260. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
Here is State’s scenario for our UAR/Israel arms initiative.1 Read especially p. 4ff on how we’d approach BG and Nasser.
The basic reason why Nasser might buy would be that Israelis are way ahead of him in nuclear field and will soon catch up in missiles. So he has a lot to gain. As to BG, our greatest leverage is that he wants a guarantee plus arms from us; nuclear self-denial is a price he knows he’ll have to pay anyway, since we won’t stand for proliferation. Ergo, he might accept a deal that gives him at least some assurance Nasser will be denied this option too.
The arrangement we propose is designed to be the least painful and visible which will still do the job: (1) It would cover only nuclear and “strategic” missiles, so as not to take away birds in the hand; (2) it would be tacit, private, and involve only separate arrangements with the US, not formal UAR-Israeli agreement; (3) it could be reasonably well policed by us, if both sides merely agreed to give us access.
Even so, I’d give this only a 50/50 chance at best. The basic suspicions of both sides will be hard to overcome. But we have no better idea of how to meet an urgent need, and it buys us time to stall on Israel security guarantee. Last but not least it provides a cover for such a guarantee: (1) if Nasser buys we tell him we have to give one to get BG signed on; (2) if Nasser refuses, we tell him we have to give one to protect Israel. So on these grounds alone it’s worth the try.
If you take McCloy for another job, we’re thinking of Gene Black as envoy. The chief reason for getting someone rolling fairly soon is that Israelis will start pressing us again shortly on the security guarantee.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Israel, 5/17/63–5/31/63. Top Secret/Cane.↩
- Not attached to the source text. Reference is presumably to Document 261.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