Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

92. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM-875–62

Washington, November 9, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Possible US Military Support to the Saudi Arabian Regime (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-20659/62, dated 17 October 1962, subject as above.

2. In the present situation, the exact nature of the threat to the Saudi Arabian Government is not clear. It is difficult to divorce the problem within Saudi Arabia from the external problem, particularly as it arises out of the Yemen affair. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the situation with a view to determining those objectives toward which US military measures within Saudi Arabia might be applied. Proceeding from the basic assumption that the US interest is to maintain the existing Saudi Arabian Government, they conclude that the following objectives are appropriate:

a. Strengthen the reciprocal confidence and loyalty of the armed forces and the monarchy.

b. Identify and neutralize subversive elements seeking the downfall of the Government.

c. Deter the United Arab Republic (UAR) from exploiting any apparent success in Yemen.

d. Defeat any overt aggression from the UAR, or elsewhere.

3. In furtherance of these objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following US military measures as being appropriate:

a. Instruct the Chief, United States Military Training Mission (USMTM), to consult closely with the leaders of the armed forces of Saudi Arabia, to inform them of US support for the Saudi Arabian Government, to impress them with their responsibilities to the Government, and to emphasize the necessity of assuring the loyalty of all personnel.

b. Continue visits by MIDEASTFOR ships to Saudi Arabian ports, to include visits to Red Sea ports on the basis of about one ship per month.¹

c. Utilize Dhahran Air Base for US forces now scheduled to participate in CENTO air defense exercises, 13–21 November 1962.

d. Offer now to conduct joint exercises with Saudi Arabia in 1963 if the world situation in 1963 permits and make public announcement once the offer is accepted.

e. Assign appropriate personnel to the USMTM to evaluate the subversive insurgency situation and to recommend a program to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in counterinsurgency.

f. Provide assistance as required to deploy some of the F-86 aircraft now at Dhahran to Jidda and to maintain the aircraft while Saudi aircrews operate in an air defense role. Before undertaking this operation, the Chief, USMTM, should report a reasonable degree of assurance that defections will not occur.

4. CINCNELM has prepared contingency plans for the Middle East based upon introducing various levels of force depending upon the situation. These plans would provide additional US military measures, if implemented.

5. In making the foregoing recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasize the following related aspects of the problem:

a. US actions in Saudi Arabia should continue to support the objective of insuring availability of Saudi Arabian oil to the Free World on acceptable terms.

b. Military measures in support of the present Saudi Arabian Government may be largely ineffective unless that Government is capable of sustaining the loyalty of the armed forces and finding an effective base of support within Saudi Arabia.

c. US actions in support of the Saudi Arabian Government could be viewed as support for the restoration of the Imamate in Yemen. A clear understanding should be concluded with the Saudi Arabian Government as to its future plans with regard to Yemen.

d. US recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic may make it difficult to implement a cooperative effort toward maintaining the existing Saudi Arabian Government.

e. US military interests in Saudi Arabia would be adversely affected if the Saudi Arabian Government were to adopt a hostile attitude due to lack of US support in the Yemen crisis. In particular, the loss of already limited US use of Dhahran Air Base and the forced withdrawal of the USMTM would deprive the United States of important assets in the Middle East.

f. An effort should be made to establish an identity of strategic interests with the United Kingdom in this situation, not only in sustaining the Saudi Arabian Government but in other situations likely to arise out of the Yemen crisis.

g. As a quid pro quo for US support, the United States should extract an acceptable USMTM agreement, an agreement to continue US use of Dhahran Air Base, and at least a promise on the part of the present Saudi Arabian Government to inaugurate reforms.

6. A detailed examination of the situation from a military point of view, toget her with the alternatives available, is attached as an Appendix.² CINCNELM and USCINCEUR have been requested to comment.³

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

John A. Heintges⁴
Major General, USA
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

0. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 1962 Files, 9180/3100 (19 Oct 62). Secret.
1. On November 10, the JCS instructed the U.S. destroyer scheduled to visit Jidda to proceed there as soon as possible, to transit the Suez Canal without informing Egyptian authorities as to its destination or mission, to maintain contact with the U.S. Ambassador in Jidda, and to avoid public statements. If asked to patrol the coastal area near the Saudi-Yemeni border, “the purpose would be to discourage, by its presence, UAR hostile naval actions against Saudi territory.” The destroyer’s command was instructed not to “maneuver in a manner threatening UAR naval ships,” but if fired on to take “appropriate defensive reaction.” (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5811/11–1062)
2. Attached but not printed.
3. The views of the JCS in this memorandum were transmitted to CINCNELM and USCINCEUR in JCS telegram 7336, November 10. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Saudi Arabia) CINCNELM cabled its concurrence to the military objectives on November 10. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 7275, Middle East Policy 1957-1964)
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Heintges signed the original.