211. Editorial Note
On April 10, 1963, the Department of State transmitted to the Mission to the United Nations guidance for a forthcoming meeting with Secretary-General U Thant concerning the U.N. role in the Yemen disengagement agreement. U Thant was to be fully briefed on the terms of the UAR-Saudi agreement, negotiated by Bunker, and encouraged not to seek Yemen’s formal adherence to the agreement, because Saudi Arabia would object. Rather, Yemen could acquiesce orally to the agreement. The guidance also contained specific suggestions for the size, composition, location, and equipment of the neutral observer mission that would police the Saudi-Yemeni demilitarized zone and verify Saudi Arabia’s suspension of aid to the royalists and the withdrawal of UAR forces. The Department also indicated U.S. willingness to provide logistic support for the mission, but indicated a preference that the UAR and Saudi Arabia or perhaps the Arab League fund the mission, or that funding be taken out of the U.N. budget. (Telegram 2563 to USUN, April 10; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 YEMEN/UN)
[Page 459]On April 12, Bunker met with U Thant in New York and urged that the United Nations proceed with speed in setting up the U.N. machinery to verify the disengagement. U Thant agreed to move quickly once he had obtained concurrence from Yemeni President Sallal to the agreement. (Telegrams 3749 and 3759 from USUN, April 12; ibid.) On April 29, U Thant reported to the Security Council that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen had confirmed their acceptance of the disengagement agreement and that financing for the U.N. mission would come from a special U.N. emergency fund. (U.N. Document S/5298)