295. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom0
6016. Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Following message from President to Prime Minister Macmillan has been relayed to Prime Minister by other channels:
Verbatim Text.
“Dear Prime Minister:
With the return of our delegations from Karachi and Delhi, I am inclined to think we ought to go ahead now on the ‘air defense’ arrangements for India recommended by our Joint Mission. These would involve chiefly periodic exercises of say three earmarked Commonwealth/US squadrons, plus temporary provision of certain radars. I would envision our presenting this publicly as joint training missions, though of course our underlying intent would be clear. We have gone into this scheme thoroughly here and my reasoning is as follows:
With a Kashmir settlement now a long way off, and Nehru in an unyielding mood, I believe it would be a mistake to let the Indians conclude that there is little prospect of any further military help in the absence of a Kashmir settlement. I note that you too were careful to counter this impression in your recent parliamentary statement. Indian support is so essential to a satisfactory non-nuclear balance of power in Asia that we don’t want to risk unduly any Indian backsliding from their new determination to counter the Chinese Communist threat. They still think they have other options, and if we push Nehru too hard it is by no means inconceivable that he would harden his attitude toward Pakistan rather than the reverse. Indeed he might transfer to us some of his current animosity toward Peiping, attempt to disengage from his confrontation with the Chinese, and rely primarily on the hope, however illusory, of substantial Soviet military help. His current mood and past performances warn us not to push him too hard.
So our problem is how to forestall jeopardizing our new relationship with India, without putting too much strain on our relations with Pakistan, and still retaining some leverage on Kashmir. It seems to me that to signify willingness to go ahead on air defense would best meet this dilemma. This would: (1) lend credibility to our intent to help India if attacked again; (2) be the least expensive gesture we could make, since it involves mostly earmarking our own forces; (3) be the gesture least [Page 591] offensive to the Paks, since it entails no build-up of Indian air; (4) last but not least, buy us time to stall a bit longer on what the Indians really want, i.e., substantial hardware to build up their own forces. In particular, such an arrangement would enable us to go slow on what is likely to be the most expensive element in any US/Commonwealth aid program, developing an all-weather interceptor component for the Indian air force.
I am quite aware of your Government’s hesitations over the risks involved in such an arrangement. These we share, though we do not regard the actual likelihood of air attack on Indian cities as very high, even if the Chinese attacked again on the ground. And in the last analysis it is almost inconceivable to me that we would allow an overt Chinese Communist air attack on Indian cities without becoming involved. In fact, I am strongly persuaded by the argument that a visible US/UK/Commonwealth ‘commitment’ to the air defense of India is the best means of deterring such an attack from occurring and thus involving us in the first place. To be sure, we would have other avenues of retaliation if an air attack occurred, but certainly defensive action in India would be the one least, rather than most, likely to lead to escalation.
Thus I see many cogent reasons for going ahead on air defense, and feel we should put this matter high on our agenda; hopefully we could say something to TTK when he is here. Incidentally, I look on your efforts to increase the effectiveness of the existing Indian Air Force units as an important complement to air defense assistance, and I am pleased to learn that your plans are now made to move ahead intensively with this program.
I would be much interested in your own views.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-2 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cameron; cleared with BNA and by Grant, Harriman, William Bundy, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Karachi and New Delhi.↩