Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State⁰

Kabul, December 19, 1962, 7 p.m.

261. Embtel 255 to Department¹ repeated Karachi 95 Tehran 96. I called on Prime Minister Daud at his request December 19 for what proved to be 2-hour exposition RGA view on economic transit, continuing need for USG assistance, inability compromise further on Pakistan-Afghanistan impasse and full recognition what this might mean in terms Afghanistan’s economic development and political alignment. Daud was accompanied by Deputy Minister Planning Abdul Hai Aziz, who interpreted, Director General Political Affairs Foreign Ministry Etemadi and acting Director General Economic Affairs Foreign Ministry Rafiq. Brewer accompanied me.

Prime Minister began by referring my talk with Foreign Minister Naim December 8, expressing appreciation continued USG assistance Afghanistan economic development. Daud noted Afghanistan currently in peculiar position regarding its twin needs pushing forward with economic development and maintaining its neutrality and non-alignment. Afghanistans had “kinship” with west and sympathized western “ideology.” RGA had always attached importance western aid as evidenced by fact USG had been requested participate in second 5-year plan even before plan prepared. RGA earnestly desired continued flow US help.

Daud continued that unfortunately situation between Afghanistan and its neighbors appeared be slowing down USG assistance. Although never explicitly stated, it appeared increasingly clear to RGA that condition attached to USG aid in form of insistence on better Afghanistan relations with its neighbors. Despite almost daily talks with AID/A officials in recent weeks RGA felt no clear agreements yet reached about future assistance on project basis. Questions economic transit and transportation costs were inevitably introduced and Afghanistanis were led to understand there some sort of precondition to further significant USGassistance. Daud noted in my talk with Naim this had been my most important point.

Admitting some differences exist between costs Iranian and Pakistan routes, Daud said further study by RGA and return Afghanistan Mission headed by Rafiq from Tehran has resulted in additional information making clear cost differences between two routes not of magnitude estimated by USG. There were basic differences in transit costs between goods moving Khorramshahr-Kandahar for USG and for RGA. On basis recent talks Rafiq Mission with Iranians, Daud felt higher USG transit costs could be substantially reduced. For example gasoline was cheaper shipped through Iran while diesel more expensive.

At this point Daud called in Rafiq to give detailed analysis comparative cost figures Iranian and Pakistan routes (details by pouch). Rafiq’s main points were that USG had been overcharged on rail freight Khorramshahr-Meshed and on trucking costs Herat-Kandahar. Among other things Rafiq asserted RGA prepared clear and handle all USAID shipments through Iran at one-fifth cost commercial agents now charging. Rafiq cited figures to support conclusion average cost gasoline and diesel needed for our projects approximately $66.38 per ton via Chaman as against $66.34 via Meshed.

Prime Minister then continued that he hoped statistical presentation, and prospective further reduction in cost diesel RGA buying from Iran, indicative what might be done on Iranian route. He then proposed RGA and USG cooperate on experimental shipment 500 to 1000 tons consigned Afghanistan trade agent Khorramshahr for clearing and forwarding. Indicated shipment be composed one half PL-480 wheat and one half materials for aid projects in order make possible refinement current figures re Iranian route by category and type.

Prime Minister next turned to question future US assistance, reiterating RGA inability pin down extent future support on any given project. I recalled had previously told both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister I would not condone any real complaint regarding substantive lethargy or bureaucratic inaction in aid program. Aziz interjected there were no complaints but simply did not seem possible agree on any project. I noted unresolved problems in many fields such as Kabul University. Aziz replied these difficulties should not cause delays in agreeing future projects. He said RGA currently preparing budget for next Afghanistan fiscal year and needed know on what projects USG would assist. Brewer noted AID/A for its part had to know what projects RGA proposed support with local currency in order determine which ones should be given USG help. Aziz indicated commodity import program could be instituted which would solve local currency problem once USG support for specific projects made clear.

I assured Prime Minister our intention break any bottlenecks that might exist in AID/A operations and noted had been seeing members his Cabinet myself in effort iron out difficulties. Iranian route figures were subject debate in which I was no position participate. Our own statistics were based on our experience where we perhaps had not gotten same favorable treatment in all instances as Afghanistanis. Question possible RGA handling future aid shipments via Iran could certainly be examined and perhaps Afghan-Iran-US meeting might help settle question. However much such discussions and experience might help in future, fact was we had major problem now.

Aziz asked pointedly whether Daud’s suggestion re experimental shipment would be referred Washington. Assuring him this would be done, I said wished make several observations on general problem we currently face. I then outlined difficulty maintaining momentum on such major project as K-K road. Recalled I had told Prime Minister last May this situation would develop unless border opened and said that our extraordinary costs now so high that we didn’t see how work on road could continue beyond end December. This why USG asked whether there might be some way reopen border temporarily for 30-60 days for this road project. While said would naturally report what Prime Minister had already told me, it would create wonderful psychological atmosphere Washington if I were able also report Prime Minister prepared meet our problem on road through periodic border openings. I also noted such action helpful in preventing transit rights across Pakistan atrophying through disuse.

