There have recently been increased public rumblings of Arab opposition to
Israel’s imminent diversion of Jordan waters.1 Despite the threats, however, it is far too soon
to predict with certainty how far the Arabs will attempt to proceed in
practice with their long-standing announced determination to stop Israel at
all costs.
On present balance, we think there is a somewhat better than even chance the
Arabs will not initiate military action over this issue. Some action in the
United Nations seeking to inhibit the Israelis is more likely. The UAR, which is pivotal, does not wish war with
Israel now. Certainly Lebanon does not, even though President Chehab fears all the Arabs might be drawn
into military action by the slightest misstep of one. Particularly if we
succeed in our current efforts to ensure Jordan’s utilization of its
allocation of Jordan water, the latter will have a national interest in
moderation.
Syria, and to a lesser extent Iraq, will be the problems. The temptation to
externalize domestic problems and embarrass Nasser, the sense of support that impetuous Syrian military
elements will derive from the Syro-Iraqi military union, even the impact of
Baathi ideology itself, will create a real danger of Syria’s stepping over
the brink regardless of the counsels of the United States and other states.
The Syrian tactic might be a limited military action in the hope of
impelling either support by the other Arabs or a prompt United Nations
intervention to forestall Israel reprisal. In the latter case, Syria would
then be free to make a maximum propaganda uproar internationally and in the
United Nations in an effort to halt Israel’s action. To deal with this and
prevent escalation of any limited conflict, we consider strengthening of the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) peace machinery to be of utmost importance. The UNTSO Chief of Staff, General Bull, has made recommendations to this
purpose and is expected to report to the Secretary General in December on
his progress in implementing these. At the
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same time firm reaffirmation of United States
intentions to prevent or put a stop to any aggression and of our belief that
Israeli diversion is consistent with the rights of other riparians,
generally, and the 1955 Unified Plan, specifically, should be made to Arab
leaders periodically in the hope of deterring them from any foolhardy
ventures. If military action and reaction can be forestalled, the success of
our support of Israel in any United Nations consideration of the diversion
should be manageable, particularly in light of the preparatory measures
already taken or under way.
There is enclosed a more detailed study of past, present, and contemplated
United States actions regarding the Jordan waters problem.
Attachment3
EVOLUTION OF THE JORDAN WATERS PROBLEM
Background of the Unified Plan
Recognizing the explosive potential of this problem, the United States
acted through Ambassador Eric Johnston during 1953–55 to prepare a
comprehensive plan for Jordan waters development that would protect the
interests of the Jordan riparian states: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and
Israel. In 1955 virtual agreement was reached on Johnston’s “Unified
Plan”, but one or two small allocational problems were left hanging.
Efforts to tie these up lapsed in October 1955 when the Arab League
Council shelved the Plan, despite approval by Arab technicians, on
grounds that its ratification would be tantamount to recognition of
Israel.
After 1955, the United States changed field. Instead of making further
efforts to win general agreement on the Unified Plan, we quietly
provided “piecemeal” aid to the riparians for national water structures,
in each instance in exchange for assurances that these did not conflict
with the Plan. In the period 1955 to date we provided some $50 million
to Israel and $13 million to Jordan.
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The Maqarin Dam
As of 1961, the major structural component of the Unified Plan remaining
to be initiated was a storage dam and Maqarin on the upper reaches of
the Jordan’s major tributary, the Yarmuk, which constitutes the border
between Jordan and Syria. Convinced of the merits of proceeding with as
much implementation of the Unified Plan as we could get; aware that
Jordanian farmers might suffer if the Israelis began upstream diversion
before compensatory structures had been built to help Jordan; sensitive
to the $50-13 million imbalance in the United States assistance to the
Israel and Arab sides, respectively; and anxious to involve an
international agency in the Jordan waters problem to serve as a
technical escape valve in anticipation of the day when Israel would
begin diversion; we privately told King Hussein in September 1961 that we would look favorably
on his going ahead with the Maqarin Dam and would assist him in finding
international financing for the dam which we estimated would cost $65–85
million. Subsequently, we encouraged IBRD interest. In March 1962, we stimulated an unofficial
visit to Jordan by Sir William
Iliff, then IBRD Vice
President. On Jordanian request, Iliff tentatively acknowledged that the Bank might play
a partial role in Maqarin, but he insisted on a full engineering survey
as prerequisite.
Regrettably, the Jordanians were compelled to make haste slowly. Syria’s
consent had to be sought, since the dam abuts on Syrian territory. King
Hussein displayed
considerable skill in winning this consent in the face of constant risk
that he might be accused of implementing the Unified Plan, but it was
not until May 1963 that Jordan, with the help of a loan from Kuwait, was
able to conclude a feasibility and engineering contract with a Yugoslav
firm.4 We understand the
engineering design will not be completed until the spring of 1965.
