Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

117. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, May 8, 1962.

McGB:

You asked me last week to give you a “sharp needle” in light of Bowles paper on Afghanistan.¹ Have look into matter and found that State/AID have come up with a response to Bowles prodding which has just gone out to field as “To Kabul 346”² attached.

Essentially, they have decided to be reasonably forthcoming with Afghans on various minor projects (air charter help, loan for other air transports, etc.), and to proceed immediately with surveys of alternative Iranian routes and financing of Herat-Meshed segment if surveys indicate it feasible. By telling Afghans all this we will seek to convince Kabul we want to help keep Afghanistan independent

However, State/AID differ from Bowles in several major respects:

1. Bowles wanted a major “psychological” commitment (perhaps $150 million) to new Afghan five-year plan as evidence of our determination to keep Afghans out of Soviet trap. Bowles saw this commitment as a major confidence builder, while actual outlays would still be contingent upon satisfactory project applications. As you know, AID reacts viscerally against such commitments unless forced. Moreover, State is anxious to keep pressure on Afghans to settle Pak/Afghan differences.

2. State/AID are unwilling to go forward full tilt with development of alternative Iranian route, which they regard as highly expensive and unlikely to be ready in time to help Afghans much anyway.

3. Most important, State/AID propose indirect pressure on Afghans by telling them that shipment of large tonnages via Iran is “impractical and uneconomic. Therefore, on any major projects we tell Afghans we propose to ship the necessary commodities to Karachi on assumption they will reopen frontier. Most big US aid projects, e.g., Kabul-Kandahar road, are in this category. Bowles, of course, strongly opposes any such tie between US aid and transit issue.

Steeves has come in with a long dissent to this last; he says Afghans will size it up immediately as US pressure and greatly resent it (Kabul 624 attached).³ Therefore, he feels that forthcoming nature of rest of our approach will be largely nullified by news that US will ship in supplies for major projects only through Karachi. He urges that we simply omit this angle. Indeed, he argues that if we are going to use such pressures on the Afghans, we should “light as many fires as possible in all Afghan quarters to bring internal pressure to bear on Daud.”

As between the Bowles/Steeves approach and that of Gaud/Talbot, I favor the latter. For us to tell the Afghans that we will do everything possible to help them, including an all-out effort to open up an uneconomic Iranian route, is tantamount to telling them that we will support them irrespective of their quarrel with the Pakistanis, thus removing all incentive to compromise. In effect, we’d prolong the dispute rather than damping it down. Moreover, so far as effective help to Afghanistan is concerned we can only provide it over the Iranian route at great excess cost and delay, at any rate for several years until a good road can be built.

Therefore, if we are to compete effectively with Soviets in Afghanistan, re-opening of the Pak route seems essential. We cannot really get the Afghans to do so until we get them to recognize that staying out of the Soviet embrace is more important than pursuing Pushtoonistan dispute. Moreover, with so many problems looming between us and Ayub, should we add to them an insulting indication that we will help the Afghans regardless of what they do on Pushtu issue? In sum, while all concerned agree with Bowles that US should make a major effort to help Afghans stay out of Soviet clutches, the rest of us disagree with him on tactics.

Finally, I gather that Bowles himself is pleased with his half a loaf; he did get a pretty forthcoming set of projects which will clue Afghans that we’re still interested, and enough movement on Iran route so Afghans see a partial alternative to total dependence on Pak door to West. True, we thus fall between two stools but the modest bait we’re dangling before Afghans may whet their appetite for more.

Ergo, no need for a “needle” on Bowles’ behalf. About the only useful handle would be an NSAM requesting State to due the President on US policy, and then a confrontation before JFK (I suspect he’d come down on Talbot/Gaud side too). So I see no WH action indicated at this time, but will keep in close touch.

RWK

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, 5/1/62-5/15/62. Secret.
1. In an April 26 memorandum to Rusk, Bowles argued that it was important to recognize the danger of further Soviet encroachments in Afghanistan and necessary to move vigorously to bolster Afghanistan’s traditional neutral status. To that end, he advocated continued support for Afghan development projects and the establishment of an alternative transit route through Iran for U.S. aid materials. He anticipated that the impasse in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan would be lengthy. On April 30, Bowles sent a copy of the memorandum to the White House under cover of a letter to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid., 3/25/62-4/30/62)
2. Dated May 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.0089/5-462)
3. Dated May 6. (Ibid., 811.0089/5-662)