318. Memorandum for the Record0
PARTICIPANTS
- Department of State
- Secretary Rusk
- Undersecretary Ball
- Governor Harriman
- Asst. Secretary Talbot
- Administrator Bell, AID
- Turner Cameron, NEA
- Department of Defense
- William Bundy
- Brig. General Charles Johnson
- CIA
- John McCone, Director
- James Critchfield
- White House
- McG. Bundy
- R.W. Komer
Meeting with the President on Pakistan
Secretary Ball described his mission as being to tell Ayub where we are going and to find out where he is going. The core of the problem is [Page 636] that Ayub can’t defend himself against India so has to rely on us. Our problem is to reassure him that our commitment to defend him is credible. The question is what we can do to make our assurances more credible. Ball suggested we might talk about a possible Indian Ocean carrier task force, joint exercises, extending planned airlift demonstrations through Turkey to Pakistan, etc. He wasn’t talking of joint planning—this would create real problems with India—but of things we could do short of this. We had given Ayub materiel; what was lacking was evidence we would back him if attacked.
Bill Bundy explained some of the complications involved, e.g. it took three carriers to keep one on station. There was also the problem of where to base them in the area. Joint exercises might be feasible, and we had earlier offered one to Ayub. It might also be possible to demonstrate our airlift capability, though probably with a smaller unit than we were planning to send to Turkey. The President said we should “talk with McNamara” before mentioning any carrier task force; otherwise we might upset our present carrier plans. At this point we should just talk about how fast we could get carriers there if necessary. Bill Bundy felt that best gambit would be joint exercises against the contingency of an attack through Afghanistan, which would implicitly show the Paks how we could support them against India too. Rusk felt planning against Afghanistan was hardly a good noise, just at the time when things were going our way, and the Afghan King was coming here. Talbot interposed that what Ayub really wants is less reassurances against Indian attack than that we will not help India militarily.
At the President’s request, Bill Bundy explained what military aid we were currently giving India and planning over the next two years. The various tranches added up to $75-100 million in FY 1964, depending of course on the appropriations outcome. On the Pak side we had made a big delivery push this year, amounting to about $58 million. In fact we delivered more firepower to Pakistan than to India. Over the next few years our military aid ought to balance out at about 2-1 in favor of India over Pakistan. The President wondered what Ball could say about comparative aid to India and Pakistan; Ayub wouldn’t like a 2-1 ratio.
Harriman thought the real problem was that Ayub wants to take care of the Indian threat himself. We have got to convince him he can’t but must depend on us. This is why credible assurances are necessary. In fact, the Indians are now fearful that the Paks will attack them, so India wants reassurances too. Thus the nub of the problem is how to convince Ayub we mean what we say. If we demand that Ayub stop his flirtation with China, we must give him confidence we will protect him. The President queried whether Ayub was really trying to use us to solve Kashmir. What could Ball say to him that would be helpful? Harriman’s answer was to tell Ayub he couldn’t get along without us. While we can’t go to [Page 637] joint planning against India, we can give credible evidence of our ability to support Pakistan.
Talbot said that Ball’s job was not just to reassure Ayub against Indian aggression but to stress our primary interest in the threat to the north, which demanded Pak/Indian reconciliation if it was to be met effectively. McCone thought it would be difficult to keep Ayub off the track of worrying about India.
The President doubted that Ayub was worried militarily about the Indians. He wanted to use us against the Indians on Kashmir and we couldn’t give this to him. So what could we offer him? There wasn’t much for Ball to say except to repeat our position. We weren’t getting much from the Pakistani either. About all the alliance was worth to us was the intelligence facilities. He asked about the apparent slow-down in negotiations. McCone explained that since 15 June the Paks had been stalling on the final agreement for Peshawar expansion, amid growing criticism of the US. McCone feared that the next Pak move would be to cut back on existing facilities which he stressed were far more important than the expansion. In response to Rusk’s question, he saw no alternative option elsewhere to expansion of Peshawar. It gave us a 30% increase in efficiency, much better coverage of China, and a more flexible arrangement.