Expressing appreciation my remarks, Prime Minister said his earlier comments could have been given me by Naim and he would now come to real reason he had asked see me, namely political aspects this problem. Without dwelling on details Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, he asserted RGA had gone to limit of what was admissible in Foreign Minister Naim’s talks New York with GOI and GOP Foreign Ministers. As result experience subsequent weeks, RGA had concluded not that GOP reluctant solve problem but that Ayub personally unwilling see it solved. Otherwise tentative agreement reached by responsible Foreign Minister with his Iranian and Afghanistan colleagues would have had some result. Re loss Pakistan transit right through disuse, Daud asserted it hard imagine international law principle under which unilateral action one man could erase right which had existed for over thousand years.

Emphasizing he wished me report what he was about to say faithfully to Washington, Daud then said he wished make following points in order avoid slightest misunderstanding between our two governments re various aspects over-all problem:

1. Afghanistan appreciated past USG help and needed it in future.

2. Afghanistan believed its best interests served by following policy neutrality which included sympathy for western “ideology.”

3. Notwithstanding points one and two and fully recognizing transit difficulties confronting USG aid shipments, RGA was not ready sacrifice or place in jeopardy future of Pushtunistan question by making any concessions.

4. For Afghanistan this remained “question of honor and life. If on this issue we will now be forced to sacrifice our economic development and much else besides we are prepared to do so.”

5. It neither wish nor interest Afghanistan that this occur. RGA does not wish sacrifice neutrality nor be forced towards one side. However American friends should know RGA unprepared move one inch from position which has been reached in this case regardless consequences.

Daud stressed only point he really wished make to me was that there should be no doubt this RGA attitude on part USG. While further USG assistance would be appreciated, if projects must be suspended or abandoned this would be accepted. Whole question had been subject review by RGA after my discussion with Naim December 8 and Daud said he was giving me considered conclusion Afghan Government this matter.

I replied that I appreciated his frankness and would see that Washington was left in no doubt of RGA position. To help explain Afghan attitude, I asked whether he could clarify reasons why movement American freight across Pakistan seemingly had to be connected with Pakistan-Afghan political problem. Also, while I knew RGA position in general on issue, said would appreciate his personal statement as to what his objective was on Pushtunistan problem.

To first question, Prime Minister responded RGA had sought negotiate on Pushtunistan question. However, when GOP took unilateral action with clear purpose using transit issue as tool political pressure RGA had felt it could not submit under duress to suppression national aspirations Pushtun people. Daud stressed it would not be possible permit USG use Pakistan route while denying same access Afghan Government and people. Prime Minister felt Pakistan press was making it increasingly clear GOP using transit issue strangle Afghanistan and this RGA would never accept.

Turning to RGA objectives on Pushtunistan, Prime Minister recalled historic, racial and cultural ties between Afghan and Pushtun peoples. RGA felt Pushtuns would not wish be part Pakistan. Obvious solution would be self-determination. RGA simply desired Pushtun people be given chance determine their own destiny in accordance international law. Should they opt remain in Pakistan, RGA would be first recognize this fact as Afghanistan had no territorial ambitions. Daud noted GOL [GOP] claim Kashmir based solely on religious ground. RGA interest Pushtunistan not only based on common religion but also common ties blood, history and culture. Although earlier had once formed part Afghanistan, RGA making no annexation claim. Accordingly it hard understand why GOP claim Kashmir considered legitimate while RGA desire see Pushtuns given opportunity for self-determination not accepted.

Daud recalled had outlined foregoing at every level USG from President Eisenhower on down. Had also made same points to GOP in past discussions. Referring latter, he said Prime Minister Suhrawardi had once asked if RGA desired annex territory. Daud said he had replied he would give written engagement foreswearing annexation if assured Pushtuns would have self-determination. Daud had suggested GOP itself get in touch with bona fide Pushtun leaders to this end.

Thanking Prime Minister for his frankness, I said our discussions would not be complete were I not to express our great fear that, while working for objective which in their eyes deemed praiseworthy, RGA would leave itself open predatory forces which might one day cause loss not only Pushtunistan but Afghanistan as well. Prime Minister asked how this might occur. I told him we had seen techniques communism had used, including exploitation political issue such as Pushtunistan to serve their own ends. By supporting divisive regional issues communists made neighboring states increasingly dependent on them. This predatory force would take every advantage of country so placed as Afghanistan. There had so far been no single instance in which such a country had avoided communist toils and RGA was taking terrible chance in assuming it might be first not fall prey this technique.I assured Prime Minister USG fully recognized Afghanistanis determined, brave and dedicated people whose society founded on religious principles but reminded him that sometimes even all this not enough prevent disaster. Prime Minister merely remarked with smile in closing that it was precisely for this reason he had emphasized how greatly Afghanistan needs USG assistance.

Comment follows.

Steeves

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/12-1962. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran.
1. Telegram 255 from Kabul, December 17, reported that the Afghan Government had failed to respond by December 15 to a demarche made by Steeves in a meeting with Foreign Minister Naim on December 8. (Ibid., 689.90D/12-1762) Steeves reported on the demarche in telegram 240 from Kabul, December 9. On instructions from the Department, Steeves had pointed to the problems involved in continuing major U.S. aid projects, such as the Kabul-Kandahar road, while the closure of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan prevented the passage of necessary supplies for the projects through Pakistan. Experience had demonstrated that it was significantly more expensive to bring such supplies in through Iran. Steeves asked for a decision by December 15 on a U.S. request for periodic openings of the border to allow the movement of U.S. supplies. (Ibid., 689.90D/12-962)