251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India0
3098. Delivery following letter to Prime Minister Nehru at earliest appropriate opportunity.
“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I’ve been weighing whether to write you on the subject of Kashmir and am persuaded that a word from me would not be misconstrued at this juncture. Our interest in this subject stems from the same concern for the security of the subcontinent which prompted us to try to be helpful when India found itself under attack from Communist China. Indeed, the US is now so heavily engaged in the effort to assure the economic development and insure the security of the subcontinent, that I hope you regard our interest in this matter as not amiss.
For this reason, I will venture to speak frankly on an issue of such moment as Kashmir. We Americans are perhaps too far away to appreciate fully the passions aroused by this painful issue. Perhaps, however, this also gives us perspective to argue that the great issues affecting the subcontinent’s future overshadow in significance the differences between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.
While the history of this problem, and the antagonisms it has aroused will demand statesmanship of the highest order on both sides to achieve such a settlement, the open Chinese Communist aggression against India seems to have provided a new and pressing reason for its achievement. I hope that this opportunity will not be allowed to pass.
What chiefly motivates me to write you are the strong Pakistani allegations, expressed to us in many ways, that India is not serious about negotiating an acceptable compromise settlement. I well realize that the Pakistani may be pressing this point in order to induce the US and UK to intervene. At the same time, however, it does underline the desirability [Page 491] of disposing of this argument to the extent it can be done. To this end, I wonder whether some public gesture on India’s part placing a Kashmir settlement and Pakistan-Indian reconciliation in the context of the subcontinent’s long term need for security and economic development would not help give the negotiations renewed momentum and provide us grounds for urging reciprocal expressions on Ayub.
Even more important, it seems to me, would be some concrete Indian proposals in the next round of talks which take sufficient account of their point of view to be proof positive to the Pakistanis that you are genuinely seeking a settlement. I believe Ambassador Galbraith has talked more specifically with you on this. President Ayub told Harriman that he recognized any viable compromise would be one unpalatable to both parties. I have no doubt that it will be hard for him too to accept a compromise, but I can assure you that we do not intend to support proposals which lean too far to one side.
Let me close with a private thought. President Ayub is in a weaker position in his own country than you are, and Pakistan is the lesser power. By these tokens it is harder for him to take the first step toward you than you toward him. I too have repeatedly been forced to accept that more is required of great powers than of others. It is always the weaker who must seem unyielding. Of course, I do not mean in any way to discount the importance of Kashmir to India, or the many factors which make settlement difficult. But the costs of settling Kashmir, great as they are, must seem less in relation to India’s larger purposes than they are to Pakistan’s. If only this issue could be settled, it would open new perspectives in terms of India’s role on the world stage, while eliminating a painful diversion which adversely affects the security of the subcontinent and inevitably complicates US-Indian relations in ways disadvantageous to us both.1
I hope that you will not mind my frankness in this matter. I have been so only because of our great interest in your country, and my own strong feeling that your personal role will be vital to the resolution of this dispute.
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy”
Letter is designed to lend impact to “joint instructions” you have received, without getting into specifics. It is also designed to impress on Nehru that the President is taking a close personal interest in the talks.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret: Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by BNA, Grant, Harriman, McGhee, and Komer; and approved by Cameron. Repeated to Karachi and London.↩
- In telegram 3086 to New Delhi, February 5, the Department informed the Embassy that Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was disturbed by the prospect of an increased program of arms aid to India before settlement of the Kashmir dispute was agreed upon. Without such a settlement, Fulbright was concerned that an enhanced military capability might lead India to attempt to compensate for any losses suffered in the border war with China at the expense of Pakistan. (Ibid., DEF 19-3 US-INDIA)↩