Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

198. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, November 16, 1962.

Mr. President:

1. You are having a meeting on the Indian military aid situation with State and Defense at 4:00 p.m., Monday.

2. The immediate subject for decision is the result of our discussion with the UK this past week. A team consisting of Jim Grant from State, Bill Bundy from Defense, and Bill Gaud from AID, has come to an agreed set of recommendations with a similar British group on what we should be prepared to do. These are contained in London 1865, attached at Tab 1.¹ In summary, this group recommends that we agree with the British and, to the extent that we can get them to contribute, other Commonwealth countries, to equip a force of about five divisions and their supporting formations. A preliminary guess is that the equipment involved might cost as much as $50 million. The associated supplies, especially ammunition, might be equally or more expensive depending on Indian production capabilities and present Indian stocks, neither of which are well known at the moment.

3. The rationale of the program is that, with such assistance, the Indians would be capable of holding the Chinese where they are now. If the Indians wish to reconquer the Chinese-occupied area, they would have to use half to two-thirds of the forces they now have on their border with Pakistan (see Tab 2).² The idea is thus to combine a respectable amount of aid to the Indians with a continuation of pressure on them to improve their relations with Pakistan.

4. At Tab 2 is an indication of the dispositions of the Indian forces at two dates, 13 October and 16 November. The latter reflects information given to Galbraith by the Indians. One thing the map does not make clear is that the troops which are on the Kashmir border look to the Indians as back-up for the unit fighting at Ladakh, even though they look to the Paks the way they have always looked to the Paks.

5. At Tab 3 are the recent cables from New Delhi:

a 1834³—Galbraith’s latest on the opinions of Foreign Secretary Desai. It shows an increase in the realism of Indian assessments.

b 1835⁴ is Nehru’s letter to Ayub.

c 1833⁵ relates a conversation Galbraith had with the Prime Minister of Bhutan. It illustrates the problems of the Indian protectorates of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.

d 18266 is the present state of the discussion on non-alignment.

e 1739 from New York—Some indirect evidence on the effect of developments on Indian non-alignment. The effects have even reached Arthur Lall.⁶

f 1726⁷ is an older one which may be interesting, showing the evolution of India’s position in its arguments with China.

6. At Tab 4 is London 1859, which gives the substance of the Macmillan-Ayub exchange.⁸ No surprise.

7. At Tab 5 is the latest assessment from Karachi.⁹ McConaughy obviously is somewhat frightened and thinks the situation is out of hand. Phil Talbot and I do not agree with his suggestion that you reply to Ayub’s letter immediately and cordially. We think a much better course of action would be for Secretary Rusk to write to Muhammad Ali, Pak Foreign Minister. The occasion can be the transmission of a copy of our agreement with India on military aid. He can use the occasion to repeat our assurances to the Paks. We propose further, that at the same time we make the agreement public—late Saturday—we make a public statement of our commitment to go to Pakistan’s aid if it is attacked, as well as our promise that the help we give to India will be used only against the Chinese Communists. The statement would come from State. It would put on the public record what you have already told Ayub privately in writing and orally several times.

8. At Tab 6 is a very interesting report (London 1851)¹⁰ from Malcolm MacDonald on the Chinese position on the conflict. MacDonald talked with Chen Yi, the Foreign Secretary, on 29 October, and later with Chou En-lai.

9. The review will raise the deeper issues of our problems and possibilities on the Indian situation. The approach embodied in the US-UKmemorandum is a cautious one. It certainly makes sense as a first step, until events reveal more clearly what Chinese intentions are and how relations within the sub-continent will shift. Still, it is important to take a longer look ahead. Do we want to push the Indians hard enough and give them enough help to make sure that they do not seek a negotiated solution on Chinese terms and lapse back into neutralism? Continuance of the war may serve important U.S. policy objectives: the sharp decline of “positive neutralism” as a foreign policy stance in the unaligned countries, greatly improved relations between India and Pakistan, another setback to Chinese Communist prestige and power with consequences felt throughout Asia. On the other hand, continuance of the war may be increasingly at our expense. Can we and do we wish to bear the costs? Alternatively, it may well be beyond our power to promote a continuance of the war. The direct reaction of the Indians when confronted with the costs of reconquering what they have already lost may lead them to draw back no matter what we do. The effects on Pakistan of our aid to India may continue to be so unfavorable as to become a limiting factor in what we can do. It is neither necessary nor possible to answer these questions now. However, we must certainly begin to consider them and the policy decision we take on the narrower issue which will be before you on Monday is at best an interim one.

CK

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/16/62. Secret.
1. Dated November 14. None of the tabs listed in the source text is printed. All are ibid.
2. The document attached at Tab 2, dated November 16, consists of a 1-page assessment of Indian military dispositions, with 2 supporting maps. There is no indication of origin or drafting information on the document.
3. Dated November 16.
4. Dated November 15. Nehru’s letter, concerning the Sino-Indian border war, was dated November 11.
5. Dated November 15.
6. Dated November 12. Arthur Lall was a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations.
7. Dated November 10.
8. Dated November 14. The exchange of letters between Macmillan and Ayub concerned the Sino-Indian border war.
9. Dated November 16.
10. Dated November 13.