314. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
The Israeli/Syrian flare-up1 has now died down locally, and our best guess is that it will stay quiet while venue shifts to the SC Friday and next week.
From our own and UNTSO observer evidence Syrians seem clearly at fault for killing of two Israelis and starting exchanges of fire. We think Syrian Baath leadership deliberately incited all this as best means of uniting people behind them and short-circuiting Nasserite pressure, since Israel is the one issue that forces all Arabs to unite.
If UNTSO’s formal report puts the blame on Syria, we will favor “severely censuring” Syrians. Reasons for doing so are: (1) Syrian guilt; (2) UN censured Israel for raid last year; (3) above all we want to warn Syrians off before they become too rambunctious (with water issue and UNGA looming); (4) we want to use resolution as basis for strengthening UNTSO, which is badly needed; (5) we want to forestall a possible Israeli reprisal raid, which would seem increasingly likely if crisis continues.
SC will meet tomorrow, but resolution probably won’t come to a vote till Tuesday or Wednesday. Much will depend on whether we think Soviets will veto (dubious at present). We’ll clear final strategy with you.
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Israel—Security, 1961–1963. Secret.↩
- On August 20, Israel requested an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council and asked that the Council condemn Syria for warlike and aggressive actions. The request followed a series of incidents along the Syrian-Israeli Armistice Line, including Syrian refusal to surrender three Israeli civilians taken prisoner on the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias in July, and the ambush killing of two Israeli kibbutz workers north of Lake Tiberias on August 19. On August 21, Syria requested a Security Council meeting, charging Israel with opening fire on Syrian positions on August 20. Both Israel and Syria sought U.S. support for their positions. (Memorandum from Grant and Gardner (IO) to Harriman, August 22; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 ISR-SYR) Additional documentation is ibid., POL 33–4.↩