Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

261. Memorandum by the Working Group on Near East Arms Limitation⁰

Washington, undated.

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY

SUBJECT

• Arms Limitation and Control Arrangement for the Near East

I. Problem:

A. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

B. Both Israel and the UAR are also devoting increasing efforts to the development of strategic missiles. Israel will shortly overtake the UAR’s present lead.

C. Israel, meanwhile, is seeking greater degree of security assurances from the U.S. through a public security guarantee.

D. The UAR’s compulsion to counter such developments is likely to bring it into increasing dependence on the Soviet Union for its security.

E. Nuclear proliferation in the Near East, if allowed to continue unchecked, will reduce U.S. capability to intervene. It will also have a disturbing effect on world stability leading other larger countries to feel they must develop their own nuclear capability.

II. Objective:

That the U.S. obtain Israel and UAR agreement not to acquire, at a minimum, (1) nuclear weapons and (2) surface to surface strategic missiles, and that the U.S. maintain unobtrusive, reasonably simple surveillance by the consent of the parties, which will complement their own efforts.

III. Plan of Action:

A. Undertaking an Initial Approach:

1. The Presidential emissary will undertake a secret probe, arriving in Cairo for a three day visit early in June, thence proceeding to a third country and returning via Israel. Both Nasser and Ben-Gurion will be apprised in advance by Presidential communication and firm assurance will be sought from both to keep the approach secret.

B. Tasks:

1. To impress on Nasser and Ben-Gurion the President’s serious concern over the Near East arms race and the inherent risks if it escalates to nuclear levels.

2. To probe the motivations and ways to establish a simple and unobtrusive arrangement which would (a) ensure both the UAR and Israel that unconventional armaments (principally nuclear and offensive missiles) are being eschewed, and (b) would not entail interference with forces necessary for national security or programs for peaceful research in atomic energy or outer space.

3. To establish a basis for continuing a secret dialogue on the problem.

C. Topics to be Discussed:

1. Introducing the subject to Nasser (Tab A).

2. Introducing the subject to Ben-Gurion (Tab B).

3. Our general estimate of the UAR and Israel’s advanced weapons programs (Tab C).

4. Possible arms limitation or control arrangements, both public and private, with attendant verification arrangements required for such schemes (Tab D—ACDA papers) which might be supplemented by (1) a more explicit assurance by the U.S. of the integrity of Israel and the Arab countries and (2) possible assistance for certain independent detection capabilities (Tab E). Primary emphasis will be on nuclear weapons and offensive missiles (Tab F—Range of Approach) but the discussion could also cover other areas such as bacteriological and chemical warfare weapons which are not considered to be a major threat (Tab G—Scientific Evaluation: Chemical, Biological, Radiological Weapons in the Near East).

5. Possible cooperative programs with the U.S. in the fields of atomic energy and outer space as a means of verification.

6. Suggestions on how Nasser might deal with Arab public opinion if an arrangement on arms limitation were to become public (Tab I).

7. Press guidance in case of a leak (Tab J).

8. The next steps which might follow an initial approach. (Identifying a local point of contact.)

9. The need to keep the approach secret.

D. Tactics:

1. While indicating our desire to be flexible, suggest that the key for controlled armaments is a quiet competent third party for the negotiation and implementing phases and stress the services which the U.S. can provide.

2. Indicate that no formal agreement is expected between the UAR and Israel; however, U.S. bilateral arrangements with each party would be expected at a minimum. At a later date, similar bilateral arrangements could be sought with other Near Eastern countries.

3. During the first round of the talks, if the Israelis should raise the subject of a security guarantee, emphasize that the longstanding U.S. interest in Israel’s security is well known to the Prime Minister and a willingness to listen to Israeli views on the subject. Indicate, however, that progress on an effort to limit the development of sophisticated weapons in the Near East should not be tied to other issues any more so than we have tied our nuclear test proposals to the issues of Berlin and conventional disarmament. Also stress that a favorable Israeli attitude toward cooperation [1 line of source text not declassified] will be of critical importance, in fact virtually a condition precedent, to our serious consideration of his request for a more formal security assurance.

