224. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Paris0
Tosec 28. Eyes Only for the Secretary. For your information, following is text of message from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy dated December 13:
“Dear Friend,
I am sending you these further thoughts about the Indian problem. Although I doubt whether we could reach any conclusion until we meet. I am very glad to hear that Harriman is going to be available on Thursday, December 20. Since Sandys is in the area I have asked him to be available also that afternoon.
My first thoughts about the military problem are as follows:
Some five or six divisions are likely to be used against the Chinese in the mountains. All these forces should be equipped not on the scale of continental armies with tanks and armoured cars and all the rest of it for fighting in the plain, but as mountain troops. Some two brigades have lost all their equipment and the rest of three divisions were badly mauled. The initial task is to re-equip these and supplement the equipment of the rest of the force.
The experts are working on this, but I doubt if it will cost as much as a hundred and twenty million dollars. I agree with your suggestion that the bill during the ‘emergency’ stage should be shared between the United States and Commonwealth countries. Secondly, what sort of [Page 431] army should the Indians have to fill the major role of defending themselves against an all-out Chinese invasion? It is clear to me that any sensible defense, on whatever scale may be agreed, can only be effective if it is organized as a joint Pakistani-Indian plan to defend the subcontinent as a whole. This would be far more effective, less wasteful of troops, and would avoid our chief difficulty which is how to help the Indians without correspondingly upsetting the Pakistanis who are loyal friends and members of the CENTO and SEATO pacts. Therefore, this involves the political problem of an agreement about Kashmir. Thirdly, even if you do get a defence system for the sub-continent as a whole, I do not myself believe that the kind of army which these two countries can sustain would be capable of defending themselves by themselves against any massive attack. If they were complete dictatorships they might try to do it by an absolute priority of guns over butter but their populations and the economies of the countries could hardly do it. Under any democratic system it would be impossible.
This leads me therefore to conclude that what we must aim at is getting first the two parties to agree on the joint defence of the sub-continent as a whole and then perhaps to get them into one of the regional military pacts. This would mean that the Chinese, like the Russians, would hesitate before making a massive attack for they would never be sure that they would not draw down upon themselves the nuclear reply.
Now comes the difficult question—how can we get political agreement between India and Pakistan? In any agreement Pakistan must obviously keep the part of Kashmir she at present occupies (with perhaps some adjustments) and the Indians must keep Jammu and Ladakh. The problem centres on the vale of Kashmir. A plebiscite will never be accepted by the Indians. It is just possible that they might agree to the vale of Kashmir becoming an autonomous state guaranteed by both India and Pakistan.
Now comes the question of how we are to encourage Nehru and Ayub to reach agreement. I have thought over your suggestion of appointing a high-level go-between; but I think this presents difficulties. A suitable individual would be hard to find, and his appointment would be interpreted as an attempt by us to act as mediators which would certainly be resented in Delhi. I doubt therefore whether he would be able to exercise effective influence.
It is the Indians who must make the first move. If they show a disposition to compromise, we can bring pressure on the Pakistanis to abate their extreme demands.
It occurs to me that the best way of keeping up the pressure would be to arrange for a series of visits to both countries by American and British personalities during the next few weeks and months. Without getting [Page 432] too directly involved they could encourage Indian and Pakistani ministers to settle their differences. Perhaps you would consider this idea.
We have one important card in our hands, namely India’s independence [dependence] on the West for military aid. But if we overplay the hand we could easily destroy the favourable atmosphere which recent events have created. It will obviously be unwise for us (whether through special envoys or through our regular diplomatic representatives) to threaten the Indians with the withdrawal of military aid if they fail to reach agreement with Pakistan. On the other hand, visiting ministers, who are not directly concerned, Generals or prominent personalities outside our governments could without the same danger more easily adopt the role of the candid friend.
Lastly there is the question of air defence. I think there is much to be said for your proposal to provide the Indians with radar and other ground equipment, presumably to train Indians to use it. You and we might from time to time fly in squadrons of fighters to show our ability to come to India’s aid should we decide to do so. But I do not think we should enter into any formal or moral obligation to participate in an Indian war with China. If we did, we should be giving India a greater measure of protection than we have been willing to do for our Allies in CENTO and SEATO. If, of course, India and Pakistan decide to form together a joint defence system for the whole subcontinent, we could bring them under the general western umbrella to the same extent as the CENTO and SEATO powers. All this raises far-reaching issues which we must discuss together. In the meantime, I thought you might like to have our preliminary thoughts.
With warm regard
Harold Macmillan”
- Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan Correspondence with Kennedy, 1962. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted in S/S by Johnson and approved by Bromley Smith. Rusk was in Paris December 11-16 for the NATO Ministerial Meeting.↩