Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

281. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State⁰

Jidda, June 28, 1963, noon.

1133. For Dept only: To be delivered at opening of business June 28.

1. Hard Surface 28-12–40 June.

2. While CINCNELM well aware problems that could arise during commitment of Hard Surface forces under current mission, following discussion designed to focus attention on particular facet which could pose difficult decision for U.S. once forces in place, and hence offered for advance consideration.

3. During meeting Tuesday between Ambassador Hart and DepFonMin Saqqaf, latter raised question of what U.S. would do if UAR continues to drop bombs on Saudi villages after forces arrive. “Would U.S. wait for UN to act?” he asked. Ambassador replied that U.S. actions governed by Bunker agreements. DepFonMin’s question doubtless inspired by Sunday bombing, first since 8 June, and is indicative Saudis will not let matter rest if additional bombings occur once unit in place.

4. Recurrence of bombings is continuing UAR capability and could be undertaken for political reasons not least of which are embarrassment to USG, offer of proof to SAG that USG will not live up to its guarantees, and evidence to dissident Saudi elements that SAG in fact relying on straw man for its support.

5. Significant point in Embassy view is that SAG not so concerned with specifics of U.S. guarantee as with its broad intent which, as Saudis see it, is that U.S. will get them out of trouble. They neither aware, nor concerned, with limitations of Hard Surface forces, only with what they consider to be spirit of Bunker promises. (See AmEmbassy Jidda 251450Z Apr.)¹

6. We are fully aware here of:

(a) Restrictive nature of Hard Surface mission, reasons for which explained in joint State-Defense message received here as Deptel 830 of 14 June,²

(b) Limited capability Hard Surface units to provide a realistic air defense posture, and

(c) Difficulties within capability of providing air defense with Hard Surface forces, even if later authorized by modified mission.

These limitations will become apparent to Saudis and also to UAR if bombings continue after Hard Surface units in place. Current guidance permits flights over southwest from time to time, but not on daily basis as recommended by Ambassador in Embtel 1077.³ Lesser frequency should suffice so long as UAR refrains from further attacks. However, should bombings continue, Saudis will expect U.S. to act, and if U.S. does not, could be accused of failing to carry out guarantees to SAG by President in letters and through Ambassador Bunker. U.S. prestige, in this case, is on the line, and the dilemma foreseen months ago by CINCNELM becomes a reality.

8. Nub of question is that mission Hard Surface forces is inconsistent with what Saudis believe mission to be. This is not intended as challenge to validity mission assigned by JCS but rather to point out difficulties likely to arise as result this discrepancy. Either Saudis must be apprised real mission and extent U.S. commitment or U.S., and in this case those here on scene, must be prepared with suitable answer to respond to Saudi requirements which exceed current mission.

9. Ambassador Hart cognizant that CINCNELM aware this possibility but believes, and I agree, that this question should receive early consideration in order that appropriate courses of action are plotted to cope with dilemma if it arises. On basis latest mission statement, accompanying guidance contained in Deptel 830, and current delicate atmosphere, it obviously not possible to disclose to Saudis restrictions on Hard Surface units.

10. It is recommended, therefore, that CINCNELM explore with JCS modification of Hard Surface operational restrictions to permit intensified overflights to within 40 miles of border with reduced emphasis on training during interim, such modification to be invoked only if problem arises after units in place; otherwise schedule of training with random flyovers of border and other areas from time to time as now planned would be followed. Would be most helpful if stand-by authority granted to undertake such modified operations as necessary to respond to pressures arising from continued UAR bombings, bearing in mind, of course, U.S. desires to avoid any appearance of hostile action toward UAR. Scheduling would be held to minimum consistent with requirement.

11. It would appear this is type of problem that can best be dealt with locally and under general guidelines for objectives to be attained. Present mission and operating instructions allow little flexibility in meeting this situation. We need maneuvering room which now not available without prior reference to Higher Authority.

12. In consideration of Hard Surface capability, frequent flyovers of southwestern regions are of doubtful value in stopping a determined UAR effort, but they might be sufficiently credible to achieve desired objective of terminating bombings. If not, we must be prepared for the remaining alternative of implementation first phase of CINCNELM OPLAN 200-6. Preliminary conditioning for this eventuality might well be initiated, since, in essence, we will be committed to this route once Hard Surface units are deployed.⁴

13. Ambassador Hart has read foregoing and fully concurs.

Signed Kirkpatrick.

Hart

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–3 US. Secret; Operational Immediate. Sent to CINCNELM unnumbered and repeated to COMAFELM and the Department of State where it was received at 8:40 a.m. The source text is the Department’s copy.
1. Not further identified.
2. Document 272.
3. Dated June 13. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–3 US)
4. At their meeting on July 1, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed telegram 1133 from Jidda, with regard to what future action should be taken in the event that the bombings of Saudi territory continued and the situation escalated. After some discussion, the Joint Chiefs agreed that the Joint Staff would review the directive under which the squadron would operate to ensure that it was realistic. (Note to Control Division by Colonel R.C. Forbes, Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 9180/3100 (27 February 63))