If there are positive indications during the first round that some adequate arms limitation arrangement might be developed, it might be appropriate to indicate, but only in the second round, that we might in due course be prepared to go further in providing some security guarantee to support the independence and integrity of each country, either by Presidential letter incorporating a unilateral statement of policy or by Executive agreement (Tab H).

E. Areas of Caution:

1. Avoid commitments or implied commitments relating to (a) more economic assistance (other than possible assistance in the field of nuclear energy or outer space), or (b) filling demonstrable gaps in defensive weapons. These would be subject to review after a workable arrangement could be developed.

2. Avoid spelling out possible sanctions which might be attendant to any proposed scheme, but record any suggestions (Tab K).

3. Do not support any proposal for direct confrontation or communication between Nasser and Ben-Gurion. If assurances of the bona fides of the other are requested, point out that this should become apparent as the dialogue for an arms control arrangement develops.

F. Special Areas for Study and Recommendation:

1. The degree of interest and sincerity of Nasser and Ben-Gurion to an arms limitation approach and their initial reaction to the range of the problem.

2. The arms limitation and inspection scheme most likely to succeed, whether the U.S. role should remain a unilateral one and the role of a security assurance in such a scheme.

3. The incentives which may be required.

4. The advisability of using State visits for Nasser and Ben-Gurion to further impress them of the President’s determination.

5. Steps to follow up the initial approach.

IV. Favorable and Unfavorable Factors:

A. Nasser:

1. Favorable

a. Has a great deal to gain since Israel has both a head-start and a far greater capacity in the nuclear field and will soon overtake the UAR in missile development, whereas the UAR’s ultimate advantages lie in conventional fields;

b. Is not asked to give up existing weapons;

c. Will seek to obtain U.S. estimates of Israeli capabilities and monitoring of French involvements since he now lacks capabilities in these areas.

d. Will wish to be responsive to the U.S. since he will perceive advantages in encouraging the flow of U.S. aid and avoiding undue military and economic dependence on the Communist bloc;

e. Will foresee some future tactical advantage in building his stature in the Afro-Asian bloc as a world statesman opposed to nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation; and

f. Is under considerable and growing strain to allocate his small economic resources to development in order to cope with his rapidly increasing population and to meet its rising expectations.

2. Unfavorable

a. Will fear that if he is placed in the position of appearing to make peace with Israel, it will be ruinous to his position in the Arab world.

b. Will suspect that the approach has been prompted by domestic U.S. political pressures aroused by the recent furor over German scientists in the UAR and that we are merely preparing the ground to give Israel a security guarantee.

c. Will fear that the arrangement might (i) weaken his position of leadership in the Arab and African world which require the UAR to be the strongest military power of the area, (ii) starve the military appetite for the latest and best in military equipment, (iii) weaken UAR military deterrence capabilities both with the East and West, and (iv) rob the UAR of its ability to develop its own weapons program.

d. Will fear appearing to be the tool of the U.S.

e. Will suspect that covert arrangements between the French and Israelis will continue in the nuclear and missile field despite any agreement.

f. Will lack confidence in the constancy of U.S. policy and remain suspicious that US-UAR relations remain very tenuous (e.g., attacks in Congress and the press, delays in fulfilling economic commitments, military measures to support Jordan and Saudi Arabia).

