322. Message From Secretary of State Rusk to Foreign Secretary Home0
Thank you for your message of August 15 requesting my views on UAR activities in Yemen and their effect on Saudi Arabia and the United Nations disengagement operation.1
In our view disengagement is now in process albeit slowly and with continued infractions of the agreement committed by both sides.
UAR troops are being withdrawn slowly but steadily. We believe there has been a net outflow of some thousands of UAR troops. There are good indications that the UAR will carry out additional phased withdrawals in September.
Although we doubt that UAR net withdrawals have been as large as certified by the U.N., we have deliberately avoided any moves that might tend to discredit the U.N. withdrawal figures. Publicly associating the UAR with these figures makes it more difficult for them to reverse the process, however large or small the actual net withdrawal may have been. Moreover, public disparagement of the U.N. figures would give the Saudis an excuse for further infractions on their side. We intend to keep a careful check on the actual outflow and as appropriate will continue to press for greater publicity of withdrawals and also for realistic U.N. verifications.
The flow of supplies from Saudi Arabia to the royalists has been greatly curtailed if not completely halted. Royalist military activity seems to have no central direction and appears to have decreased with curtailment of Saudi support. Following the recent exposure of illegal border crossings, the Saudis have indicated to the U.N. that they will take more stringent steps to prevent supplies from getting to the Yemeni dissidents.
In our contacts with UAR officials we have of course raised the reported bombings of innocent civilians in connection with military operations against the dissident elements. We have made strong representations to the UAR and have emphasized there is no justification for such raids regardless of Saudi infractions of the agreement. We have done so even though it is quite probable, on the basis of information which I can describe to you in New York, that the bombing raids of July 31 and August 12 which occurred within Saudi territory were the actions [Page 699] of zealous pilots spilling over the ill-defined border areas rather than deliberate flouting of the disengagement agreement.
In our view the disengagement operation has deterred not only deep penetrations of Saudi territory by the UAR but also active efforts by the UAR to overthrow the Saud regime by internal means. Largely as a result of the disengagement agreement Prince Faysal today has a greatly improved position inside Saudi Arabia as contrasted to that of six months ago. This has been our prime purpose from the outset of the disengagement effort.
Although we think disengagement is beginning to work, we believe it would be most unrealistic to expect quick results. Some measure of stability in Yemen after the departure of the UAR is in the Saudi interest as well as our own, and internal stabilization may take considerable time. During that time we must avoid any actions that might pave the way for Communist aggrandizement or revive direct UAR-Saudi confrontation in Yemen. In their own interests, both the UAR and Saudi Arabia must be discouraged under any circumstances from deliberately violating the disengagement agreement.
President Nasser probably agreed in April to disengage on the assumption that it would be possible for him to gradually withdraw his combat troops over a period of months without jeopardizing the survival of the YAR. It seems unlikely that he will withdraw to the extent that a republican collapse is certain. However, by mounting international pressure on him to show continuous progress on withdrawal of his troops he has compelling reasons to seek sufficient political accommodations between the Sanaa regime and key dissident tribes to permit a gradual reduction of the UAR forces in Yemen.
We are encouraged by recent indications that the Yemenis themselves may be trying to broaden the base of the regime. We have already informed your Embassy in Washington on a strictly secret basis of our recent endeavors to encourage a detente in relations between the UAR and SAG. So far we have not succeeded, with Faysal in particular dragging his feet. We are cautiously optimistic, however, that by holding both sides to the disengagement agreement and continuing our side efforts to maintain the pace of UAR withdrawal and to encourage a broadening of the Yemeni regime we may yet see a more normal situation restored in Yemen. I need not reiterate in detail our previously expressed view that your recognition of the YAR would facilitate this process.