Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

263. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, June 6, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Situation in Iran—Information Memorandum

1. Rioting is continuing today in Tehran and provincial cities; security forces are firing into all crowds.¹ We continue to estimate that security forces will crush rioters, though there is constant danger peasant soldiers might refuse to fire on mullah-led crowds during this season of strong excitation of religious feelings. The Shia hierarchy has in essence launched a civil war against the regime, in reaction to the Shah’s reform program, particularly land reform and women’s rights.

2. The Shah is probably in considerable danger of assassination, particularly if he should leave the palace. His death would bring political chaos.

3. There is no hard evidence of any important foreign role in the uprising. Communist propaganda has been anti-religious and tolerant of the Shah’s reforms; mullahs are traditionally hostile to Russia and to communism. There are slight indications but no real evidence of Nasserite influence; Cairo radio has been agitating in favor of religious and tribal reaction against the Shah and his reform program.

4. There is real and constant danger to American life, particularly of imprudent individuals who venture into the streets.

5. Should the regime be toppled, religious leaders are probably incapable of forming a government, but their power and prestige would be such that any successor government would be neutralist and reactionary, at least in its early stages.

6. Should the disorders be repressed (today’s and possibly tomorrow’s events will be critical in this respect), religion as an active political force in Iran will have been dealt a mortal wound, but the Shah will be even more obliged to produce a quick political success in the implementation of his reform programs, since the destruction of the organized conservative opposition will leave a vacuum of political leadership which communists and pro-Mosadeq elements will try to fill. Long-term economic factors will have to be balanced against the pressure of immediate political needs. The Shah will be likely to press even harder on his reform path rather than to halt or retreat. Elections will in any case be delayed beyond present schedule for early summer.²

0. Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 68 D 100, POL 23-3-a, Civil National Police. Secret. Drafted by Bowling. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that Secretary Rusk saw the memorandum.
1. Topol 1825 to Paris, June 14, reported violent rioting in Tehran on June 5 that spread to other cities following the arrest of Mullah Khomeini and other clerical opponents of the Shah’s reform program. The riots were the most severe since the Mosadeq era and left approximately 200 killed, several hundred wounded, and extensive property damage. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 25 IRAN)
2. According to the record of the Secretary’s staff meeting on June 7, “Mr. Talbot commented that the Iranian Government seemed to have weathered the situation arising from the disturbances in Tehran. The Secretary said that if in fact the Shah is now at a turning point, we should consider whether there is anything we can do to give him some support. He cited possible speeding up of deliveries under current programs or announcing some additional type of economic aid. Mr. Talbot confirmed that this is a turning point for the Shah and said that he would study what we might do.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147) A memorandum from Bowling to Talbot, June 12, contains further comments on the Secretary’s request for actions that demonstrate support for the Shah. (Ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 68 D 51, POL 1 General Policy)