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

B. Ben-Gurion:

1. Favorable

a. Will be more receptive to firm U.S. pressure since he is aware that Israel is, ultimately, dependent upon the U.S. for security and so seeks to increase U.S. involvement;

b. Recognizes the extent of U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation and will seek to maximize his advantages within this context if he cannot circumvent it;

c. Might recognize that while early development of nuclear weapons offers Israel some major defensive advantages, it could be quickly self-defeating by forcing UAR to turn to the Soviets on Castro-like terms, and by providing the Soviets, or even Chicoms, with a golden opportunity for providing a nuclear guarantee for the Arab Near East;

d. Due to Israel’s proclaimed peaceful aims and desires to build a national home, wishes to divert funds to developmental projects if this can be done in security; and

e. Will perceive no danger to Israel since, if successful, Israel’s security will be enhanced; he may think that, if unsuccessful, what Israel regards as U.S. flirtation with Nasser will likely be ended.

f. Will find a U.S. security guarantee, even though conditioned upon Israeli agreement to an arms limitation arrangement, to be a powerful incentive.

2. Unfavorable

a. Will view the approach with suspicion as it would mean giving up a tremendous, realizable increase in Israel’s capability and rob Israel of a useful psychological weapon at the moment.

b. Will consider that the effect of the arrangement would inhibit Israel’s freedom of action.

c. Will take the stance that this approach is unacceptable unless and until Israel first receives a public and written U.S. security guarantee coupled with joint military planning, access to U.S. weapons, and the demilitarization of the West Bank of Jordan.

d. Will seek to make use the approach as a device to gain support for other Israeli objectives both major and minor, namely: (i) continued high level U.S. economic aid; (ii) support for “direct negotiations” resolution in the UN; (iii) disavowal if [of?] UN resolutions on the refugees; (iv) avowal by the U.S. of its willingness to use economic aid to the UAR as a means of insuring compliance with Israeli objectives (boycott, Suez transit); and (v) identification of the U.S. with Israel’s technical and aid programs in other countries.

V. After the Initial Approach:

A. If both sides wish further exploratory talks, a small staff will be sent to the field to lay the groundwork for the second approach, probably in July or early in August.

B. A fourth country will be brought into the picture if the nature of the response justifies it. (Tab L—Role of France and Soviet Union.)

VI. What We Hope To Eventually Accomplish:

A. While the emissary would describe different alternative schemes for arms limitation—both public and private, unilateral and multi-lateral—we would ultimately hope to wind up with the following largely secret arrangement:

1. An undertaking by both sides not to develop, test, manufacture, or import nuclear weapons or surface-to-surface missiles which would be “strategic” in terms of the Near East.¹

2. Peaceful nuclear programs and scientific space research programs would be declared and subject to safeguards, with the nuclear program preferably subject to IAEA safeguards.

3. A cooperative arrangement for prompt access for U.S. technicians to any potential production facility for nuclears or missiles considered suspicious by the U.S. or the other country [1 line of source text not declassified].

B. The non-importation requirement would be intended to preclude stationing on the territory of the two countries foreign troops equipped with such arms. The non-development and testing requirement would also preclude either side from conducting this activity within a third country.

C. The inspection systems devised to accomplish this purpose would not be elaborate or formalized. A few technical personnel would be assigned to our Embassies. Visits by technical personnel would be supplemented by normal U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities.

VII. Side Benefits Even if Approach Fails:

A. Even if we do not succeed, we will have a better idea of conditions and likely sticking points by both sides for an arms control arrangement. If we should undertake another initiative in the future, we will have an important point of reference.

B. Educative effect. Both Ben-Gurion and Nasser will have a better appreciation of the problem, economic costs, and risks involved if they try to develop unconventional weapons.

C. We will have greater freedom of action in the Near East to pursue unilateral means to stop nuclear escalation.

0. Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, JPG Master Copy Probe # 7 Jan 1963 (Arms/McCloy). Top Secret. Presumably this is the memorandum Komer forwarded to President Kennedy on May 31; see Document 260. Thirteen attachments, none printed, contain additional guidance on a variety of issues related to the arms limitation initiative. A handwritten note at the top of the source text reads: “The Secretary. (Return directly to Grant).”
1. The UAR’s present missiles are largely show pieces which it might retain for that purpose. Present UAR missile development would be re-directed toward prestigious outer space programs. [Footnote in the source text.]