Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

205. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State⁰

Cairo, April 3, 1963, 10 p.m.

1655. From Bunker. Embtels 1632, 1645.¹ With Ambassador Badeau I called on President Nasser at 1800 this evening for further discussion disengagement proposals as per reftels. In light of two previous talks, had revised proposals to conform to what I believed would secure acceptance from Nasser. Proposals were as follows:

1. Suspension by the Saudi Arabian Government of its support to the Royalists on a date to be determined.

2. Prevention by the Saudi Arabian Government of efforts of Imam’s adherents to continue support from Saudi territory.

3. Cessation of United Arab Republic attacks on Saudi territory.

4. Establishment of a demilitarized zone extending for a distance of 20 kilometers on either side of the demarcated Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border from which military forces and military equipment would be excluded.

5. Within 15 days of Saudi suspension of aid to the Royalists, UAR would begin withdrawal of its troops from Yemen. UAR would continue a phased withdrawal of its forces, in the course of which UAR forces would be withdrawn from field activities to their bases pending their departure from Yemen.

6. Stationing of impartial observers on both sides of the border in demilitarized zone, who would be available as occasion requires for use outside demilitarized zone, to certify suspension of Saudi support activities and outward movement of UAR forces and equipment from Yemeni airports and seaports.

7. Cooperation of UAR, Saudi Arabia, and YAR with Secretary General’s representative or other mutually acceptable mediator in reaching agreement on process and verification of disengagement.

8. Agreement by UAR to exercise its good offices on Sallal to desist from further inflammatory speeches against neighboring countries and to reaffirm his desire to live at peace with his neighbors.

I again urged on Nasser importance of at least simultaneous token withdrawal of UAR troops at time of suspension of aid to Royalists by SAG. He agreed to withdrawal of one or two companies at time of SAG suspension of aid. This would be followed by further withdrawal of battalion within 15 days of Saudi suspension of aid as contemplated in point five above. I did not press again for definite time limit on withdrawal UAR forces since it apparent in last talk Nasser not prepared to put definite termination date on withdrawal. It is my impression, however, that he would like to withdraw as rapidly as possible but wants first to determine whether Faisal carrying out in good faith commitment to suspend aid and to prevent efforts of Imam’s adherents to continue support from Saudi territory.

Nasser also insisted on removal of Imam’s family, consisting of group of 15 in all, from border area, suggesting they retire to Jidda or Riyadh in order to insure against further subversive efforts on their part.

I said that as I did not propose to visit Yemen, I assumed Nasser would be able to obtain acquiescence from Sallal to whatever disengagement conditions were approved by UAR and SAG. I referred to YAR’s separate conditions, e.g., prior recognition of YAR by UK and SAG, and referred to my previous comment that I believed once disengagement took place recognition by UK would follow and that in the long run SAG could not be only holdout. Nasser said he had not yet informed Sallal of our talks but would do so tonight. I proposed to Nasser that I proceed Jidda tomorrow to obtain Faisal’s further view and would then return to Cairo within a few days. He said he would be glad to receive me at any time except Saturday April 6 when all-day meeting scheduled with Syrians and Iraqis.

Comment: In view talk today, changes will be made in points two and five of proposals. Point two would include stipulation of retirement of Imam’s family from border area and point five would provide for simultaneous suspension of aid to Royalists and withdrawal of UAR troops from Yemen. Though initial withdrawal will be a token amount, this more or less what was contemplated from the beginning. While I realize fully difficulties ahead in presentation to Faisal, believe considerable progress has been made from Nasser’s original position and am still hopeful further talks both sides may enable us to move ahead with disengagement. Believe SYG should be prepared to move rapidly in situation. As in previous conversations, although hard bargaining involved, talks were informal, relaxed and moderate.

More detailed message re three talks with Nasser follows. Ambassador Badeau’s excellent and complete Memcons of three conversations should arrive Department Monday.² He has been most helpful here as has Ambassador Hart in talks with Faisal.

Badeau

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Emergency; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Jidda, USUN, and London and passed to the White House.
1. In telegram 1632 from Cairo, April 1, Badeau reported on a meeting with Nasser on April 1, during which Bunker delivered President Kennedy’s oral message (see Document 203). In telegram 1645 from Cairo, April 2, Badeau reported on Bunker’s April 2 meeting with Nasser and Ali Sabri. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN)
2. Badeau’s memoranda of conversations held on April 1, 2, and 3 were transmitted to the Department of State in airgram A-724 from Cairo, April 3 (ibid.); airgram A-732, April 3 (ibid., POL 16 YEMEN); and airgram A-733, April 6 (ibid., POL 27 YEMEN).