122. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State0
3691. Pass Defense. Embassy believes Indian political situation is entering period of transition with major implications for U.S. interests and requiring clear decisions. We are aware that in light of recent Senate action and in face current attitudes toward India the timing of decision could not be more inconvenient than this, and ways of juggling time factor have had our detailed consideration. Unfortunately the tune is being called by others.
The first factor in situation is Prime Minister’s age and illness and following possibilities: (a) In immediate future he may not be exercising dominant influence and this gives increased freedom for maneuver to Menon. Menon is dearly determined to exploit situation to weaken American influence and very probably has design to protect his own longer-run position by getting greater dependence on Soviets, (b) Prime Minister may become incapacitated or disappear from immediate scene, which will bring prompt reduction in Menon’s influence. During this period the US. must play hand in accordance with underlying realities of situation and not surface influences and specifically must avoid action and forestall steps which would play into Menon’s hands and weaken the fundamentally far stronger pro-western members of cabinet and armed forces. Checking any increased dependence on Soviets, with its political consequences, and protecting present western orientation of military forces are thus vital factors. Against this background question of supply of military equipment to Government of India becomes matter of major significance.
- 2.
- Second basic fact is intense dissatisfaction of Indian Armed Forces with present obsolete military equipment. Accordingly Indian defense establishment will continue to exert strong pressure on Government of India to obtain modern military equipment through foreign purchase or some sort of direct military assistance. In absence of detente on Chinese Communist border, and in lesser degree on Pakistan border, Government of India will get more modern military equipment one way or another. It must be stressed that in Government of India decision on material prestige and morale factors may well take precedence over question of strict operational role. This is especially case in their decision to immediately obtain high performance supersonic aircraft. This does not lessen force of determination or problem created thereby or open way to dissuasion.
- 3.
- Third basic fact is that GOI is unable to pay for substantial quantities of modern military equipment with foreign exchange. Accordingly, Government of India will have to turn to either Soviet or western aid, disguised or undisguised. Some senior members Government of India now recognize purchase Soviet equipment for rupees must be considered form of military aid, and Washington will be aware this has been a major thrust of our recent arguments.
- 4.
- Fourth fact is that our intervention and that of United Kingdom have for the moment blocked MIG-21 deal. Inherent in decision to delay is recognition that insufficient consideration given to United States and United Kingdom alternatives. Therefore, Indian decision to delay requires United States to make decision on its course. We must decide whether Soviets will make important inroads into Indian military with likely far-reaching consequences or whether west will provide alternative and competitive sources of supply. Mission is united in recommending latter course. We recognize public announcement of decision, especially re supply F-104’s, must be related to this year’s foreign aid legislation, a point on which Indians, Krishna Menon apart, can be persuaded.
- 5.
- We stress now the consequences. In absence of a favorable United States policy India will go to Soviets for military equipment. If Government of India obtains MIG-21 and/or other types of major military equipment from Soviets, following will result: (a) Large number of Soviet technicians will be introduced into Indian defense establishment. (b)There will be much closer association with Soviet Armed Forces than presently exists. The AN-12’s, MI-4’s, IL-14’s and HF-24 engines have already introduced some 200 Soviet technicians into Indian defense installations. (c) Position of senior Indian officers who presently pro-west in orientation and who do not want Soviet military equipment will be undermined. (d) Five to ten years from now present strongly pro-west senior officers will be out of picture. Soviet training and technical advisors who would accompany purchase of Soviet equipment will have inevitable influence on younger post-independence Indian military officers now rising to position of prominence. (e) Soviets will emerge as the defender of India against dramatic border enemies. This will be a source of gratitude and esteem outweighing power plants, steel mills or other economic aid. Movement of India toward west during past five years will be arrested and possibly reversed. (f) Action will serve directly interests of small group in Government of India, led by Krishna Menon, who seek break with United States and closer alignment with Soviets. This alignment vital for Menon fortunes as is failure of United States to supply equipment As other telegrams will have told, Menon has invented United States supply reluctance and failure in advance of manifestation. Note that Menon has no future as a pro-westerner and no future in a pro-western [Page 250] India and no inability to understand matters affecting his personal ambitions.
- 6.
- Decision to meet Soviet offers will require: (a) Willingness to supply F-104’s from inventory promptly or possibly to convince United Kingdom to offer Lightnings under same terms. Ambassador will discuss this latter possibility on his return to United States. It raises considerations that cannot be judged fully from here. (b) Rupee payment with appropriate price concessions. (c) Licensing agreement for manufacture of F-104’s (or Lightnings) in India. (d) Possible modification of United States security requirements.
- 7.
- At first time domestic situation reasonably allows, Ambassador should be authorized make offer on C-130’s to Prime Minister. In event there no alternative to F-104’s Ambassador should be authorized make same offer on these. Way should similarly be opened on other needs. We do not minimize the difficulties of finding a right time and, as noted, if decision is fairly clear we can ask responsible Indians for tolerance on timing. Note also that availability of an alternative that must be technically examined and then considered will have effect of delaying any decision on high performance fighters at least by weeks, perhaps even by months. The chance to shove through MIG’s rapidly depends heavily on absence of alternative.
- 8.
- Provision of F-104 and other major items of military equipment should be accompanied by well-proclaimed United States-Indian understanding that they are provided for defense of India’s Northern borders. Pakistanis will not like decision urged above, but such line of action would also be for overall protection of Pakistan, which is as vulnerable to Communists as India and perhaps in light of situation in East Bengal more so.
- 9.
- Embassy fully aware of varying forms of opposition in United States and need for explanation in light of current attitudes which Menon, we should remind ourselves, has himself cultivated with skill. However we believe all legitimate arguments can be met and that pivotal position of India in Asia justifies decision.
- 10.
- Points here reflect fully agreed position of Mission.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.00/5-1862. Secret; Limit Distribution.↩