Office of the Historian

266. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara0

Washington, March 12, 1963.

JCSM-203 – 63

SUBJECT

  • Report by Commonwealth/United States Air Defense Mission to India (U)
1.
In response to a request from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, a draft of the report by the Commonwealth/United [Page 522] States Air Defense Mission to India has been obtained and is forwarded herewith.1 It is understood that, with the exception of necessary editorial corrections, the findings contained therein will approximate those in the final report of the Mission.
2.
Provided there are no substantive changes in its final form and subject to Joint Chiefs of Staff review of the final report of the Chief of the US element, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the findings of the Mission are generally acceptable.
3.
With respect to implementing actions to improve Indian air defense capability in the short term, the preliminary views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are that:
a.
The United Kingdom should assume over-all responsibility for implementing the air defense program for India, with assistance from other Commonwealth countries and the United States.
b.
The United States should be prepared to commit one US fighter squadron and one mobile ground control intercept radar (GCI) to assist the Indian Air Force in air defense tasks in the event of resumption of Sino-Indian hostilities on a scale which indicates the immediate danger of Chinese air attack on Delhi or Calcutta. A US fighter squadron could be deployed in approximately 58 hours, and a mobile GCI would require six days.
c.
The United States should not make any commitment, such as 3 b above, to the Government of India involving US combat air defense units unless political reasons therefore are overriding and provided no Constitutional objection exists. Even then, such commitment should be withheld until there is agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom as to contributions and responsibilities in the air defense program for India.
d.
In such an agreement, the United Kingdom, in accordance with undertakings at Nassau, should be requested to take immediate action to improve present Indian day-fighter capability to include supply of spares for Hunter aircraft, technical assistance in making the Gnat operational, and supply of attrition aircraft. Further, the United Kingdom should make arrangements with the Indian government for improvements to existing TPS-IE and type 8 radars.
e.
Prior to governmental approval of commitments as outlined above, action will be required to determine the concept for employment and extent of combat involvement of UK and US air defense units. Due consideration must be given the principle that in committing United States Forces to combat, there will be an implied further commitment of US military force as may be necessary for the defense of India.
4.
The US fighter currently available for deployment (F-100 or F-105) is not a true all-weather interceptor. By reason of its over-all performance, however, deployment of one of these types would add to existing Indian air defense capability. Furthermore, current estimates of the threat do not credit the Chinese with a significant all-weather offensive [Page 523] capability. If the threat changes, plans may be required for deploying some other type, such as F-102’s or F-4C’s, if available at the time.
5.
It is recommended that the foregoing be used as a basis for the air defense aspects of the informal reply to the questions contained in NSAM 223.2 The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on longer range Indian air defense requirements will be submitted when the final report of the Commonwealth/United States Air Defense Mission has been reviewed.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, India, 091.3 (26 Oct 1962), 1963 Papers. Secret.↩
  2. Attached but not printed.↩
  3. Document 260.↩