323. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- Near East Arms Limitation Probe—Next Steps
At the time Mr. McCloy met with you on July 23,1 to report on his discussions with President Nasser, we had planned that the next steps in our probe of Near Eastern arms limitation would be taken in Israel and the UAR in September. Circumstances have changed sufficiently in the meantime so that I believe it would be better not to send Mr. McCloy to Israel now. Rather, I suggest that we await the results of Ambassador Badeau’s approach to Nasser shortly after his imminent return to Cairo.
We can look at the arms limitation problem in slightly longer perspective today than seemed feasible last spring. Since that time both the UAR and Israel have signed the nuclear test ban. Prime Minister Eshkol has gone at least part way to meet our request for adequate inspection of Dimona. The potential threat to Israel of an encircling, hostile Arab union has been virtually eliminated with the abandonment of unity talks and public rupture between the Ba’ath leadership in Syria and Nasser. Nasser, once again disillusioned with efforts to create an Arab union, is also confronted with growing economic difficulties at home.
With a little more time at our disposal, we can usefully continue our dialogue with Nasser before asking Mr. McCloy to go to Israel. I would suggest that Ambassador Badeau carry with him when he returns to Cairo a letter from you to President Nasser inviting a written confirmation of the assurances that he had given Mr. McCloy earlier that the UAR would not acquire nuclear weapons or attack Israel. A draft is enclosed.2
The Ambassador would also reemphasize to Nasser the importance we attach to some form of verification in the nuclear field and to restraint in defensive missile production. We would seek to plant in Nasser’s mind the value of UAR adherence to IAEA safeguards for future, yet unbuilt, UAR nuclear reactors, in order to create a lever to move Israel to accede to these safeguards for its nuclear reactors. If we could make [Page 701] some progress along these lines with Nasser, we would be in a stronger bargaining position when in a later probe we sought Israeli assurances not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons from any source.
We should recognize that Nasser’s offer to Mr. McCloy for a public letter of assurance was tentative in nature and that events in the Near East since this offer was made may make it difficult for him to follow through. The recent set-back to Nasser’s unity aims will make him even more sensitive to continued charges by the Syrian Ba’ath Socialists that he has become soft on Israel in return for our aid. However, we see no problem in exploring the matter with Nasser and such an approach would help keep the arms problem before him.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, UAR/Israel Arms Limitation, 08/63–10/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Cane. A handwritten note on the source text by Komer reads: “Pres. approved 9/10/63.” The Department of State copy is attached to a September 10 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, recommending that Rusk sign the memorandum, and indicates Talbot as the drafting officer. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/MCCLOY)↩
- See Document 303.↩
- See Document 324.↩