Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, July 5, 1962, 6:31 p.m.

91. Eyes Only for Ambassador. Deptel 7062 to London,¹ 4428 to New Delhi, 2806 to Karachi. There follows for your information text of Prime Minister Macmillan’s message to President of July 3:

“I have now had a further discussion with my colleagues about this very complicated problem. As I mentioned in my message of June 29 there is quite a chance that the Indians will quietly drop the whole idea of buying fighters; Nehru’s recent public statements seem further to support this view. All the same, I think we should both keep up the pressure and leave the Indians in no doubt about the serious effects which their purchase of Russian fighters would have on public opinion in Western countries.

Nevertheless, it is possible, and indeed perhaps probable, that the Indians will ask us what we have to offer. So we must be ready to meet this event.

There are two problems—the physical and the financial. So far as the physical question is concerned, we are ready, in spite of all the difficulties, to make one squadron of Lightnings available and postpone deliveries to our own forces.

Then there is the probable reaction from Pakistan. You mention your natural anxiety about your facilities there. But, as you know, we also have important facilities of a similar nature in Pakistan. Sandys explained the whole position frankly to Ayub, who was very understanding and recognized the seriousness of allowing the Russians to infiltrate into India’s defense system. However, whilst the Pakistan Government may understand the problem and acquiesce in our action, there will doubtless be biased criticism in the Pakistan press and Parliament. I am sure you would not wish us to bear this entirely on our own. I suggest, therefore, that any Western offer of fighters to India should be openly seen to be a joint move in which you and we are both associated.

Now for the financial problem. The full cost of the Lightnings including ancillary equipment will run to between 10 and 11 million pounds sterling. As the Indian situation is pretty desperate we shall, in effect, have to make them a credit or a loan or give them some financial help in some other way without much hope of repayment. It looks as though this assistance will have to go further than we have ever been ready to go to help even our allies or members of the Commonwealth to acquire modern armaments. In our present position we really could not put up more than one quarter of this total, which was the proportion which you will remember we agreed on for the Orpheus engine. Do you see your way to meeting the other three quarters either by paying us or by paying the Indians?

Apart from finding the money the complications of your system of grants and Congressional votes, combined with the complications of our system of Parliamentary control will make it quite difficult to work out how payment can actually be made. Perhaps it might be a good plan if you could authorize somebody from your Embassy or someone sent from Washington to discuss with our experts how, if at all, the finance could be arranged.

The Indian Finance Minister is in London this week and will certainly ask for more aid. For financial reasons this would not in any case be easy. But even on matters where we could help we propose for the moment to be non-committal. We shall avoid any quotable suggestion of a link between fighters and aid; at the same time we shall leave Desai in no doubt that the British people are becoming increasingly anxious about India’s general attitude towards the West.

I should be grateful if you would let me know how you now see this business.”

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/7-562. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cameron, cleared by Rewinkel and Bromley Smith, and approved by Cameron. Repeated to New Delhi and Karachi eyes only Ambassadors.
1. Telegram 7062 to London, June 30, repeated the text of Macmillan’s June 29 message to Kennedy. Macmillan referred to his discussions with Sandys following the latter’s return from India and drew the conclusion that Nehru might be thinking of dropping the idea of buying fighters of any kind. But he noted that Nehru might not have the final word on the subject, and added that it continued to be important to coordinate a U.S.-U.K. proposal to put to the Indian Government. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan Correspondence with Kennedy, 1962, Vol. III)