Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

97. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, November 13, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Rationale for Our Proposed Course of Action on Yemen

(Ambassador Badeau telephoned at 10 a.m. today, referring to the defection of 4 Jordanian pilots with planes and stating his fear that unless the formula we proposed November 10 for the Yemen is implemented promptly the UAR will change its mind.)

In creating our approach to the Yemeni problem (Tab A)¹ we had in mind the following:

1) While the royalists may be able to control part of Yemen, we doubt their ability to conquer the principal centers, whatever the support received from Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Continuation of a serious civil war would only lead to greater complications. Termination of outside support for the royalists would reduce the scale of the conflict.

2) The UAR is heavily committed, both materially and in prestige. Unable to afford a serious setback the UAR will be forced to take whatever measures it considers necessary to assure the survival of the Republican regime, including extension of hostilities to Saudi territory.

3) We believe the Republican regime and the UAR will prove willing to call on the Soviets for effective assistance if it proves needed. Several hundred Soviet advisors and technicians are already in Yemen.

4) Our actions should not appear to favor restoration of the discredited Imamate.

5) The fabric of Saudi and Jordanian stability is strained by their participation in the Yemeni conflict. We consider it essential that both concentrate on internal reforms and development.

6) By obtaining public commitments from both the UAR and the YAR, the former to phased disengagement and the latter to concentration on internal affairs, we shall have a basis for exerting leverage, particularly psychological and economic.

7) It is unrealistic to expect the UAR to start reducing its forces before the Saudis and Jordanians disengage. Total withdrawal of UAR forces cannot be expected until a measure of stability is achieved in Yemen.

8) Our principal concern is not Yemen itself at present (barring a serious Soviet threat). Rather we are concerned to maintain stability in Saudi Arabia and Jordan and to prevent serious pressures on the UK base at Aden.

9) By our measures of open support for Faysal and Saudi Arabia (President’s letter, visits of military aircraft and naval vessels) we are promoting stability in Saudi Arabia and are underlining to the UAR the seriousness of our purpose, explained several times orally to UAR officials.

10) We consider the proposed circular letter to Faysal, Hussein, Nasser and Sallal as a needed appeal and symbol to which response can be made. In the absence of such a letter of appeal, favorable actions by the parties would be much more difficult.²

11) We consider our recognition of the YAR, in conjunction with the President’s letter, as the catalytic action which will lead to normalization of the Yemeni situation. Other major nations will follow suit plus a good many smaller states. Impact of our recognition on Saudi Arabia will have been reduced by our measures of open support.

12) We believe the UAR is under considerable strain and would like to disengage. Further, we believe that as a more normal situation is created in Yemen, there will be frictions and stresses between the Yemeni Republicans and the Egyptians which will reduce the role of the latter in Yemen.

13) Finally, our AID mission in the Taiz area is having difficulties, which could become serious if recognition is withheld much longer.

Delay in U.S. recognition of the YAR stemmed originally from our concern for Saudi Arabia and the uncertain internal situation. We wished to wait until Faysal returned to Riyadh and formed a government. Then when in early November we began preparing for recognition the UAR bombed and shelled Saudi Arabian territory near the Yemeni border (November 5–6). At that time the UK also asked us to delay recognition until after the Parliament debated the Aden Federation on November 13 and to give the UK time to consult the protectorate rulers. We agreed to wait until November 15 but indicated further delay might be difficult.

Something is needed to break the vicious cycle. We are in the best position to do so. While the UAR will have a “victory”, pursuit of proper domestic policies in Saudi Arabia and Jordan should protect those regimes. We believe that there should be no thought of trying to inflict a defeat on the UAR or to weaken it. The consequences would be unhappy.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/11–1362. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Strong.
1. Not printed.
2. On November 14, Brubeck transmitted to Bundy the text of a draft message from Kennedy to Faysal, King Hussein, Nasser, and Sallal. Brubeck’s covering memorandum reads in part: “The Presidential message is proposed in conjunction with moves which were reported to the President in a memorandum from the Secretary dated November 12 recommending United States recognition of Yemen.” (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–1462) The November 12 memorandum is Document 95. A November 14 memorandum from Komer that transmitted the memorandum to Kennedy advised: “State’s proposals are well worth the try.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yemen, 10/63) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen. For text of the letter as sent, see Document 100.