351. Memorandum From Robert W.
Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
Washington, October 30,
1963.
Mac—
I am most concerned lest Komer’s war
is well on the way to becoming Talbot’s war again. The combination of Faysal’s stubbornness and
of U Thant’s reluctance to do his job
is leading to the demise of UNYOM and with
it our painfully constructed disengagement scheme. However rickety these
expedients have been and however poorly carried out, they are still a far
better road than the alternative of renewed clashes between UAR and Saudis which I see in prospect.
Now that SYG’s report is out, IO and USUN are
most reluctant to go for SC action (I beat up
Harlan1 for
an hour this afternoon). They think we should wait and see if things flare
up again before going to the SC. I regard
such a hiatus as highly dangerous—why would Faysal be so dead set against
anteing up $200,000 unless he intended to renew supplies to the royalists?
If he does, it is almost certain Nasser will resume bombings
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if not worse. We, of course, will withdraw Hard
Surface, thus appearing to desert Saudis.
Time is short, since U Thant is already
starting to dismantle UNYOM. Attached is
my view of bidding. Could you tell Rusk he ought to grab hold of this one before it is too
late? I have reserved JFK’s desire to clear any course of action, but first
step is to get Rusk to decide between
NEA and IO.
Attachment2
We must decide now between essentially two courses of action on Yemen.
U Thant has reported to the
SC that UNYOM is to be withdrawn by 4 November because Saudis
haven’t agreed to extension. Faysal probably won’t voluntarily sign on,
though he might not reject extension if thrust on him.
- A.
-
One course would be to let UNYOM die on 4 November, banking instead on SYG’s substitute of 20-man
observer/political team led by a senior UN official. We could simultaneously call on both
parties to continue disengagement scheme. This approach might
give the UN more leverage on
Yemeni internal politics, though leaving little buffer between
the UAR and SAG. We’d wait and see, however,
whether fighting (and UAR
bombing) flared up again. If so, we’d ask SC to put in a real peacekeeping operation.
Advantages: (1) We could pull out our
squadron (on grounds it tied to UNYOM presence) or tell Faysal we’d pull it out if
he resumed aid;3 (2)
we wouldn’t have to keep prodding both sides so hard to pay up,
and comply; (3) we avoid merely postponing issue another month
or two, at which point we’d probably have to go through this
wholly messy business again.
Disadvantages: (1) We lose leverage on
UAR to pull out, since
disengagement much harder to police; (2) if Saudis resume aid,
we risk renewed UAR bombing and
resultant pressure on us to help Saudis; (3) with UNYOM dismantled, chances that a
better UN buffer can be created
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later are dim—risk
of Soviet veto later, when UAR
is under the gun, are greater than now. So if Faysal resumes aid
and we pull our squadron out, we risk giving Nasser a green light to resume
bombing (unless we warn him unmistakably that doing so will cost
him US aid or lead to US defense commitment to Saudis). But do
we want to offer these hostages?
- B.
-
Alternate course is to get a new SC mandate for UNYOM right now, counting on Faysal’s reluctance to
buck the UN. We could call on the
SYG to finance it out of
UN funds.
Advantages: (1) We optimize chances of
keeping war damped down by maintaining UN buffer in between; (2) we avoid dilemma of
whether to withdraw our squadron and risk crisis of confidence
with Saudis; (3) we keep onus for wrecking disengagement and
resuming aid clearly on Faysal; (4) we buy a little more time to
get political solution working; (5) we retain excuse for keeping
pressure on Nasser to
withdraw.
Disadvantages: (1) We create trouble with
Faysal by going against his grain, though keeping squadron there
should avoid an even worse blow-up; (2) by going to SC, we raise whole thorny issue of
SC approval for financing
SYG’s peacekeeping
operations; (3) we draw down our capital with SYG, who’s obviously reluctant to
get too involved.
I conclude that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.
Advantages of trying to keep war from flaring up again in first
place (thus facing US and UN with
even tougher decisions) outweigh those of getting out from under
a faltering disengagement scheme. More preventive diplomacy just
looks better than risking another blowup.
In fact, why couldn’t we get best of both worlds by going to
SC now for a new broadened
UNYOM mandate, instead of
waiting for situation to deteriorate? This minimizes risks,
while maximizing our continued leverage on situation.