The President reverted to what Ball could say that would convince Ayub. Ball replied we could warn him about coming trouble on the Hill, citing the Broomfield Amendment which almost passed. McGeorge Bundy felt that simply to say “disagreeable words” was worth the effort. Harriman adverted to the thought that the Paks were genuinely worried about an Indian attack, so we should study how we could reassure them. Rusk proposed the tactic of asking Ayub some direct questions. For example, did he want US military aid to continue? Did he want US support in event of an Indian attack? We should try and put the monkey on Ayub’s back. Komer added that what Ball didn’t say would be just as important as what he did. The Paks were mounting a pressure campaign on us, and to the extent that Ball did not respond by promising them additional aid, it would be a warning that such tactics wouldn’t work.
The President seemed unsatisfied by these rejoinders and again asked “what precisely do we want to get from Ayub.” We know each other’s arguments, so the best we can do is remind them we don’t like the Chicoms, get them to call off their distasteful press campaign, and tell them that Peshawar is vital to us so that if they don’t play ball, we will give our aid to someone else. The President said he understood Ayub’s arguments and could see his point of view. As seen by the Pakistani, India was a threat to their interests. However, we were right too in our position, so the best we could get was a “standoff.” Ball rejoined that the [Page 638] Paks needed us more than we needed them. Ayub would pull back from his China gambit if we pressed him hard enough.
The President still didn’t think that Ayub was really scared of India. What would the Indians get out of attacking Pakistan? They’d lose a billion dollars in Western aid. What Ayub was really worried about was that he was losing the capability to attack India successfully or at least to get his way vis-a-vis India. Rusk interjected that the Pakistani must know we could pulverize India with nuclear weapons. The President simply doubted that we could or would use nuclear weapons except if forced to against the Soviets. Bundy pointed out that this illustrated the value of an Indian Ocean task force with conventional capabilities. This would give us a little cushion out in the area. Rusk indicated he was dubious about any cut-back in our carrier force. For just this sort of reason he would want to take a close look at any such proposals. The President said he’d asked McNamara about an Indian Ocean squadron.
Talbot felt the real point was for Ball to make clear that Ayub’s “gamesmanship” is now getting out of bounds. But the President asked why we were so worried about how far Ayub went with China? He couldn’t be really serious about this. Bill Bundy indicated that while we wouldn’t really be ready to talk about carriers for awhile, we could give Ayub some dope about how fast we could get out there if he were attacked. We could describe, for example, what we could do with the CASF. DOD would provide some ammunition to Mr. Ball.
In response to the President’s query as to whether Ball would say anything about MAP to Ayub, especially F-104s, Ball replied it was preferable to hold off any such discussions and make his mission a strictly political exercise. There was some discussion about giving supersonics to Pakistan and India. Bill Bundy pointed out we have to face this issue in the next MAP program in any case, because the Paks expected modernization of their air force. It was pointed out that the Soviets might give supersonics to India. The President’s view was “Let’s not give supersonics to the Paks if we don’t to the Indians or vice versa.” This led the President to ask again what Ball realistically expected to achieve. Ball answered that we would at least clarify to Ayub our views on his China gambit. The President asked how we would respond if he countered that the Indians were playing with the Russians. Ball felt we could argue this was different—we have an alliance with the Paks and not with the Indians.
Komer raised the question of what Ball might say on Kashmir. Ball felt we should not “disengage” on this issue, partly because of the repercussions on the Hill. Rusk recalled that the Indians had agreed to mediation, but Komer pointed out they had recently changed their tune. McGeorge Bundy wondered whether the Paks were really much interested [Page 639] in mediation at this point. If the Paks raised the issue in the UN, we could use the President’s new policy of “abstention.”
Talbot asked about press treatment. When news of the trip got out he favored as neutral a press guidance as possible. We should simply say that Ball was going out at the President’s request to discuss US/Pakistani relations. Ball agreed that neutral treatment was best, although both the Paks and Indians were going to speculate widely on his purpose.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, 8/63-11/63. Secret. Drafted by Komer. According to the President’s Appointment Book, the meeting was held at the White House. (Ibid.)↩