210. Memorandum From the Director of the Near East, South Asia and Africa Region, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense (Fuqua) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)0
SUBJECT
- Middle East Situation Report
Ambassador Bunker met with Prince Faysal on 6 April and secured Faysal’s agreement in principle to termination of Saudi support of the Royalists in the Yemen subject to reciprocal concessions on the part of the UAR (i.e. phased withdrawal of UAR forces from the Yemen and termination of UAR attacks on Saudi territory). The complete details of Bunker’s meetings with Faysal and other key Saudi officials are set forth in Jidda 8201 and Jidda 829 (both dated 7 April).2 However, other salient points accepted by Faysal included creation of a de-militarization zone extending 20 kilometers on either side of the Saudi-Yemeni border. Impartial observers, presumably UN, would be stationed on both sides of the DZ to observe and verify the disengagement of forces. No military forces or equipment would be permitted inside the DZ.
In covering the foregoing with Faysal, Ambassador Bunker reports that Faysal still desired to have the U.S. deploy a USAF squadron once the disengagement was initiated. Faysal stated that he preferred that the details of the deployment be worked out by the respective Saudi-U.S. military experts. Subsequently Saqqaf (Deputy Foreign Minister) informed Bunker on 7 April that Faysal wished to officially request deployment of the squadron to Saudi Arabia at least 10 days before “the standing day” of the 2 May Haj pilgrimage, the preferred time to pay obeisance at Mecca. According to Saqqaf, the Crown Prince believed the squadron would provide the required measure of reassurance to the Saudi people.
The Department of State has responded (State to Cairo 2328, 8 April)3 to the foregoing by informing Ambassador Bunker, who is now in Cairo, that we can not meet the deployment deadline requested by the Saudis. State’s position is based on the fact that the prior conditions of [Page 458] deployment were contingent upon the actual fact of disengagement and not their promise. Additionally, State believes that it would be premature to move the squadron before the required follow-on actions are taken to consummate Faysal’s agreement as set forth above. This will require further negotiations with Nasser (who has yet to be informed of the proposed movement of the squadron), Sallal, Prime Minister of the Yemen, and the UN in New York. In short, we are in mid-passage with somewhat brighter prospects then heretofore for resolution of the Yemeni affair and the attendant UAR-Saudi involvement therein. However, there is still some hard and perhaps painful negotiating ahead.4
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Middle East 1963 000.1—. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Stoddart.↩
- Dated April 7. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–3 US)↩
- Reference is to telegram 819 from Jidda, Document 209, which was incorrectly numbered telegram 829 when it reached the Department of State.↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN)↩
- A handwritten note by Strong dated April 8 reads as follows: “On the air squadron to Saudi Arabia, the Pres., PT says, does not want any early action. He wants disengagement to get going & then put it in. I told PT this is our view, we have 2 weeks before ‘ten days prior to May 2’, and we could easily split the difference to April 27, meaning 19 days. I am trying to make sure the Pentagon doesn’t start cranking all over again right now.” (Ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 116, Bunker Mission & UN Effort Other than tels)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