Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

227. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, December 17, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Conversation between the President and the Ambassador of India

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• His Excellency Braj Kumar Nehru, Ambassador of India
• Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Ambassador Nehru apologized for requesting an appointment on what he knew was one of the President’s busiest days. His Government, however, wished to present some views on the Kashmir problem to the President before the Nassau Conference. The Indian High Commissioner in London was under instructions to make a similar approach to Prime Minister Macmillan.

The Ambassador said that his Government wanted the President to be aware that Pakistan is undermining the prospects of fruitful talks on Kashmir by a steady stream of abusive statements about India emanating from public officials and the press. He said his Government fears that Pakistanis are doing this only because they believe that they have the United States in a position in which it will not give military assistance to India unless India satisfies Pakistan’s claims in Kashmir. The Government of India supposes that the United States has not made such a commitment to Pakistan, and believes it would be helpful if the point could be clarified with the Pakistanis. Otherwise the Pakistanis are likely to enter the Kashmir talks thinking they can hold India to ransom. His Government also hopes that the President will realize that the Kashmir problem and other difficulties between India and Pakistan have deep roots and are extremely difficult to solve. The Government of India is prepared to go into these talks in good faith, but the Prime Minister hopes that the President will realize progress may be slow and unspectacular, even if the Pakistanis show more willingness to cooperate than they have done until now.

The President said he would like to make a personal response and then an official response. Speaking personally, he said, he felt the Prime Minister had erred in making a statement in Parliament which would give the Pakistanis a handle to charge that India was not serious about the Kashmir talks. The Pakistanis are not only attacking India, they are also trying to get at the United States. Indeed, the next few months are likely to be a period of continuous effort by Pakistan and by Pakistan’s friends in this country to put pressure on him, the President. In this situation he would hope the Prime Minister could ignore the abusive and other unfortunate remarks being made. The best posture would be to enter seriously in the discussions and show the world that India is determined to reach some sort of settlement.

The President observed that the coming period will require the most subtle and skillful policy on the part of India. On the one hand, he supposed that no Indian politician could involve his country in negotiations with Pakistan if Indian opinion came to believe that the West was forcing India to give up Kashmir as a price for helping it to save Ladakh or even NEFA. On the other hand, some progress would be very important. India wants us to understand its problems, and we try to do so. At the same time, the President hoped that India could understand our problems here. Whether we like it or not, the question of Kashmir is inescapably linked to what we can do to assist India militarily. He was sure the Ambassador would understand this and could communicate it to his Government.

The President concluded by observing that we get a lot of abuse, as India feels it does. The problem is how to ignore it and get on with the job that has to be done. He hoped that the Prime Minister would see his way clear to a constructive settlement, because Ayub is the only man in Pakistan who can carry off a settlement that involves heavy compromise of Pakistani claims and it may be that Nehru is the one man who could do the same in India.

0. Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 66 D 415, Kashmir, May-December 1962 (Miscellaneous Papers). Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it was apparently drafted by Talbot. According to the President’s Appointment Book, the conversation took place in the White House. (Kennedy Library)