Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia⁰

Washington, November 7, 1962, 7:46 p.m.

225. Ambassador should immediately call on Crown Prince Faysal and 1) express concern with which US views UAR bombing of Saudi villages and shelling of Muwassam; 2) state USG has indicated its grave concern to UAR;¹ 3) USG preparing appropriate military measures to underline its Saudi commitment. (FYI. Measures include destroyer patrol Saudi Red Sea coast and visit US aircraft Dhahran. Latter likely be in form visit 2 B-66’s or 6–8 F-100’s within week. Other possible arrangements include joint US-SAG military exercises in Saudi Arabia later in FY 63. End FYI); 4) USG agreeable loan SAG 11 F-86’s at Dhahran for duration crisis together with maintenance and limited operational assistance, provided SAG guarantees their use limited purely defense purposes, and provided operational assistance confined well inside Saudi border (however, we must first sign agreement being cabled immediately); 5) USG willing allow use limited quantity rocket warheads if guaranteed not to be used for offensive operations outside Saudi territory (FYI. Unclear whether warheads located Saudi Arabia. Please clarify. In any case wish insofar possible drag our feet on this. End FYI) and 6) USG will make strenuous effort to effect termination all outside military participation Yemen and we counting on SAG cooperation. USG cannot refrain indefinitely from recognizing YARG but will not do so in immediate difficult circumstances.

Assure Faysal, as he earlier informed in US, USG has deep and abiding interest in stability Saudi Arabia and its progress. US wishes demonstrate this interest in variety of ways and continues to welcome Prince Faysal’s suggestions. Among measures contemplated are following:

(a) Presidential letter—(in earlier telegram)² which Ambassador should deliver. Should Faysal wish to reply this letter and agree make public, we would propose early release of correspondence. FYI. If Faysal reply raises extraneous issues such as attack on Nasser and Palestine problem preferable have no reply since this would disrupt our plans for publication President’s letter. We wish make latter public. On line 2 second para of letter delete word “reasonably.” End FYI.

(b) Civic actions—As President informed Faysal, USG making plans initiate civic action program. As plans crystalize Ambassador will discuss further with Faysal.

(c) Technical assistance. USG wishes be as helpful as possible in assisting SAG move ahead rapidly on economic development program and has taken careful note recommendations US Economic Survey Team. We prepared assist in finding experts in appropriate fields interested in temporary service with SAG who can aid in work of Supreme Planning Board and SAG ministries. FYI. Department and AID consulting on five recommendations contained part II Jidda’s 321.3 AID has no funds for technical assistance or grant activities in Saudi Arabia in FY 6/3/. AID/W assistance will have to be limited locating personnel.

(d) Nature US commitment. USG officials Washington made clear to Faysal vital US interest in Saudi Arabia would justify full US support for Saudi Arabia’s integrity and preclusion of active outside intervention. We wish Faysal fully understand our commitment to Royal Family as such contingent upon progress and reform in Saudi Arabia and does not connote preservation Saudi Royal Family at all costs. US pleased at evidence of serious intent carry out reforms. USG fully accords with Faysal’s view that SAG requires tranquility in order cope with internal affairs. President alludes such need in his letter and USG, while deploring disruption SAG-UAR relations, will use its best efforts bring about accommodation. FYI. We leave to your discretion how best to handle this. Perhaps discussion this subject should await subsequent talks with Faysal. We fully endorse your recommendation we arrange occasional visit to Saudi Arabia of distinguished Americans and note such arrangements would be facilitated by modifications SAG visa policies which President raised with Faysal (Deptel 142).⁴ Also endorse your recommended reform measures (Jidda’s 321)⁵ and leave to your discretion method and timing presentation to Faysal. End FYI.

FYI. Until receipt reports of UAR bombings and shelling of Saudi territory, we had planned inform Prince Faysal, King Hussein and UAR this week our intention recognize YAR November 15, after House of Commons debate on Aden federation plan. However, we now forced postpone discussions leading to recognition since would appear to be giving in to UAR use of force and would be totally unacceptable Faysal while UAR forces attacking Saudi territory. Our efforts must be focussed on somehow securing disengagement outside forces involved Yemen conflict with recognition to follow. In your discretion you may inform Faysal our concern opposition in Jordan to Hussein’s efforts aid in restoration Imamate and our hope that he will not further involve himself lest very fabric Jordan state be seriously weakened.⁶ End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.54866/11–762. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Strong, Kettelhut, Quinn (DOD), and Gaud; and approved by Grant. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, Dhahran, Taiz, Aden (by pouch), and USUN.
1. Telegram 487 to Cairo, November 6, instructed Badeau to inform Ali Sabri that reports of recent bombings of Saudi Arabia were of “grave concern” to the United States and, if true, would greatly complicate early resolution of the Yemen problem and U.S. recognition. (Ibid. 686A.86B/11–662) Telegram 492 to Cairo, November 8, instructed Badeau to seek an interview with Nasser to discuss the Yemen situation. (Ibid., 786A.5486B/11–862). Telegram 208 to Taiz, November 10, instructed Stookey to impress upon Yemeni leaders that the United States was satisfied with Saudi assurances that no Saudi troops were fighting in Yemen. (Ibid., 686B.86H/11–762) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.
2. Document 88.
4. Telegram 142 to Jidda, October 6, contained a summary of Document 71. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/10-662)
5. Reform measures mentioned in telegram 321 from Jidda, October 31, included: eliminate the extravagance [text not declassified] of the Royal family; establish mechanisms for increased popular participation in government; eliminate the power of [text not declassified] religious officials; accelerate the government’s decisionmaking process; permit economic development program to get underway; reduce bribery and graft in government; improve the administration of justice; intensify efforts to improve the Saudi educational system; restrict expansion of the government bureaucracy; and abolish slavery.
6. Hart met with Faysal on November 8 and delivered the 6 points of the first paragraph of this telegram. Hart then gave him the letter from Kennedy as directed in the next paragraph. Hart reported that Faysal appeared satisfied with the U.S. response. (Telegram 120 from Dhahran, November 9; Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/11–962) Hart continued the discussion with Faysal on November 10 and 12, leaving until the final meeting the execution of his instructions in paragraph d of telegram 225. Hart reported that Faysal “took this in excellent spirit and without making direct response dwelt on some of problems he confronting in pushing ‘fundamental’ reforms amid protests of still powerful religious leaders on one side and clamor of urban elements for changes of ‘secondary’ importance such as ‘cities of entertainment.’” (Telegrams 362 and 374 from Jidda, November 10 and 12; ibid., 786A.5622/11–1062 and 611.86A/11–1262)