that US not asking for bases. Ambassador suggested matter be kept at technical level and political aspects be played in low key. Mr. Ball agreed on low key approach and repeated US intention work things out through discussions.
Longer-Term Military Aid: Mr. Ball said US has under consideration longer-term military assistance to India. To make decisions we need more information about Indian plans on force levels; on diversion of resources from economic development; and “pretty definite” understanding regarding limitation of arms procurement from Soviets. Ambassador interrupted to ask what kind of understanding we had in mind. Mr. Ball said US could not work out longer-run aid for India if GOI would go around shopping in USSR. Ambassador asked if US would object to GOI getting Soviet arms as part of over-all plan on scope of Indian requirements and build-up. In such plan, US and Soviets each might supply some of what GOI unable achieve from own resources. Mr. Ball said that in view Congressional attitudes, for US to undertake longer-term assistance we would feel our aid should be “fairly exclusive,” Ambassador asked why. Mr. Ball replied there is difference between Soviet economic aid and military aid. Latter involves question of our security requirements and could establish relationship of Indian dependence on Soviets in military matters. Ambassador asked if General Taylor had discussed this. Mr. Ball said General Taylor would discuss it and added that this question subject to further discussion.
Ambassador said that Indian viewpoint would be to have a plan and to fill in gaps caused by limitation Indian resources where GOI could. Ambassador then said he understands US has two objections to Soviet arms aid: possible security compromise, and political objections. He said security problems could be overcome. Ambassador then cited Mr. Ball’s statement that military assistance entails dependence and asked if US wants India to be dependent exclusively on US. Mr. Ball replied there is question of degree and this matter can be discussed further. He said US also needs more indication of India’s plans to keep tensions [Page 708] down with Pakistan, in view of effect our arms aid on US as well as Indian relations with Paks.
Earlier in conversation Ambassador had expressed inability understand why Paks stirring up trouble with India. In response question, Mr. Ball expressed belief that Pak relations with Chicoms would remain “formalistic” and not develop into “something serious.”
Ambassador turned to US rationale for arms aid to India if US assessment is that Chicom won’t attack. Mr. Ball said we do not believe Chicoms presently intend to attack again but we can’t be sure about future. It is important for us that India not have to live in fear of an attack and that India be in position to meet attack if one develops in next few years. This does not mean we think India should have excessive military establishment and it important not to disrupt economic development.
Ambassador said he had no disagreement with this in principle. He also said that a defense plan which US might aid would have to be one of agreed magnitude. However, Ambassador said he foresaw “great difficulty” on the other two “conditions” (i.e. understanding re limitation arms procurement from Soviets and understanding re Indo-Pak relations). Ambassador then asked about the other “condition” he has heard, namely GOI undertaking security responsibilities in Southeast Asia. In response Mr. Ball said this not priority matter; stressed India needs to concentrate on own immediate problems. Ambassador next raised question of Sino-Soviet rift and after brief exchange of views suggested that Western actions could have important effect on rift. As he was departing Nehru said US insistence on exclusive Indian dependence on US arms, combined with placing India under protection 7th fleet, could have considerable effect on Soviet by seeming to place India in position of fearing attack from Soviets as well as from Chicoms. This could affect Soviet policy toward India and toward Sino-Soviet rift by tending push Soviets and Chicoms closer together.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-5 US. Secret. Drafted by Lakeland and approved by Talbot and Ball. Repeated to Karachi, London, Moscow, and Hong Kong.↩