288. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0
Secto 40. 1. Sandys called on Secretary late this afternoon. Ambassador, Bundy, Timmons, Gore-Booth and Pickard present. Sandys inquired as to results Secretary’s talk with Nehru this morning.1 Secretary said he had impression that if mediation proposal2 can be worked out it is on as far as Nehru is concerned. Secretary added that he talked with Nehru privately today and asked where the Kashmir talks went next. Nehru knocked down idea of independence for Vale, but Secretary felt Nehru used rather desultory arguments. Same true of condominium. Nehru feared as usual that if ceasefire line relaxed, hordes would pour in from Pakistan-held Kashmir and inundate Indian portion.
2. Secretary said he had indicated to Nehru that Sandys had recounted to him Sandys own talk with Nehru, in which idea of mediator had emerged. Nehru said that if Indians proposed this, Paks would turn [Page 571] down. Secretary gave Nehru to understand that idea would be explored with Paks and that we would be in touch with Nehru again. Secretary said that at end of conversation Nehru unquestionably knew what he (Secretary) had in mind doing, and that Secretary was acting on assumption that such a proposal was all right with Nehru. Ambassador pointed out Radhakrishnan had mentioned mediation idea this afternoon at tea for Secretary and party, and had specifically referred to Ellsworth Bunker as possible mediator. Secretary noted Nehru had said this morning it important “not let situation break down,” and that mediation should be explored in lieu of further rounds. Summing up, Secretary said Nehru clearly seemed agree that U.S. should explore mediation idea with Ayub. Secretary seeing Nehru briefly after PM’s dinner tonight and this would afford opportunity take final reading.
3. Discussion then turned to question of tactics with Paks. Ambassador suggested line with Paks should be that having sounded Indians out we think we can get them accept U.S. or Britsh mediator; can we go back to Indians with Pak acceptance? Sandys agreed, noting it could be said to Paks that since Indians clearly not ready move forward on any precise proposals, what about mediation? We think we can get GOI to agree. Also noted however that if reluctance encountered might be necessary put mediation proposal more formally to both sides. Secretary thought two stages might be involved. First would be to attempt bring Paks along. If necessary, in second stage proposal could be put to both. Sandys noted Paks would doubtless fear that mediation proposal simply device for spinning things out. Secretary said could be pointed out to Paks that mediation procedure is not something that can go on forever, and that Paks should test to see whether it mere device. Sandys suggested we take stance that proposal good news for Paks since they have always wanted it. U.S. side noted that while Paks have wanted US/UK governmental intervention in negotiations in expectation that this would operate in Pak favor, they might be less enthusiastic about a mediator acting as a private individual.
4. Sandys asked if Eugene Black available. Ambassador said Indians had indicated that difficult accept Black now, as this would mean reversal of earlier decision (i.e. rejection in 1962 of offer of Black’s good offices).
5. Pickard asked if question of terms of reference for mediator had come up. Secretary thought it best if mediator worked out his own as he went along, since this not formal mediation procedure. Sandys said he had in mind purely procedural matters, such as that mediator would talk to both sides, explore possibilities of settlement, propose basis for discussion between two sides or with him. Secretary said maximum flexibility should be preserved; therefore thought process should be started by finding appropriate individual and ask him attempt straighten out [Page 572] Kashmir problem. Secretary also noted that more than Kashmir involved. It generally agreed mediator’s task would embrace “other related matters.”
6. Discussion also touched on question of time limit. Ambassador said process of modifying attitudes and positions on both sides will take time and Paks must be persuaded of this. While work of mediator moves forward, we must also go ahead with military aid decisions, otherwise political climate here would become intolerable. Sandys agreed no time limit should be fixed, but also noted that since Paks could hardly raise Kashmir in UN while mediation going on, they would not wish give up their freedom of action in this regard indefinitely. This another factor which might impel Paks seek some limit. Secretary noted that in any case the mediator himself would have in mind some general time limit beyond which he would not extend his efforts unless some results in sight.
7. Meeting ended this point in order permit Secretary keep another engagement. Agreed that Secretary and Sandys would have further word after Secretary had seen Nehru tonight.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State on May 3 at 9:53 p.m. Repeated to Karachi and London.↩
- Rusk visited New Delhi May 2-4.↩
- Rusk learned in a conversation with Sandys on May 2 that the idea of introducing a mediator into the deadlocked negotiations over Kashmir had been raised by Nehru in a conversation between Nehru and Lord Mountbatten before Sandys arrived in New Delhi. Nehru envisioned someone of international stature, unconnected with the ongoing talks, who would study the Kashmir problem and put forward possible lines for a solution. (Secto 32 from New Delhi, May 2; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK)↩