Office of the Historian

184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan0

Washington, October 27, 1962, 8:44 p.m.

680. For Ambassador McConaughy. Talbot-McConaughy Telcon October 27,1 Karachi’s 7642 and 7653 to Dept.

[Page 356]

Text being transmitted septel of Presidential message4 you are to deliver to Ayub October 29. You will note suggestions in your excellent 765 have been taken into account including reassurances that any U.S. military assistance to India will be used only against ChiCom threat. We do not however feel it appropriate to make any commitment about Kashmir at this stage.

In presenting letter you should make following points:

1.
If you have heard from Galbraith that Nehru has told him private assurances from Ayub would be welcome, emphasize this fact. (In absence of word from Galbraith, do not mention that we have approached Nehru on this point.)
2.
Reiterate our view that Sino-Indian border conflict is second in importance only to Cuba in present global confrontation between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We expect our Allies in both areas will do all they can to meet the Communist challenge.
3.
Re President’s request that Ayub send a private message of assurance to Nehru, say that we accept without question the repeated GOP statements that it has no aggressive intentions toward India, and have often said so, but emphasize President’s view of urgency of reassuring Nehru on this point.
4.
As examples of other appropriate actions which GOP might take, suggest
(a)
Adjournment Pak-ChiCom border negotiations;
(b)
Guidance to Pak press for positive approach;
(c)
Private assurances to presently controlling Indian military leaders, eg. Cariappa or Thimayya, not only that Pakistan has no aggressive intentions but that Pakistan willing pull back its troops from cease-fire line in Kashmir as Indian troops deployed away from line.

All that you say to Ayub should reinforce our conviction that Pakistan support for India at this time of trouble will strengthen Free World resistance to Communist threat and ultimately create new and healthier climate in which Pakistan’s problems with India could become more manageable. In all candor Paks now have an unparalleled opportunity to transform basic relationships in the subcontinent.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10-2762. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Talbot, cleared in substance by Kaysen, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi and London.↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. Document 183.↩
  4. Telegram 765, October 27, transmitted McConaughy’s suggestions for points to be included in a Presidential letter to Ayub designed to “lift his sights above present restricted frame in which he now views Pak-Indian relations and Sino-Indian crisis.” (Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10-2762)↩
  5. See Document 186.↩