204. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
Answer to the President’s query today1 about what we’re doing for the new Iraqi regime is that we’re being as helpful as possible without getting into an unwarranted big new aid program. State feels we’ve gone about as far as we can until the Iraqis can be more specific about their needs.
The new Iraqi regime has made only a vague pitch for economic aid to help justify its crackdown on the Communists. However, it has been [Page 446] tied up with Arab unity negotiations and hasn’t yet re-evaluated the Soviet aid program to isolate projects it might turn over to the West. So the next move is the Iraqis’.
We want to keep our aid on the technical assistance and credit sales level rather than getting into development loans. The Iraqis have adequate capital from oil revenue if they use it wisely. AID has already raised its modest allotment for participant training ($600,000 to $800,000). Also, we’ve told Iraqis we’re ready to help them arrange for IBRD, UN, or private US technical aid; to provide Ex-Im credit; to encourage private US investors and perhaps negotiate an investment guaranty program when Iraqis are ready; and to encourage Western trade.
We’ve already agreed to sell them the 12 helicopters they asked for, and it’s up to them to decide what kind they want (cost range is $4–15 million depending on model). State will probably also approve selling 40 light tanks they’ve requested to replace some we gave them before 1958. A new policy paper awaiting clearance through the Talbot-Harriman echelons draws the line at selling heavy equipment that could be moved through Syria to the Israeli front. However, we see no serious problem in selling light tanks, small arms and ammo, commo equipment, or even transport aircraft if requested. AID and DOD are also considering civic action possibilities, but this depends on Iraqi willingness to let us work closely with their military.
The Kurds may object to our military sales. (We’ve already turned down their request for help—see Baghdad 611.)2 However, we think it’s more important to be responsive to the new regime. Besides, we want Kurds to negotiate a settlement with the new government. If that fails, our interests will be better served if the government can control the Kurds than if the Kurdish rebellion is successful enough to invite Soviet or Iranian meddling.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Iraq. Secret.↩
- According to Legere’s notes of the daily White House staff meeting on April 2, when Bundy asked Saunders, in Komer’s absence, what actions the United States could take to indicate its support of the Iraqi regime, Saunders replied that “Chief MAAG Iraq had recently requested some tanks for Iraq forces, but that the use contemplated for these tanks was probably to help quell Kurdish unrest, and this is something which we do not necessarily want to do. Here the subject dropped.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily White House Memos)↩
- See footnote 1, Document 208.↩