Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic⁰

Washington, August 22, 1963, 9:35 p.m.

779. Eyes only Chiefs of Mission. View SAG reply to direct talks proposal (Jidda Embtel 203)¹ and in view likelihood SYG’s August 26 report to SC is likely to find performance of both parties less than satisfactory in implementation disengagement agreement, request you seek immediate appointment with Ali Sabri, and state you under instructions from highest levels USG to seek full review of Yemen problem with our views to be conveyed to President Nasser:

1. SAG has informed us it notes and welcomes Egyptian interest in direct discussions and ready meet UAR anywhere, including in UAR. However, continuance of UAR propaganda hostile to SAG is giving SAG problems. Thus we experiencing some delays in persuading Saudis to commence talks.

2. USG not in any way trying absolve Saudis from measure of blame in situation as it has developed. However, we cannot deny a certain validity to Saudi viewpoint re propaganda. Whereas UAR overt propaganda has tapered off to some extent, clandestine broadcasts and UAR official statements continue to attack SAG and members of Saud family. UAR bombings of July 31 and August 12 have naturally exacerbated situation.

3. Aside from propaganda it essential in creating proper atmosphere for talks that both sides abide fully by disengagement agreement and refrain from violations. Information which lately available to UN and USG indicates there some leakage of arms and supplies to royalists, but UN and USG both doing everything possible to see that it is stopped and have been assured of SAG cooperation. In any case UAR bombings or other infractions (e.g. troops improperly in some parts DMZ, limiting observers access to other Yemen areas) of disengagement agreement are wholly unwarranted.

4. It would appear from recent reports UAR-YAR situation improved, Royalist opposition dwindling and that UAR withdrawal can and should continue at expeditious rate. Across-the-border bombings of Saudi territory or DMZ, bombings of innocent civilian populations, or the use of unorthodox weapons are not only morally reprehensible, but in our view lose more for the UAR politically than it would hope to gain militarily. We have real difficulty understanding why UAR which stands to gain so much by UNYOM operations not cooperating. Whatever minor leakage on Saudi side, UNYOM has cut off great bulk of Saudi covert aid.

5. Moreover if troop movements represented as troop withdrawals should turn out to be mere rotations as some reports now claiming, world reaction would be most severe.

6. Another problem is keeping UNYOM going. Saudis have agreed to continue their share of financing but we understand UNSYG has not yet obtained response from UAR. We believe UNYOM has already demonstrated its value and hope UAR will promptly accede to SYG’s request. We fear that if UAR does not favorably respond to SYG’s request within next few days, whole future of UNYOM operation may be called into question. Such a meeting would lead to recriminations, considerably exaggerated publicity with respect both UAR and Saudi violations of disengagement terms, and possibly to more serious consequences. (Suggest you follow up this point with Fawzi or other appropriate official to assure implementation.)

7. If disengagement agreement undermined by the parties, would not only violate solemn undertaking to UN and USG but would threaten direct SAG-UAR confrontation which in interests of no one, would likely escalate conflict and would threaten continued existence YAR.

8. Therefore wish offer following propositions which we think would go far toward improving situation:

a. UAR continue and if possible accelerate withdrawals making certain UNYOM has full facts to enable determine and verify extent net reductions.

b. Maximum publicity be given to withdrawals and intent to honor disengagement agreement in spirit and in fact.

c. UAR military be given fresh instructions (1) to cease across-border or DMZ bombardments, (2) refrain from bombing concentrated civilian populations, (3) refrain from using unorthodox weapons.

d. That UAR terminate all propaganda, including clandestine, against SAG for at least one month. We will ask Saudis do likewise including Yemeni royalist broadcasts.

e. UAR in meantime give further thought to broadening base of representation in YAR regime.

f. UAR continue bear its share of financing of UNYOM and so indicate to SYG as soon as possible.

g. Within a month we would expect Ambassadors Hart and Badeau to have returned to their posts in Jidda and Cairo respectively at which time we will again pursue question direct talks in hope that by then a more propitious atmosphere will have been created. Meanwhile we will continue to press Saudis toward full cooperation with UNYOM in stopping smuggling of arms and money to dissident tribes.²

FYI. Department has conveyed foregoing Ambassador Kamel. End FYI.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Barrow; cleared by Russell, Symmes, Buffum, Lubkeman, Komer (in substance), and Grant; and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Jidda, London, Taiz, and USUN. A copy of an earlier draft of the telegram shows extensive handwritten changes made by Komer. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yemen, 8/63)
1. In telegram 203 from Jidda, August 20, Thacher reported on a conversation with Faisal, in which the Crown Prince reaffirmed a message previously sent through Saqqaf that Saudi Arabia could not holds talks with the United Arab Republic while UAR propaganda continued to attack Saudi Arabia and its royal family. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN)
2. Badeau executed these instructions during a conversation with Hafez Ismail on August 31. (Telegram 537 from Cairo, August 31; ibid., POL 27 YEMEN/UN)