Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

98. Message From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan⁰

Washington, November 15, 1962.

My impression from our talk this evening¹ is that you see the advantages of our going ahead with our plan on Yemen but are concerned over (1) the lack of any provision for simultaneity in the proposed withdrawals by the several parties; and (2) the impact of our recognition on the current delicate situation in Aden.

Before discussing these, let me review the next plays as we see them. The key elements of our plan are:

1. Expeditious and phased withdrawal of the UAR forces from Yemen;

2. Termination of external support to the royalists; and

3. Withdrawal of Saudi-Jordanian forces from the vicinity of the Yemeni border.

In effecting withdrawal we envisage direct contact between the parties concerned, the good offices of a third party, or possibly recourse to the UN in some form.

I would propose to address identical private messages to Nasser, Faysal, Hussein and Sallal urging the above scheme and proposing that the following initial steps be taken simultaneously:

1. US recognition of the YAR.

2. A UAR statement signifying its willingness to undertake a reciprocal disengagement and expeditious, phased removal of troops as Saudi and Jordanian forces are removed from the border and their support of the royalists is stopped.

3. Public YAR reaffirmation of its intention to honor international obligations, seek normalization of relations with neighboring states, and concentrate on domestic affairs.

Once Nasser and Sallal issue their statements, we would recognize. Our purpose in doing so without waiting for Saudi and Jordanian acceptance of the proposals is, quite frankly, that we believe only the shock action of our recognition will bring Faysal and Hussein to abandon their venture. We fear that prior detailed agreement from all parties on the nature and terms of disengagement is impossible of attainment.

I sense, however, that your chief concern is over the immediate impact on Aden. I should hope that the Yemeni statement called for above would go far toward permitting you to portray it as a pledge of non-intervention in Aden. We could, however, go further and ask Sallal to disavow specifically any designs on neighboring territory, including Saudi Arabia and Aden.

I think we could also reasonably ask Nasser to press this point with his Yemenis, though we are not sure Sallal would agree. If he did, it would of course justify your recognition too, and greatly ease any pressure on Aden.

Would you have any objections to our going ahead on this basis? I, of course, can’t guarantee that our plan will work, but even paper promises from Nasser and Sallal will give us more to build on than if we delay much longer and then end up having to recognize without even these.²

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, President Kennedy’s Correspondence with Prime Minister Macmillan—1962–1963, Volume II. Secret. A typed note at the top on the source text reads: “To be delivered at opening of Business November 16.”On November 13, during a meeting with Rusk, Lord Hood asked that the United States delay plans to recognize the Yemen Arab Republic. Rusk responded that the United States was reluctant to delay recognition beyond mid-November. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, 786H.00/11–1362) That afternoon, Lord Home telephoned Rusk to convey British concern over Aden and the need to get something from Nasser in exchange for U.S. recognition. Rusk said that the United States would not recognize without a public UAR commitment to begin prompt disengagement. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) On November 14, Macmillan sent a message to Kennedy asking that the United States withhold recognition until the UAR presented a timetable and a final date for complete withdrawal. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Official Correspondence with President Kennedy)
1. A record of Kennedy’s side of the 6 p.m. conversation is in a memorandum for the record, November 15. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Macmillan Telephone Conversations, 10-62–11–62) During the exchange Kennedy indicated that he realized that the U.S. proposal on Yemen was “full of hopes, but believe Egypt has enough force to make a revolution successful. We can postpone recognition, but will we be better off a week from now than we are now?”
2. In Macmillan’s November 16 response, he expressed the hope that Nasser’s statement on phased withdrawal would be made as concrete as possible, Sallal’s statement would disavow designs on Aden and contain an appeal to Yemenis in Aden to behave as law-abiding citizens, and the United States would delay its announcement of recognition to allow time for debate within Yemen over British merger proposals. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Official Correspondence with President Kennedy)