Nevertheless, we have recently reminded the IBRD of our hope that it will display a sympathetic
interest in this project.
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Assurances of Support to Israel
Concurrently with these efforts to help Jordan catch up, the United
States on June 13, 1962, pledged support of Israel’s diversion provided
the diversion stayed within Unified Plan allocations. A number of steps
were initiated to make this support effective and dissuade the Arabs
from making diversion a casus belli.
Preparations to Support Israel
1. Israel Statements
In July 1962, we suggested to the Israelis that they begin to use the
following four themes in occasional public references to this problem:
(1) belief in the desirability of unified, equitable development of the
Jordan waters in a manner benefiting all riparians; (2) willingness to
discuss unified development with other riparians at any time; (3)
Israel’s intention to hold its withdrawals to a level which will protect
traditional usages and rights of Jewish and Arab in-basin users even
though international agreement on unified development has not yet been
reached; and (4) willingness at any time to accept international
observation of its Jordan water usage provided the Arabs do likewise.
All were designed to cast Israel’s actions as “on the side of the
angels” and facilitate our support. Israel has used three of the themes
but balked at the fourth, which is fundamental to the Unified Plan. We
think such a statement is quite important in presenting an appearance of
virtue, particularly since the Arabs will tend to suspect United States
statements that Israel is staying within Plan allocations.
2. Criddle Survey
Concerned over the fact that with completion of Maqarin still four to
five years in the future Jordan would suffer when Israel began extensive
withdrawals upstream, both we and the Israelis began thinking of
measures that might minimize Jordan’s problems. (Israel’s concern
presumably stems from recognition that a genuinely aggrieved Jordan
might provide the Arabs with good grounds in international law either to
call for suspension of Israel’s diversion or for damage payments.) In
May 1963 the Israelis came to us unofficially with some interesting
proposals about what Jordan might do. In June-July, we sent Mr.
Wayne Criddle, an internationally respected
hydrologist who had worked with Ambassador Johnston from the beginning,
on an unpublicized trip to Jordan and Israel with the twofold purpose of
(1) providing the United States with firm technical assurance that
Israel’s intended actions were consistent with the Plan, and (2)
evaluating Israel’s suggestions for remedial measures in Jordan.
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3. Criddle Report
Mr. Criddle’s report confirms that Israel is so far
within Unified Plan confines. First test of Israel’s withdrawal system
will begin early in 1964. First sustained withdrawals will take place in
early summer 1964 but remain at a low level for at least a year
thereafter. Equally important, the report built on the Israeli
suggestions of May in pointing to several ways in which Jordan could
improve its situation in the interim before completion of Maqarin if it
could count on scheduled Israeli releases, from Lake Tiberias, of water
allocated to Jordan under the Unified Plan.
4. Criddle Report
Implementation
We propose to put Criddle’s suggestions quietly to Jordan (a) at the
highest level by an Ambassador Macomber-King Hussein approach, and (b) thereafter by asking Criddle
to sell Jordanian technicians on his ideas. Mr.
Criddle is, in fact, already corresponding with
the Jordanian technicians to this purpose. Before going to the
Jordanians officially, however, it has been essential to take up with
the Israelis the one or two small loose ends concerning allocations
which have been unresolved since 1955, as these directly affect the
amount of water Jordan was given to understand it would receive under
the Plan. On October 10, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jernegan opened talks with Israel
Ambassador Herman. We hope to complete these in a month and then go to
King Hussein. If we are
successful, the result will be to increase Jordan’s all-important vested
interest in a quiet acquiescence in Israel’s diversion and lessen the
chances that Jordan, denominated under the Unified Plan as primary
rightful beneficiary of the Jordan water resources, will add its voice
to Arab opposition to Israel’s plans.
5. Other Preparations
Given (a) Israel’s private official assurance to us that it will stay
within the Unified Plan, (b) Mr. Criddle’s
technical confirmation that this is presently the case, (c) Israel
public statements that put its intentions in an internationally
unexceptionable light, (d) measures afoot to protect Jordan, including
Maqarin construction with IBRD and, as
necessary, United States and other Free World financial help, (e)
studies showing the consistency of Israel’s actions with established
international water practice and law, (f) rebuttals for expected Arab
arguments, we will have the firmest possible base for representations to
the Arabs (and in appropriate world capitals to win support) to show the
futility of efforts to stop Israel. The converse of this will be
encouragement of the Arabs to proceed with early utilization of their
equitable shares of the waters. Premature representations, however,
might well exacerbate the anticipated Arab reactions. The just concluded
Istanbul Conference of Near East Chiefs of Mission has concurred in our
general approach.
