379. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (Badeau)0
Dear John: We have been pondering answers to the different questions you have raised in your letter of November 16,1 especially in light of events of the past few days.
At this time, there is no precise picture of what the effect of the Gruening Amendment is going to be. As you have pointed out, aggression [Page 823] is a subjective term. No one has been able to define it successfully, not even the United Nations after fifteen years of debate. The broader concept of preparing for aggression is even more difficult. Before President Kennedy’s assassination, the Administration was examining how to put a better perspective on the Amendment, possibly by (1) having a statement in the Conference report interpreting the sense of Congress which would stress the importance of the President’s judgment in determining whether aggression in fact exists, (2) seeking an amendment of the PL-480 Act which would permit transactions under this Act notwithstanding the Gruening Amendment in the Foreign Assistance Act, and (3) interpreting the provisions of the Gruening Amendment in a strict and properly narrow sense.
The Administration is of course sensitive to the fact that the Amendment could become a tool for opponents or pressure groups seeking to put it on the defensive. The Amendment almost puts the executive in a position of having to argue publicly with Congress whether aggression did or did not take place or justify why a determination was or was not made. President Kennedy’s press statement of November 14 made clear that the executive branch must have freedom of action to deal with problems as they arise. In President Johnson’s statement to Congress on November 27,2 he specifically referred to the need to preserve executive flexibility in the conduct of foreign affairs. We have recommended that the President issue a statement at the time the Foreign Aid Bill is signed in which he will comment on problems posed by this legislative action and of his intentions to employ his authority according to a strict and careful definition of aggression and aggressive intent. Although the House-Senate Conference now meeting to review the Foreign Aid Bill has not acted to change the Farbstein-Gruening Amendment, it has acted to remove a number of other mandatory strictures which had been placed in the Aid bill. Also, we now have a letter from Congressman Farbstein confirming the interpretation we had already placed on the Amendment; namely, that it leaves the initiative in determining aggression to the executive.
Since the application of the Gruening Amendment requires Presidential determination and we can expect that the President will wish to use this authority judiciously, it should not significantly alter our current aid relationship provided the UAR does not take action which could be classed as aggression in the full sense of the word and require the President to make a determination. Providing military assistance to a country that has requested it, such as Algeria, would probably not be considered aggression if this was all that was involved. The same could be said of the [Page 824] Yemen. However, when the UAR bombs Saudi territory, or refuses to withdraw from a Demilitarized Zone surveyed by the United Nations, or violates Saudi airspace with its military aircraft, the determination of whether aggression has occurred becomes more difficult. Certainly the pressure to make such a determination increases.
To answer your questions more specifically, our analysis to date indicates a determination of aggression under the Gruening Amendment would affect both AID and Public Law 480 Title I assistance. As regards the former, no further fund obligations, either for new or continuing activities, could be incurred and it might be necessary to reconsider further implementation of activities under way in light of the Congressional policy expressed. This would mean examining each project on a case by case basis. The provision of the amendment prohibiting sales under PL-480 would probably preclude issuance of further procurement authorizations pursuant to the Title I agreement. There is some possibility that assistance under programs sponsored by voluntary agencies (Title III) may still be possible in whole or in part. Now local currency loan obligations would probably be precluded. Since the statutory language is significantly different from previous “termination of aid” provisions, the precise legal effect may not be determined for some time.
Our new President’s views regarding an economic aid relationship with the UAR frankly are not known to us. If his statement to Congress on November 27 is any indication, he will wish to avoid precipitating a crisis through halting of aid. However, since the ability of the Administration to pursue this policy will depend a great deal on the image that the UAR projects in the United States, we cannot expect that the President will want to be called upon to argue away ill-conceived actions which the UAR may take. As you have correctly surmised, Congressional attitudes toward U.S.-UAR relations have been affected by events outside of the Arab-Israel dispute and your moves to point out that Zionism alone is not responsible for the Gruening Amendment are well taken.
If you can avoid discussion of the Gruening Amendment for the time being with Dr. Kaissouni or other Egyptians, that would be best. I cannot overemphasize the importance of not identifying President Johnson’s Administration with my view of the Amendment before the President has had opportunity to examine the matter in detail. You can, of course, make clear to Dr. Kaissouni that it remains our purpose to stand by our commitments, and we hope to continue to operate our aid program on a “business as usual” basis. However, the three requirements which we indicated to Dr. Kaissouni last October still remain and no new commitments can be expected until we can see effective action in these three areas. In the meantime, it should be recognized that the Yemen developments have made it increasingly difficult for us to rationalize effectively our aid policy toward the UAR. If progress does not occur, we [Page 825] face the very real danger of eventual Congressional action directly to ban aid to the UAR.
With kindest personal regards.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 218, UAR, AID 1. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Dickman on November 29 and cleared in draft by Davies, Gaud, and in substance by Williams and Phillips.↩
- Not found.↩
- For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, pp. 8-11.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