178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan0
118. Karachi’s 715 to Dept1 and previous. Following is summary US behind-the-scenes effort over past month move Pak-Afghan transit dispute toward solution, and our estimate of chances of making progress.
President saw Ayub Sept 24, Prince Naim Sept 27 and Mohammed Ali Oct 15. Secretary saw Ayub Sept 27, Naim Sept 29, Aram Oct 9, and [Page 348] Mohammed Ali Oct 13. Naim, Mohammed Ali and Aram had long dinner meeting Sept 28.
At dinner meeting formula proposed by Aram was reportedly agreed on for referral to Ayub and Daud by Mohammed Ali and Naim respectively. If it appears there is room for further meaningful negotiations, meetings will be held in Tehran under GOI aegis.
Conversations here subsequent to dinner meeting suggest formula proposed by Aram may be subject to different interpretations. He himself says key element in formula is that Afghan diplomats from Karachi should be detailed to Peshawar to perform consular functions. The Persian version does not specify when regular consular personnel might be assigned. Naim’s understanding, as described by Ambassador Maiwandwal to us, is that Afghan Embassy officers temporarily assigned to consular functions in frontier offices would be replaced by regular consular officers “month or so” after diplomatic relations resumed. Mohammed Ali’s understanding as given to the President is that these frontier offices will be maintained and manned by diplomatic personnel until rail spurs are completed. Then when need for trade agencies is eliminated regular consular personnel will be permitted to establish regular consular posts in Peshawar and Quetta. Since differences in understandings appear to be in detail and timing rather than principle, formula appears promising in that it would seem to allow requirements of “face” to be met. Whether it meets Ayub’s domestic requirements is an open question, however.
As indicated in Karachi’s 715, Mohammed Ali has sent outline formula, as he understands it, to Pakistan and will discuss it with Ayub upon his return. Mohammed Ali not scheduled to leave New York until October 26. We have no present intentions to make further representations to him on transit problem while he is here. Naim in London and still plans go home via Moscow, arriving in Kabul at the end of the month.
From here it seems we have done all we usefully can do for moment. We are particularly mindful Mohammed Ali’s insistence with Ambassador McConaughy evening Sept 24 that US remain in background and Iran’s efforts be kept in forefront. So far Pak-Afghan squabble has recently been overlooked in press here, and Tehran meeting would appear natural result of Shah’s previous efforts rather than result of US intervention.
We believe Daud can accept principle of formula. As Foreign Secy Dehlavi pointed out to Ambassador McConaughy, Pakistan decision rests squarely on Ayub and thus, ultimately, success or failure also rests on him. Dept is not without hope that he will show at least enough flexibility to authorize Mohammed Ali to negotiate in Tehran.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10-762. Confidential. Drafted by Gatch on October 19; cleared by Laise, Bromley Smith, and with GTI; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to London, Tehran, and USUN.↩
- In telegram 715, October 17, McConaughy reported that Foreign Secretary Dehlavi had indicated that Foreign Minister Ali was not optimistic about the possibility of a settlement with Afghanistan in the wake of the meeting he had in New York on September 28 with Naim and Aram. Ali’s pessimism stemmed from the fact that the Afghan Government was still insisting upon the status quo ante as the basis for the settlement. (Ibid.)↩