Office of the Historian

380. Special National Intelligence Estimate0

SNIE 30-4–63
Washington, December 4, 1963.

THE UAR MISSILE PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL

The Problem

To estimate the probable developments in the UAR missile program over the next five years, and their implications for Israel.

Conclusions

A.
By mid-1964 the United Arab Republic (UAR) may be able to deploy a few surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) capable of reaching Israel, but these missiles would probably have no more than a 500-pound payload, and a CEP on the order of 5–10 miles. They would not have nuclear warheads, and their military value would be trifling. (Paras. 1–6)
B.
Over the next five years, the UAR will doubtless seek to produce more, and more accurate, SSMs. Because of high costs, inadequate production [Page 826] facilities, and shortage of competent personnel, we believe that the UAR is unlikely to deploy more than a few hundred SSMs, and the figure could well be substantially less. (Para. 7)
C.
Israel’s leaders claim that UAR missiles, despite their inefficiency, could seriously affect Israeli morale and disrupt mobilization, thus enabling UAR conventional forces to overrun Israel. In view of the inaccuracy, limited payload, and limited reliability of the UAR missiles, we believe it extremely unlikely that any UAR missile attack would have such serious results, at least for the next five years. (Paras. 10-13)
D.
Israel has contracted with a French firm for 250 sophisticated SSMs [1 line of source text not declassified]. While the factors which have inhibited a new outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities in recent years still apply, the progress of the advanced weapons programs will raise tensions on both sides. In an atmosphere of this kind, there will always be the danger that one side or the other might initiate hostile action. (Paras. 14–15)

[Here follows the Discussion section of the Estimate; for text, see the Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

  1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Near and Middle East. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on April 17, except the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

    A December 10 memorandum from Komer to Bundy indicates that Komer requested that this estimate be written “as basis for our responding to Israelis that we do not see UAR rocket development as posing threat Israelis claimed.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Central Files, Vol. 2) The memorandum is in the Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute.

    ↩